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 i 
Abstract 
 
The thesis analyses the systems, dynamics and conditions of international 
cooperation/non-cooperation in the international community that is embodied 
through international/regional institutions and organisations. As Robert 
Cooper describes, the international community consists of the three worlds in 
which the differences between them may be confrontational in international 
cooperation. While the post-modern civilisation and values are introduced into 
the institutions and organisations for international peace and security, the 
state actors from the pre-modern and modern civilisations and values are 
vigorously defending the traditional version of state sovereignty. Then, all 
these are equally the member of the international community and, as Robert 
Axelrod’s Prisoner Dilemma game sets, neither state actors nor structural 
actors of international relations can escape from it. Therefore, it is hoped that, 
as Axelrod’s theory suggests, the closed community, in the end, produces 
cooperation and a positive peace for a better future for all.  
 In the case studies, the OSCE faces a number of non-cooperative state 
actors, like Russia. An anti-OSCE civilisation exists and is resisting the 
organisational values, while it is staying in the framework. Thus, the 
organisation is suffering from defectors and free-riders. Knowing the limitation 
of the organisation, it still has a space for improvement and a useful function 
which is to provide a long term process to make a non-cooperate actor 
cooperative.  
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Introduction 
 
International and regional peace and security are an area that suspicion and 
doubts are traditionally dominated. The way of overcoming such obstacles 
for international cooperation in the peace and security has been searched for 
such a long time. A number of the major international/regional 
institutions/organisations have been established as an answer for the search.  
 The senses of international security and threats dramatically changed 
when the Cold War ended. It was the end of the domination of hard security 
thinking and the beginning of the post-Cold and modern one in which a 
variety of threats are perceived as security agendas. Some of the threats 
used to be categorised into internal affairs over which the traditional 
Westphalian state sovereignty forbids external interference and were not 
counted as international security threats.  
 Chris Brown notes on security:  
 
‘The basic thought … is that, whether the referent 
object of security be an individual, groups, state or 
nation, ‘security’ is an ontological status, that of 
feeling secure, which at any one time may be under 
threat from a number of different directions.’1  
 
                                            
1 Brown, Chris. (2001). Understanding International Relations. 2nd edition. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and New York: Palgrave. 
p.238. 
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Thus, the security concept is always relative to the given environment, which 
always varies, and our interpretation of it. The end of the Cold War marked 
the great shift of the international environment and of international security 
thinking.  
 The shift allowed international/regional institutions and organisations to 
expand their roles beyond the traditional Westphalian state sovereignty in the 
name of international peace and security. For example, Michael Ignatieff 
describes that ‘since 1991, newly emerging States have followed suit, 
accepting OSCE monitoring of their minority rights performance’, and ‘they 
[do not] see such ‘intervention’ as an infringement of sovereignty, as an insult 
to their dignity as new States’. 2  The expansion of the roles of 
international/regional institutions and organisations means that the space for 
state actors to act egoistically and in self-help manner has narrowed to some 
extent. Although it is not perfect yet, the international community has 
moralised the rule of international law more than before. Human rights have 
theoretically gained the highest position of the law above state rights. The 
democratic governance of states, therefore, is more stressed. Humanitarian 
intervention is arguably legal, if the intervention can obtained a legal blessing 
from the international community.  
 Realists in International Relations (IR) used to say that ‘institutions have 
minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little promise for 
promoting stability in the post-Cold War world’3 Yet, international/regional 
                                            
2 Ignatieff, Michael. (2001). Foreword. In: Kemp, Walter A., ed. Quiet 
Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. 
The Hague, London, and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001. p. xv. 
3 Mearsheimer, John J. (1999). The False Promise of International 
Institutions. In: Brown, M.E., O.R. Coté Jr., S.M. Lynn-Jones, and S.E. Miller, 
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institutions and organisations have clearly widened their presence and 
functions to contribute to the international order and peace and security in 
the 21st century. Then, this has not achieved in exchange of the state actors’ 
presence and roles. As the complication of the international system deepens, 
the system cannot be covered by state actors whose primary purposes are to 
serve their national interests but not necessarily to contribute to the 
international community. The complication of systems tends to call for 
automation and institutionalisation of some parts of the systems to reduce 
the amount of commitment and work for the responsible. State actors are not 
always capable of exerting a full control of the international system, and the 
great powers are not so great as they used to be, even though they may like 
to dictate the course of the international community as they wish. Some 
kinds of threats in the post-Cold War are not always manageable for one 
state, but require international cooperation with other states.  
 Although it means a certain degree of surrender of state sovereignty, 
some great powers have understood the reality and delegated a certain 
portion of sovereignty to international/regional institutions and organisations 
and made them work for the rule of law at the international level. That means 
that the space for international cooperation through international/regional 
institutions and organisations has been expanded in the international system. 
International cooperation, therefore, is becoming more important a subject of 
international relations than before.  
 In general, cooperative actors are a long-term thinker, susceptible for 
the danger of the long-term consequences from a series of momentary, 
                                            
eds. Theories of War and Peace. 2nd printing. Cambridge, Massachusetts 
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realistic, self-help and strategic decisions in the community. The actors build 
up their reputation, do their business and survive. For them, cooperation is a 
viable strategy. However, non-cooperative actors are usually a short-term 
thinker, preferring risking in getting interests “more” than others. Many of 
them consequently lose trustworthiness but do not seem to perceive this as a 
loss. Where does the difference between the two kinds of actors come from? 
This thesis is an analysis on the systems, dynamics and conditions of 
international cooperation/non-cooperation that emerge in the interaction 
between state actors, international institutional/organisational actors and 
international/regional environment in the post-Cold and post-modern era.  
 For some, the term, “post-modern”, seems to be confusing. In this 
thesis, the term, “post-modern,” can be sometimes interchangeably used 
with “post-Cold War’. However, since some parts of the discussion employ 
Robert Cooper’s categorisation of the world in which he uses the expression 
of the “post-modern” world, the meaning of “post-modern” in this thesis much 
weights on the Cooper’s usage. The readers of the thesis are hoped not to 
confuse with bringing any other philosophical discussion on post-modern or 
post-modernity. In addition, international/regional institutions/organisations in 
this thesis are public or inter-state ones, which are usually organised 
between or among the governments of state actors, and working in the field 
of international peace and security. They do not include NGOs or other 
private and commercial institutions/organisations.  
 The attention on “public” is due to the concern of the value of “common 
goods” or “public goods” in the international community, the international 
                                            
and London, England: The MIT Press, 1999. p.332. 
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system and international institutions/organisations. The thesis inclines to 
consider that “common goods” are about the shared interests of a group, and 
“public goods” are about shared interests for all, the whole international 
community or the whole humanity.  
 The thesis accordingly considers institutional effects, roles or 
phenomena that may or may not persuade states to fit them within the range 
that the concept of the post-modern international peace and security permits. 
In addition, it rather takes a position to see institutions as processes and 
social spaces to generate the change of values and norms, borrowing the 
ideas from liberalism, institutionalism and sociological IR. As the subject of 
international institutions working in the field of international peace and 
security, the thesis employs the Organisations for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) as a case study, though other international/regional 
organisations may appear for some purposes. The OSCE equips with some 
features of a process and social space from its initiation and provides an 
appropriate example of a post-modern international/regional peace and 
security institution. The OSCE takes a value-based approach and has the 
problematic Former Soviet Union (FSU) region inside where the change of 
norms and values are needed in pursuit of the post-modern concept of 
international peace and security. The FSU republics therefore form another 
subset of the case studies.  
 
The Thesis Structure 
 
In thinking of international cooperation at the public international level, 
Chapter 1 of the thesis focuses on state actors who are the primary actors in 
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international relations and cooperation. In cooperation, what is the biggest 
problem is how to invite and keep non-cooperative actors into cooperation. 
State actors are sometimes described as self-help, since to maximise their 
individually national interests may require to defect from or free-ride the 
system of cooperation. Thus, the chapter introduces a theory of cooperation 
mainly from Robert Axelrod’s theory. It also refers to Robert Cooper’s 
distinction of the three worlds that usefully serves for identifying the quality of 
states and state’s preference. Chapter 2 takes a look of international/regional 
institutions and organisations as public actors in the international community. 
How is their publicness produced? Where do the different degrees of 
publicness come from? In what way does the geographic limitation of the 
public actors determine the quality of the public actors and cooperation/non-
cooperation of the institutions and organisations? Cooper’s three worlds 
again become useful in thinking of international/regional institutions and 
organisations. Chapter 3 features the OSCE. The organisation is given a 
variety of limitations that can be explained through the visions of Barry Buzan, 
Ole Wæver and other scholars on regional security complexes (RSCs). The 
post-modern features of the organisation are traced through the institutional 
process to develop into a regional organisation with the post-modern ideas 
on some of the principles of international relations, such as state sovereignty.  
 How do the limitations and the potentiality of the post-modern ideas 
play out? Chapter 4 and 5 are the case studies about the relations between 
the OSCE’s values and Russia and between the OSCE’s way of navigating 
the peace processes of the Caucasian frozen conflicts and the biased 
mediators who are hiding their ulterior purposes in the processes. Both of 
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them are about public actors which aim at promoting cooperation for peace 
and non-cooperative state actors. Finally, bringing the example of 
cooperative state actors from the cases of the Baltic states, the Conclusion 
argues about the importance of the value systems of actors, the necessity of 
the shift of the actors’ values into the post-modern ones, and expectation 
towards international/regional institutions and organisations in the process of 
the potential shift. 
 
 
  8 
1: Theories of Cooperation for 
State Actors  
 
When thinking of international/regional institutions and organisations as a 
means of cooperation and a way of organising the international community, it 
is natural to start looking at what they consist of. They consist of some actors. 
This chapter considers who they are and how and why they act in the way 
that they do. With the consideration, it is argued how cooperation can be 
produced, preserved, destroyed and restored.  
 There are several types of actors at the international level. They are 
states, inter-governmental organisations which are usually called 
international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
celebrities and international corporations. States and international 
organisations belong to the public sector and NGOs, celebrities and 
international corporations do so to the private sector. While NGOs 
theoretically work with non-profitable things, international corporations 
pursue commercial gains. 
 These actors can be divided into two categories: active actors and 
structural actors. An active actor is an actor who acts as a coherent unit and 
shows their collectively individual will like a personality, while a structural 
actor is an actor who works as environment surrounding and influencing 
active actors though it is not so much capable of expressing its will, if has, 
due to its non-personal nature. Although some newly identified active actors 
invited to the international level in International Relation (IR) theory after the 
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Cold War, such as international NGOs, state actors are still the dominant 
actors in international relations both in the theory and reality. As a unit, a 
state is so convenient to be described as a human-like entity and personified 
as a person and personality in discussions. Up to a point, this approach is 
useful for a theoretical simplification and not so problematic. Nevertheless, 
from some point, it becomes necessary to examine the qualitative 
differences among state actors for a better and accurate understanding of 
situations.  
 This can be said in discussing about international cooperation. State 
actors are the main actors in international cooperation, even in the case that 
the cooperation is carried out through international institutions, organisations 
or regimes. Headed by the government, they respectively act as a quasi-
person usually speaking with the representative’s one voice, though they are 
actually a collective in which holds internal competitions and dissensions 
across the groups, strata and interests of the people. These internal affairs 
are put aside when they speak out to the international community at the 
public level. This was a reason why realism used to be able to completely 
separate international relations from internal affairs of states on theory. 
Nevertheless, internal affairs actually have effects to state’s behaviours at 
the international level. Along with the development of communication and 
transportation technology, the connection between “internal” and 
“international” over state’s behaviours has become clearer than in and before 
the Cold War. 
 As long as such an internal quality of states affects state’s behaviours, 
it is essential in understanding international cooperation to examine the 
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quality of states. What affects the quality? What makes state actors 
cooperate or not cooperate? Why do one state’s behaviours and mind sets 
differ from other state’s ones? At the present time, it is a fact that some 
states are regarded as cooperative, and some are not. State actors are not 
so qualitatively monolithic as realism used to presume for its theory 
construction. This chapter concentrates on state actors.  
 For some state actors whose cooperative thinking and behaviour are 
normalised, reasons for making international cooperation may not need to be 
clearly and precisely reasoned in each occasion. They instinctively or 
normally know that starting from cooperation is a better strategy to extract 
cooperation from others, even though they do not exactly know what the 
cooperative actions result in. A problem in explaining such cooperative 
actors is the today’s cynical value that discredits moral virtue. In the modern 
minds, moral virtue or moral excellence seems to be taken as ridiculous, 
naive and, therefore, less plausible in persuading that cooperation can be a 
realistic, positive and logical choice.  
 In the ancient time, for example when Plato lived, however, moral virtue 
could be a great reason for sacrificing individual’s, group’s or state’s interests, 
no matter how ridiculous it sounds today. It was the time when a different 
value system was working, when the way of thinking weighted on more 
honour, duty or face than material gains (or, in other words, honourable, 
dutiful and moral acts could earn what the ancient thought as gains), and 
when even a democracy was run by a small number of elites (with the 
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ancient value) in society.4 At that time, cooperation could be explained 
simply in the light of moral virtue and obtain a certain degree of approval. 
 Yet, this type of interpretation of cooperation is outdated or out of 
fashion today. Although honour, duty or face can be counted as gains or 
interests, it is done so in a lesser significance at the theoretical level. Moral 
virtue can be taken as a fantasy in accounting for international cooperation, 
in particular, in the field of international security, even though there are a 
number of multilateral or bilateral international cooperation in the field, such 
as the UN, NATO or the OSCE. Therefore, theory of international 
cooperation must demonstrate why cooperative state actors are cooperative. 
Then, of course, there are non-cooperative state actors. On non-cooperative 
state actors, IR theory may have been eloquent, since it is much easier to 
find out reasons why they are negative about and reject cooperation. 
 There are many who are used to think that cheating and defecting in 
relations are more realistic and logical a choice to defend at minimum and 
expand one’s interests at maximum, even though they are morally negative. 
There is also fear on free-riding, bargaining problems, collaboration problems, 
coordination problems and opportunistic behaviour. Facing such 
transactional costs, cooperation can be looked as a too risky strategy and 
not productive, if state actors concentrate on maximising their interests. This 
mode of thinking is a reflection of the zero-sum game thinking that tends to 
recognise that “one’s gains are other’s losses.” And an explanation with the 
zero-sum game theory for an event is relatively easy to demonstrate the 
                                            
4 Kreeft, Peter. (2003). The Modern Scholar - Ethics: A History of Moral 
Thought (The course guide of an audio lecture book). Boston College. In 
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reasons of why defection to earn gains is understandable in particular in 
international relations.  
 Nevertheless, since the post-Cold War era has been witnessing the 
expansion of international cooperation, it is important why the cooperation is 
increasing involving with the state actors whose the character or preference 
is possibly weighted on non-cooperative. State actors as a whole are usually 
considered as self-help, realistic and rational actors in IR and international 
security. While this monolithic assumption may be controversial, in particular 
about the definition of rationality, the reasons of cooperation by the non-
cooperative state actors should be the core in the theory of international 
cooperation, since what is concerned most is against non-cooperation actors.  
 If state actors are divided into cooperative and non-cooperative, what 
creates the difference of the state actor’s character or preference? The 
following section considers this point as the starting point of exploring 
international cooperation.  
 
1.1: Environments for Cooperation: The Pre-
modern, Modern and Post-Modern Worlds 
 
What creates the differences among the state actor’s characters or 
preferences in relation to international cooperation? State actors do not have 
any genetic reason in the biological sense about the question. Nevertheless, 
they do have reasons in an externally environmental sense. First of all, in IR, 
the external environment of a state matters. As a tradition of IR, there is an 
                                            
particular “Lecture 2: Being Good and Being Traditional: Why Do We Call It 
"Ancient Wisdom?””, pp.11-15. 
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assumption that state actors are in an anarchic world, and the anarchy 
shapes the preference of state actors. State actors, in a sense, are forced to 
acquire a certain set of characters or preferences. 
 There are, at least, two versions of anarchy that have been proposed: 
realist and liberal anarchies. While these two schools of thought in IR may be 
conflicting at the level of the basic assumptions, the conflict in theory gives 
us a clue about why state actors have different preferences. Realists in IR 
assume that: (1) ‘“the international scene is properly described as an 
anarchy – a multiplicity of powers without a government,”’ (2) ‘the primary 
actors are independent states whose domestic hierarchy (sovereignty) 
complements international anarchy,’ and (3) ‘the lack of a legitimate 
international source of controlling authority means no restraint – where moral, 
social, cultural economic, or political – is sufficiently strong or general either 
to eliminate completely or manage reliably conflicts of interests, prestige or 
values.’ 5  In order to fit to this realist violent anarchic international 
environment, it is supposed that the primary state actors are needed to be 
self-help, strategic and realistic about state’s physical survival if they survive 
in international relations. It seems to be very difficult for state actors in the 
realist anarchic world to be friendly or amicable in a greater degree. 
 The realist view on actors is theoretically limited largely to state actors 
and ignores the differences among states in terms of the scale of territory 
and economy, the capacity of military and the influence to international 
politics. Nevertheless, some of states behave as realists prescribe, some of 
regions in the world lack “a multiplicity of powers” with a number of failed 
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state’s governments, and there is no “sufficiently strong or general” restraint 
“either to eliminate completely or manage reliably conflicts of interests, 
prestige or values”. For example, Russia tends to behave in an imperial 
mode over the former Soviet Union (FSU) republics and sometimes 
overdoes it. Its gas blockade over Ukraine threatened the gas supply over 
Central and East European states several times in the last decade. Africa 
and Central Asia are a full of failed states where the nominal governments of 
the states compete each other without taking a clear lead. Then, in many 
cases, these regions seem to be troubling in solving their own problems 
without having a capable government. The realist anarchy fits to some part of 
the current global reality. 
 Yet, in the post-Cold War era, this is not the whole and full picture of the 
world and the international community. Despite the current Euro crisis, 
Europe with the European integration project through the EU is the most 
institutionalised region in the world where the self-help nature of states is 
significantly curved in the name of the unity of Europe. At least, within the EU 
Europe, there is no concern about inter-state war. Interference of internal 
affairs is basically through the institutionalised EU system, so that there is no 
unexpected issue to happen, though there may be inconvenient and/or 
unwelcome issues that require the policy adjustment of the member states 
concerned. The disarray of the EU members, when exists, is carefully and 
delicately managed by diplomacy within the member states. Ironically, 
however, that might be one of the causes of why the Euro system is in 
danger today. The diplomatic manner allowed some states to easily “cheat” 
                                            
5 Doyle, M.W. (1997). Ways of War and Peace. New York and London: W.W. 
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the report on their economy at the time of initiating the Euro system, has had 
the Euro crisis delay to surface, and is still postponing a decisive action to 
resolve the issue, such as the expulsion of Greece from the Euro system. 
While it is in crises in economic terms, the EU still keeps an outstanding 
sphere of cooperation at the level of regional security. The states in the 
region see less value or meaning in the attempt of overwhelming, controlling 
or conquering their neighbouring states than states in other regions of the 
world. It was not so long time ago that the current EU member states were 
playing a game of balance of power and the power distribution or projection. 
The preference or, at least, the attitude of the states has been significantly 
transformed into a cooperative manner. 
 In fact, the EU-Europe is the region of the world where the liberal 
version of the anarchic world is largely working. In the anarchy, the character 
of state actors is given more variations than in the realist anarchy, being 
released from the solo focus on national security. These liberal ideas stem 
from the following liberal premises:  (1) ‘[a]lthough states live under 
international anarchy, meaning the absence of a global government, they do 
not experience a general, state of war’, (2) ‘[s]tates are inherently different 
“units,” differentiated by how they relate to individual human rights’, and (3) 
‘[t]he aims of the state, as do the aims of the individual, go beyond security to 
the protection and promotion of individual rights.’6  
 While realism and liberalism in IR tend to compete over the validity of 
their theory against each other, in the light of the current world reality, both 
                                            
Norton & Company. p.45. 
6 Doyle, M.W. (1997). Ways of War and Peace. New York and London: W.W. 
Norton & Company. p.211. 
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premises sound correct to some extent over limited situations and conditions. 
It is, therefore, still generally valid at the level of international politics, 
economy and peace and security that the prime actors in international 
relations as well as international cooperation/non-cooperation are state 
actors. Yet, the realist treatment of state actors is dangerous and impractical 
since it discards state’s individual quality and conditions that, in fact, are an 
important pillar of the case studies of states. For the sake of the face value of 
realists, however, it should be noted that its traditionally monolithic view on 
state actors in the school of thought was done only for theory-making that 
needed simplification in the Cold War when the structure of international 
security under the bipolarity of the two superpowers brushed off the 
qualitative differences of states.  
 In the post-Cold War, being lifted the structural restriction, it has been 
taken into account that there are variations of the preference of state actors, 
their regional environment and relations to the greater world. All inter-state 
regions are politically, economically or militarily different and all states are 
qualitatively and quantitatively different. The international reality is, thus, 
anarchic, and what is important in understanding international relations is to 
see what type of anarchy is working. The gaps among anarchies are not 
always convenient in terms of maintaining peace and security both at the 
regional and global levels. Robert Cooper, for example, sorts out the post-
Cold War anarchic world into three modes: (1) pre-modern (= pre-state and 
post imperial chaos), (2) modern (= classical state system in which balance 
of power is likely working) and (3) post-modern (= rule-and moral-driven 
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international system). 7  As a tendency, the pre-modern and modern 
conditions make state actors focus on hard security. Therefore, the states 
become more self-help for their survival due to the severity of their physical 
or territorial security. As anyone notices, this is what realists used to have in 
mind as the view of the world. Even in the post-Cold War era, it should be 
understood that the pre-modern and modern modes with the realist-biased 
state preference are seen a large parts of the world.  
 As a matter of fact, however, the today’s pre-modern and modern 
conditions are safer than before. After WWII, the international community 
was making an effort to normalise state sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
non-intervention to internal affairs through international institutions like the 
UN, and, to some extent, successful. Currently, there are few areas of the 
world that are not covered by state system, though some states are still so 
weak to be a coherent state. There is no state which explicitly shows a pride 
in invading and colonising other state today. A possible excuse to do so may 
be a claim of self-defence, though such an excuse requires persuasive 
evidence which should be beyond any doubt. In other words, there has been 
a great reduction of danger in international security as well as necessity to be 
self-help for its own security which urges the state actors to focus on their 
survival. 
 The alleviation of the global security environment, however, has not 
eradicated the states that incline self-help, defection, free-riding and non-
cooperation. A recent prominent example may be China. It violated the 
                                            
7 See: Cooper, Robert. (2004, revised version, paperback).  The Breaking 
of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century.  London: Atlantic 
Books, in particular p.16-17, 21-22 and 26-37. 
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number of the WTO (World Trade Organization) rules including the restriction 
of the export of rare earth materials that presently has called for an 
arbitration procedure of a panel in the organisation urged by a coalition of the 
US, the EU and Japan.8 China did not keep its (unofficial) promise of 
improving human rights conditions in exchange of holding the Beijing 
Olympic games. China created a peace award when the Nobel Committee 
awarded the peace prize to Liu Xiaobo, a dissident against the Chinese 
government, in order to show its discontent in 2010. China is currently 
causing several disputes against some ASEAN countries and Japan over the 
territorial issues of the South and East China Seas, intentionally distorting 
the interpretation of the UN Convention of Law of Sea (UNLOS).9 Another 
example in the Western side of the world is Russia. Russia similarly 
challenged the principle of territorial integrity in the case of Georgian War 
2008, with the claim of the protection of Russians in the conflict area, the use 
of force and granting the independent state status on Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Although these areas belong to Georgia in the light of international 
law, they have become Russia’s sphere of influence. Even the US, which is 
the solo superpower at the current time, does not override so easily the 
principles, treaties and rules of the international community nowadays. If it 
does, the US at least tries to utilise, for example, the UN’s procedures and 
get legitimacy like the Iraq War in 2003. Therefore, the attitudes of China and 
                                            
8 See, for example: Palmer, Doug., and Sebastian Moffett. (2012). ‘U.S., EU, 
Japan take on China at WTO over rare earths’. Reuters. March, 13rh, 2012. 
Online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/13/us-china-trade-eu-
idUSBRE82C0JU20120313. 
9 For example, see: Dillon, Dana. June 1st, 2011. Counting Beijing in the 
South China Sea. Hoover Institute Stanford University. Online: 
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Russia, which have the veto in the UN Security Council, are a threat to the 
current international system. 
 What drives such an assertive foreign and military policy in the time 
when there is no major power to threaten China and Russia? They are 
regional great powers and surrounded by relatively weaker states than them. 
As long as they keep staying within their territorial borders and sphere of 
influence in the regions, they are not externally threatened in the military 
point of view, possibly except the potentiality that they may crash each other. 
China, however, looks at the South and East China Seas at the current time 
rather than north or Russia, and Russia concerns more about the Eastern 
and Central Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East than the Central Asia 
and the Far East. The two powers clearly do not think of international and 
regional relations as the EU-European countries do. They are still colonial-
minded in some sense. Thus, in Cooper’s three worlds, China and Russia 
are located in somewhere between the pre-modern and modern world. An 
agenda of international peace and security at the global sense is how to 
bring such pre-modern and modern states into international cooperation at 
least at the level that they respect internationally agreed principles, norms, 
treaties, rules and procedures or into the post-modern world. This is an 
important puzzle to solve.  
 It should be kept in mind that Cooper’s three worlds are not necessarily 
about geography. They may be related to geographic settings of states. They 
may be related to conceptual settings of the peoples or leaders of states. 
They may be related to both geographic and conceptual settings 
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simultaneously, or they are the separate issues. At the same time, some 
states belong to, not only one world, but two or all three in some 
circumstances, issues or events. Yet, Cooper’s three worlds are practical in 
understanding which environment is friendly/unfriendly for international 
cooperation and which environment is affecting to states involved in an issue 
or event. The three worlds indicate the kinds of international or regional 
anarchy and the degree of risk for cooperation with other states. Because of 
the observation of the reality, it is reasonably possible to presume that the 
pre-modern world is the worst friendly environment in the three worlds, the 
modern world comes in the middle of them, and the post-modern world is the 
most amicable environment for international cooperation.  
 In Cooper’s mind, the pre-modern world is represented by, for example, 
Somalia, Afghanistan and Liberia. It is hard to believe that these states are 
actually functioning as the unitary states due to their internal instability and 
the lack of the rule of law. The modern world contains many states/regions in 
the world and the environment seems to affect to issues and events 
happening in the world. For example, the modern world has the US 
especially when it faces the Pacific (or the Far East and South East Asia) or 
the Persian Gulf states. As stated above, Russia and China may come in this 
world though they may also belong to the pre-modern world when they have 
to deal with the chaotic Central Asian states and region. The post-modern 
world (predictably) includes Europe with the EU and other well-functioning 
international/regional organisations and regimes. The North American 
countries, which include the US and Canada, stay in the world when they 
                                            
on October 12th, 2012). 
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relate to other states in the post-modern world. Japan belongs to the post-
modern world in Cooper’s opinion at the time of writing his book. However, 
Cooper predicts that, ‘if China develops in an uncompromising fashion (either 
modern or pre-modern), Japan could be forced to revert to defensive 
modernism.’10 What is currently going on in the South and East China Seas 
may be a symptom of this prediction.  
 Promotion and implementation of international cooperation among the 
states in the post-modern world may not be so troublesome, since they tend 
to normally cooperate. A huge problem in international cooperation is non-
cooperative norm by the states in the pre-modern and modern worlds. 
Suspicion is their norm, so that the states incline to take the zero-sum game 
thinking for their safety and are less restrictive in employing military power to 
navigate the course of foreign affairs. In this sense, the most fundamental 
agenda for international and regional peace and security is to have the states 
actors in the pre-modern and modern worlds adjust to the post-modern world 
and turn to be less aggressive, respect the rules and principles, adapt the 
standard of international norms, and be cooperative.  
 
1.2: Theories of Cooperation 
 
While it may be not a panacea for all problems of the non-cooperative state 
actors, socialisation can be a key for adjustment of the actors. In the post-
Cold War era, the degree of socialisation at the international level among 
                                            
10 Cooper, Robert. (2004, revised version, paperback).  The Breaking of 
Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century.  London: Atlantic 
Books, p.41. 
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state actors, which may constitute part of the phenomenon called 
globalisation, is progressively increasing. Nevertheless, the mode of thinking 
of state actors is not always adequately updated and adjusted along with the 
speed of the phenomenon.  
 This is because the international political environment had been pre-
modern and modern for a long time. It is a quite recent event that some 
European states boldly began to endeavour to unify the national economic 
interests in order to achieve their national security. The Western Europe 
countries happened to be a collection of one of the richest countries, belong 
to the US-led Western camp in terms of international security, and had 
aspiration to secure their future peace, at least, among them with regret over 
the two world wars that devastated these countries. At the same time, it can 
be said that frequent wars in the past are a result of socialisation in a 
negative sense. What the Western states started as the EC project was a 
positive version of socialisation through translating the regret into a 
motivation to lead peace, which produced a sphere of cooperation in Europe. 
The European states used to be the self-help state actors who played the 
game of balance of power. Today, they have turned into the relatively 
cooperative state actors and, at least, act in the way within Europe. This 
European process implies something important. The self-help nature is 
curved or transformed into less egoistic one through a long term. Can this 
experience be brought out of Europe to other parts of the world? How can 
self-help actors be turned into cooperative actors?  
 For the states in the pre-modern and modern worlds, it may be too 
much to leap to that they behave like the post-modern European states. 
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However, it may be possible to achieve a certain degree and/or kind of 
international cooperation even among or including the states in the pre-
modern and modern worlds. Military alliances can be often found in history. 
Collective security has been universally formed through the UN system, even 
though its effectiveness is sometimes in doubt. Organising cooperation, 
therefore, is possible even with the states in the pre-modern and modern 
worlds. A question is the degree and/or kind. What is the best is the degree 
and/or kind of the EU-Europe level of international/regional cooperation at 
which there is no need to worry about inter-state war and there is 
collaboration for solving civil wars, terrorism, violence and cross-border 
crimes in the region. 
 The states in the pre-modern and modern worlds may be more 
accustomed to playing free-riding, defection or strategic interaction with other 
self-help state actors than the states in the post-modern world are. Partly it is 
out of their physical environment surround them. Their neighbours are self-
help state actors, and they have to play these tactics before they are done by 
the other self-help neighbouring states for survival. Yet, globalisation in the 
21st century does allow to connect to the states in the post-modern world or 
lesser pre-modern and modern worlds over the geographic restriction. Can 
such a deepening socialisation rapidly or gradually change the external 
environment and the self-help preference of the states in the pre-modern and 
modern worlds? There is the possibility and a theory of that. 
 
1.2.1. Axelrod’s Game Theory for Cooperation 
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The tactics for survival are often called rational choices and related to the 
game theory that realism upholds. Fundamentally, the game theory is 
supposed to prove mathematically that defection is a better strategy than 
cooperation. Therefore, the game theory is strongly supported by realists 
including rational choice theorists. Nevertheless, the game theory can be 
also used for providing an explanation about rationality of cooperation as 
Robert Axelrod presents. The duality of the game theory is significant, since 
the exactly same method of reasoning can sustain the completely opposite 
conclusions.  
 Conventionally, liberal schools of thought in IR, including liberal 
internationalism, functionalism, institutionalism, cognitivism and 
constructivism, are not so sharp to counter the realist denial for cooperation, 
since their arguments have to rely on phenomena which are very difficult to 
precisely, numerically and natural-scientifically explain, like mutual trust, 
shared interests, amicable relations, respect or, even, friendships. In front of 
the mathematically demonstrable game theory, these relatively 
immeasurable phenomena tend to be less powerful in persuasion. Probably 
because of that, liberalism, which is a greater supporter of international 
cooperation, likes to pick up international trade, sharing science and 
technology, and environmental issues at the global-scale to insist the value 
of international cooperation where shared interests of a group of states or the 
international community are relatively measurable and demonstrable. When 
liberalism steps in, for example, the support of human rights and human 
rights regimes, the liberal arguments for international cooperation are slightly 
more ambiguous relying on stressing the universal values than when it talks 
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about numerically measurable interests deducted by logical calculations 
which is rather easy to make it sound plausible. Therefore, it is meaningful 
that Axelrod used the game theory in demonstrating that cooperation is a 
rational choice, if not the absolute choice, and provides a mathematically 
measurable explanation for cooperation.  
 How can cooperation be a rational choice? Axelrod employs the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma with which realists usually conclude the superiority of the 
defection strategy to the cooperation one. Because the experiment uses the 
same formula of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the players or actors are supposed 
to be self-help and rational in aiming maximising their interests or points in 
the game. The difference from the realist and rational theorist’s Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is that Axelrod embeds a long term process in his experiments of 
the game theory through repeating the sessions of the game in indefinite 
times. The players are not informed about when the game ends. That is a 
replication of the reality that one cannot stop relating to others at one’s will 
only. In society, this sometimes happens.  
 In the experiment, Axelrod finds that, even in the world of the selfish, 
‘with an indefinite number of interactions, cooperation can emerge.’ 11 
Playing with the same partner in an indefinite number of the game and 
attempting to maximising own interests or points, the coupled players learn in 
time that defection is not the best option. The players, of course, are still able 
to choose defection. Yet, this option likely call for the partner’s defection in 
the future rounds. Then, both players will get worst. This means that the 
long-term relation becomes a process that memorises what both players or 
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actors did before and establishes a basis of prediction over what the other 
player or actor will do in the next round of the game – the phenomena 
respectively called “the history of the game” and “the shadow of the future.” 
In other words, the process is a profiling of oneself and the other player 
(actor). Axelrod comments that ‘the importance of the next encounter 
between the same two individuals must be great enough to make defection 
an unprofitable strategy.’12  
 Playing the indefinite number of the games as interaction between the 
actors, thus, urges them to have a long-term view. Ironically, Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, which is a realist favourite game to prove that actors should be 
selfish, can extract the completely opposite conclusion when it is played in 
the unlimited times. When the realist selfish actors learn from “the history of 
the game” and extend their thoughts to maximise their interests over the 
indefinite length of their relationship, they are, soon or later, persuaded by 
the “shadow of the future” to curb their egoism or become more cooperative 
than before. 
 In this sense, it can be interpret that the Axelrod’s game theory is based 
on socialisation. That means that actors are confined in an inescapable 
condition and have to continue their relations. Because of the premise that 
actors “have to stay in society”, the “history of the game” can be piled up as 
memories about specific actors and the “shadow of the future” can be given 
its significance and effect in the minds of all actors there. The “history of the 
game” is likely to become a preference or prejudice towards the specific 
                                            
11 Axelrod, Robert. (1990). The Evolution of Cooperation. London: Penguin 
Books. p.11. 
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actors by other actors in the society. The other actors shape their attitudes 
towards the specific actors, so that the “shadow of the future” is empowered.  
 
1.2.2. Sociological IR Theories for Cooperation 
 
The international community is gradually approaching the condition of 
Axelrod’s premise through globalisation, even though it is not intended by 
any actor and the degree of inescapable may not reach to the level of the 
Axelrod’s experiment. In fact, the history of international politics, economy 
and relations can be seen as a process of increasing socialisation that first 
facilitated the establishment of state system and inter-state system, which 
initially started from Europe, and led the shaping of the international 
community. Today, state system covers almost all over the world, the most of 
states join international organisations, many of them are connected to in 
international trade and other economic activities, the peoples of the states 
come and go between the states, and they communicate through internet or 
other telecommunication means. Therefore, in a structural aspect, things are 
going to the direction of pro-international cooperation at a glance.  
 It should also bear in mind that the premise of socialisation implies that 
Axelrod’s game theory is based on learning from experience through 
processes. The part of Axelrod’s theory reminds of some knowledge-based 
theories that are generally considered part of liberal institutionalism, such as 
cognitivism and constructivism. In these schools of thought, actors’ 
                                            
12 Axelrod, Robert. (1990). The Evolution of Cooperation. London: Penguin 
Books. p.174. 
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perception, causal and normative beliefs, understanding and learning play a 
greater role in the dynamics of relations to other actors and form a reality.13  
 As discussed, “The history of game,” “the shadow of future” and the 
long-term thinking in Axelrod’s theory imply that these are the processes of 
relations among actors that generate, construct and alter the perception, 
beliefs and understanding of actors. In other words, these are the learning 
processes. For the knowledge-based theorists, the effects of learning are 
supposed to be significant, and they regard that cooperation can be learnt 
through ‘new understandings of their social and political environment.’14 
Then, although the emergence of cooperation may not be straightforward, 
these schools of thought regard that even the failure of the emergence of 
cooperation may be lessons to be learnt for the next round. Unlike the 
theories from realist sectors which generally concentrate on explaining the 
“momentary” reality, the knowledge-based theories are much more adaptive 
for grasping the “continuum” of reality.  
 Cognitivism and constructivism are a strong supporter of socialisation 
as the processes and continuum of reality. Thus, international institutions are, 
at the international level, working for facilitation of socialisation among actors 
and naturally occupy a meaningful place in these theorists’ thoughts. In the 
case of the so-called “strong cognitivism,” an international society is 
supposed to be ‘structured by institutions’ which are ultimately ‘cognitive 
entities (mutual expectations, beliefs about appropriate and inappropriate 
                                            
13 See: Hasenclever, Andreas., Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. (1997). 
Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
pp.136-210. 
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behavior, etc.), although they depend on corresponding practices for their 
continuity.’15   
 Cognitivism and constructivism in IR root in sociology. Although these 
two schools may be regarded as part of the liberal sector in IR, sociological 
IR extends the influence even to the realist sector in IR. Realism influenced 
by sociological IR inclines to grasp international institutions and/or 
organisations as “a site of socialisation” rather than a “promoter of 
socialisation” and a “process of socialisation” seen in liberalism.16  
 The realist “site of socialisation” is a repeat of its chaotic anarchy vision 
of the world with a lesser degree, of ‘the notion of international institutions as 
social environments, [and of] the mere membership of which evokes the 
socialization of actors….’17 The “site of socialisation” in this sense is nothing 
more than a meeting place of state actors whose actions are determined by 
the force of balance of power or the distribution of power over all state actors. 
Affected by the position, the realist sector in institutionalism still remains in its 
domain of material, physical, direct, relatively instant and calculative interests, 
or the logic of consequences to define their interests as the motivation of 
their actions. Therefore, realism again makes a contrast with liberalism over 
international institutions, a kind of structural actors in international relations. 
                                            
14 Hasenclever, Andreas., Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. (1997). 
Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
p.145. 
15 Hasenclever, Andreas., Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. (1997). 
Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
p.138. 
16 See Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005). International Institutions and Socialization 
in Europe: Introduction and Framework. International Organization. Vol. 59, 
Fall. pp.801-826. 
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The liberal idea of international institutions and/or organisations as a 
“promoter of socialisation” and/or ““process of socialisation” shows the liberal 
expectation that these phenomenon change the state preference based on 
the logic of consequences to the one based on the logic of appropriateness 
that leads “common good” and “public goods” of the international community. 
When the change reaches at the point, the logic of appropriateness for either 
a group of states or the international community as a whole begins to be 
formed a sphere of cooperation for them.  
 
1.2.3. How to Protect to a Sphere of Cooperation 
 
There are some points that Axelrod underlines about the way of producing 
and maintaining the “sphere of cooperation”. First, cooperation can be 
started by a small number of actors ‘who are prepared to reciprocate 
cooperation, even in a world no one else will cooperate.’18 As long as 
reciprocity is carried out by the group of the actors and the “shadow of future” 
keeps being effective among them, cooperation can thrive with them. 
Altruism is unnecessary to bring cooperation as long as reciprocity works 
within them.  
 Second, ‘once cooperation based on reciprocity is established, it can 
protect itself from invasion by uncooperative strategies’ through 
‘[discriminating] between those who respond to the [cooperation] and those 
                                            
17 Zürn, Michael., and Jeffrey T. Checkel. (2005). Getting Socialized to Build 
Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State in 
Europe. International Organization. Vol. 59, Fall. p.1049. 
18 Axelrod, Robert. (1990). The Evolution of Cooperation. London: Penguin 
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who do not.’19 In other words, expelling non-cooperative actors from the 
sphere of the cooperation is an important strategy to preserve the 
cooperation, and hesitation to do so collapses it. This can be a suggestion 
about how to preserve the structural system of cooperation in international 
institutions and/or organisations. Axelrod’s discriminating policy for the 
creation and maintenance of a sphere of cooperation is quite meaningful at 
the current time when the Euro crisis threatens the unity of the EU.  
 The ongoing Euro Crisis is a product of a sort of the non-discriminating 
or -punishment “norm”, if not “policy”, by the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) which had been practically unable to control free-riders and defectors 
of the monetary rules in the system, including Greece notably. Rather, the 
Union had been sticking with tactics to “earn time” without solving or 
reducing the problem until the problem could not be contained anymore. Due 
to this inactiveness and the sudden imposition of austerity measures on 
Greece or Spain, the Union itself is now in danger of disintegration. The 
current Euro Crisis suggests that a timely discriminating policy from a sphere 
of cooperation can minimise the damage that free-riders and defectors cause 
and preserve an institution for cooperation. There may be kinds and degree 
of discrimination which may fall in politics and negotiations among the actors. 
Nevertheless, the lack of discriminating means widely opens the opportunity 
for free-riding and defection. An institutional design should take into account 
this point.  
 Third, forgiveness is a key to restore a sphere of cooperation. Initially 
non-cooperative actors may change their mind after they see benefits of 
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cooperation in the sphere of cooperation. Or the former defecting actors may 
“repent” and hope to join the sphere. Of course, some of them may attempt 
to free-ride, pretending their “repentance”. If the strategy of discrimination is 
rigidly applied, after their first try, they are expelled from the sphere of 
cooperation as a punishment. Yet, is the expulsion forever? Should it be so? 
What Axelrod recommends is “forgiveness”. In his experiment, following Tit 
for Tat strategy (or to cooperate when being cooperated and to defect when 
being defected like simply following the game partner’s moves) seems to be 
the best strategy to earn points, so that, if your game partner cooperates 
after his or her defection, the best strategy to revive the sphere of 
cooperation is to follow the move which is cooperation. This is what Axelrod 
calls “forgiveness”. This is another example why the first move should be 
cooperation if an actor would like to create or enter the sphere of cooperation. 
The actor has to prove that the one deserves being trusted with paying the 
first risk to earn an opportunity or trust from other actors. Yet, this strategy 
must be coincided with the discriminating strategy  — if defected, defect 
immediately —, since some may plan free-riding. In other words, a free-rider 
should be discriminated and punished if the sphere of cooperation is 
preserved.  
 Of course, the discriminating strategy possibly creates a sphere of non-
cooperation outside of a sphere of cooperation. It may also generate a 
sphere of cooperation by discriminated non-cooperatives or defectors. These 
spheres may overlap with Cooper’s pre-modern and modern worlds to some 
extent. Since suspicion and self-help are the norms of the states there, they 
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are unable to develop their version of cooperation in a stable and permanent 
form, even they would like to do so. Yet, will they “repent” and become ones 
who deserve “forgiveness” in order to re-join a sphere of cooperation?  
 That depends on the degree of success or performance of the sphere 
of cooperation. In the 1990s, so many former communist states in Eastern 
Europe desired to join the Western international/regional organisations, 
because they looked like so successful and seemed to be able to provide 
economic prosperity with the EU common market, better security with NATO, 
and improvement of human rights, the rule of law and democracy with the 
OSCE and the CoE. The Eastern European states were the former allies to 
the defunct Soviet Union and the former enemies to the West, even though 
historical evaluation would regard that the East European states were forced 
to be so. With the West’s wish to establish a sphere of cooperation with the 
former communist states in Eastern Europe in the light security, the West 
“forgot” the historical fact rather than “forgave” them and invited them into the 
Western sphere of cooperation. The current European peace is partly a 
product of the forgetting/forgiveness. At the same time, there is a problem 
how greater this sphere should be extended. For example, should Georgia, a 
former Soviet Union republic which has been a target of Russian harassment, 
be firmly included in the Western sphere of cooperation, knowing that it 
definitely angers Russia which is still in the mode of the modern or 
distribution of power thinking.  
 In relation between Axelrod’s recommendation of discrimination and the 
real practice of international institutions/organisations, what should be 
reminded of is that the most of these bodies little equip with discriminating 
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measures as their formal practice. The UN’s infamous shortage of finance 
partly comes out of non-payment or delaying of the membership fee by a 
number of the member states. Although there is a rule that two-years delay 
of the payment suspends the voting right in some situations, there is no 
further measure if this rule does not work for some states. Therefore, many 
member states do not correct the free-riding behaviour and keep delaying or 
do not pay their payment. Yet, none of the states are completely suspended 
their membership or expelled from the UN. As a result, the free-riding 
behaviour continues.  
 The OSCE, in this aspect, may be slightly better than the UN. It has the 
history of suspension of the membership, which was applied to the former 
Yugoslavia without the consent of the Yugoslavian government when the 
country fell in the civil wars. The ‘exception to the rule of consensus 
(consensus minus one, …) was introduced for the case of a serious violation’ 
in the CSCE Council of Ministers meeting in Prague in 1992 with the 
background of the conflicts.20 Today, the decision-making rule is embedded 
in some mechanisms of the OSCE’s activities, such as the Vienna and 
Moscow mechanisms.21 In this light, it can be possible to judge that the 
OSCE’s discriminatory rules are more advanced than the UN.  
 Yet, there is a concern today, regarding the history of the engagement 
of the mechanisms. In the 1990s, he Western values and opinions were 
taken as an instructor’s voice in the absence of counter-values and opinions 
in the international community. Therefore, there was a political circumstance 
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that the Western participating states in the OSCE could push what they 
thought as “right” in the course of the organisational actions. At the current 
time, this Western tide looks weakened. Although the mechanism of the 
decision-making is still there, it is questionable whether the OSCE employs 
this discriminatory rule again due to politics within and surrounding the 
organisation. Nevertheless, it has made a precedence. This remains in the 
institutional memory and, when the time comes, may be remembered to 
employ it again.  
 In sum, Axelrod’s game theory suggests that the self-help and rational 
characters of actors should not necessarily be regarded as absolute reasons 
for non-cooperation. They can be a cooperative actor, if they realise 
Axelrod’s game theory by their rationality. Nevertheless, there are other 
elements that may prevent state actors from cooperation and Axelrod’s game 
theory may not be always workable. In this point, Cooper’s three worlds may 
help to identify where the problems lie. 
 
 
1.3: Problems to Cooperate for Actors 
 
Axelrod’s theory of cooperation is presupposed that actors are rational. In the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, interests, benefits or profits are converted into points. 
The assumption of the game is that to get more points is supposed to be 
better, and, therefore, actors make an effort to get more points. That is, in the 
game theory, rational. If the theory works in international relations, state 
actors must be rational and, following the rationality, attempt to get more 
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state interests. Realists are happy for this assumption. Yet, rationality as a 
theory assumption is always tricky. What is considered as rational choices 
and actions depends on what kind of value system one lives with. Then, the 
value system is partly affected by environment surrounding actors.  
 At the same time, environment determines necessity, so that it shapes 
the types and quality of capability. What sort of neighbouring states 
surrounding a state will determine what sort of capability the state needs to 
equip with for the continuation of itself. If surrounded by militarily aggressive 
states, a state has to have military capability for survival. On the other hand, 
a militarily aggressive state may be either surrendered or curbed the state 
activities by the surrounding states. It depends on the gap in hard power or 
the distribution of power over these states. If surrounded by economically 
vibrant states, a state may be given an opportunity to get economic growth 
through associating with the surrounding states. Centring the purpose of 
states which is survival, the environment of states will form state’s character 
and preferences. 
 In this sense, for example, Robert Cooper’s three worlds become useful 
and relevant to understand international cooperation. What do the three 
worlds represent in relation to international cooperation?  
 
 
1.3.1.Capability to Cooperate 
 
International cooperation has several levels in terms of the degree of 
capability to carry out the premise. Inter-governmental cooperation may be 
just a pretence or show, like the shake-hand between the heads of states 
who like to sell an image of friendly relationship towards the international 
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audience. It may be a more serious cooperation when it is dealing with 
practical matters that require real solutions or improvement. In that case, the 
cooperation may be organised through some branches or sections of the 
governments concerned, and need to establish prescribed procedures and 
practices. International cooperation becomes complicate, cumbersome and 
meticulous when it is done through international institutions and 
organisations. Since it involves a greater number of states, the bar of the 
required level of coordination over the states is raised higher than an 
ordinary inter-governmental cooperation. Because of the increased 
complication in running the cooperation, some of international cooperation 
through international institutions and organisations looks inefficiency, slow in 
performance and ineffective.  
 In other words, cooperation needs capable actors to run it, when it turns 
out to be somehow effective. In many cases, the actors are state actors or 
member states of cooperation regimes under the current time. The officers of 
international institutions and organisations may be employed individually and 
more impartial over their nationalities. Realistically, however, the most of 
international institutions and organisations are formed as a collection of 
states, and they have the right to join the decision-making system. The 
officers are not. Therefore, who are the capable actors to cooperate 
inevitably means which state actors are capable of making and joining 
cooperation.  
 The capable actors to run a complicated system at the international 
level can be more found in the post-modern world or the developed and 
mature democratic countries. It is not a secret that more number of 
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international/regional organisations dutifully working for the organisational 
purposes are based on the Europe-North American sphere, and the powers 
from the regions have been leading the discussions in the UN, and its family 
organisations and agencies to form the international public opinions. Why 
does this happen?  
 The post-modern world is the place where cooperation, whichever 
internal or international, is most flourished, since peace is more prevail (or 
security concerns are less), economy is richer and civil activities are more 
vibrant. The backgrounds and resources for making cooperation are fertile. 
What means “peace” in this context is that these states are usually the 
mature and liberal democracies and the post-modern world consists of such 
a type of states. The post-modern world or the mature liberal democracies 
are much about the high capability of creating, revising and maintaining 
complex and multi-layered systems in their politics, economy and civil society 
which are working simultaneously, ceaselessly and seamlessly in an orderly 
and systematic way. In terms of politics, ‘democratic political institutions 
provide a crucial level of mediation and aggregation between, on one side, 
structural factors and, on the other, not only individuals but also the diverse 
groupings under which society organizes its multiple interests and 
identities.’22  The states in the post-modern world has already equipped 
enough with conflict resolution systems to run cooperation through 
coordinating a variety of interests of a number of actors. They just bring the 
accumulated experience to international cooperation. Therefore, it is often 
said that the developed countries are much easier to make treaties, organise 
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rules and regulations through institutional arrangements and manoeuvres 
measures for the purposes of the agreements, since the states in the post-
modern world can understand the significance and delicateness of the 
complex systems of cooperation under the frameworks of international 
institutions. Accountability and transparency are systematically set when 
procedures are established. Discussions are relatively open to the public. 
These “ordinary things” in the states are internalised in their norms. In other 
words, the states in the post-modern world comprehend and tend to follow 
what James G March and Johan P. Olsen call the “rules of appropriateness” 
or a sense of “how things should be done”, which is a perspective of the logic 
of appropriateness. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen explain: 
 
‘Rules of appropriateness are … embodied in the 
foundational norms of contemporary democracies. 
Subjecting human conduct to constitutive rules has 
been portrayed as part of processes of 
democratization and civilization; and legitimacy has 
come to depend on how things are done, not solely 
on subjective performance ….’23  
 
                                            
22 O’Donnell, Guillermo. (1994). Delegative Democracy. Journal of 
Democracy. Vol. 5, No. 1, January. p.59. 
23 March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. (2009). The Logic of 
Appropriateness. ARENA Working Paper WP 04/09. ARENA Centre for 
European Studies (University of Oslo). Online: 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2004/wp04_9.pdf (accessed on 
2012-Sep-08), p.6. 
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With a stronger sense of the “rules of appropriateness”, the states in the 
post-modern world even ‘sometimes show considerable ability to 
accommodate shifting circumstances by changing behavior without changing 
core rules and structures ….’24  
 The states in the post-modern world also present a peaceful preference 
from which some political scientists have extracted an idea of the 
“democratic peace”. This means that the states in the post-modern world or 
mature democracies have the ability of refraining themselves from resorting 
immediate, unwise and threatening actions when a problem rises among 
them. They have art of communicating and exchanging their objection, 
refusal or dissatisfaction and keep the problem under control. The existence 
of differences does not immediately lead the military confrontation among 
them. In this way, the post-modern world contains a shock-resistant 
mechanism to cope with the existence of problems, differences and 
dissatisfaction in a peaceful or non-violent way. 
 Yet, the states in the modern world do not always have the same level 
of tolerance and patience that the states in the post-modern world have. The 
pre-modern and modern worlds are chaotic, if Cooper’s definition is followed. 
Nevertheless, the states in the modern world may be better positioned to 
make cooperation than the states in the pre-modern states, since the modern 
states are at the stage of the classical state system (or the Westphalian 
system) and at minimum have the internally consolidated system to behave a 
                                            
24 March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. (2009). The Logic of 
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unified state. Thus, the elites and leaders of this type of states know to some 
extent the significance of the “rule of appropriateness” and “logic of 
appropriateness”, the rule of law and democracy as a tool to produce 
legitimacy. 
 This does not mean that they are the mature and liberal democracies. 
They are more likely the lesser democracies, quasi-democracies, illiberal 
democracies (by Fareed Zakaria)25 or delegative democracies (by Guillermo 
O’Donnell)26, according to Cooper’s view. Externally, then, they are situated 
in the realist anarchy in which suspicion is an essential norm. Since their 
preference is much biased to the distribution of power and hegemony, when 
the states in the modern world attempt to form international cooperation, it 
tends to become a pretence, whatever the cooperation is embodied through 
international institutions or organisations, since these are run by their 
preference. The states in the modern world incline to move their affairs 
through imposing or competing influence rather than following rules and 
procedures. Accordingly, accountability, transparency and regularity as 
institutions will be lost. There may be international cooperation among them. 
However, the cooperation has a wider space for defection, since no actor 
runs cooperation through trust that stands for evaluation and examination. 
The states in the modern world prefer running things by the distribution of 
power and/or hegemony to putting them under the rule of law. This 
                                            
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2004/wp04_9.pdf (accessed on 
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25 See: Zakaria, Fareed. 2004.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy 
at Home and Abroad.  New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company. 
26 see: O’Donnell, Guillermo. (1994). Delegative Democracy. Journal of 
Democracy. Vol. 5, No. 1, January. pp.55-69. 
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preference is so die-hard, and a reason that can be asked in a lack or 
shortage of democracy in their internal state system.  
 Russia and China represent the states in the modern world, in Cooper’s 
mind. As known, Russia is, at the current time, still an immature democracy 
or rather a non-democracy under the too strong presidential system and 
President Putin’s individual preference, which has probably been formed by 
his career as a former KGB that was an extra-judiciary body for intelligence 
activities only under the control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU). China is unquestionably under the one-party dictatorship by the 
Communist Party, even though communism is almost irrelevant to the 
today’s China. In these countries, rules and procedures are skipped at the 
elite’s convenience. The rule of the game in society is the only competition of 
the elites. The delicate and complicated systems to resolve the differences of 
individual or group interests through the rule of law in the mature liberal 
democracies are replaced with the distribution of power in the modern states 
that includes the use of violence by state authorities under the name of the 
stability of society. In their societies, the elites are trained to behave in that 
way. Their foreign policies are decided with this preference. It is very difficult 
for the elites who are accustomed to behaving strategically in the light of the 
distribution of power and/or hegemony to change their attitude and adapt the 
so-called international standards that are largely written by the post-modern 
West. In the eyes of the states in the post-modern world, their behaviour 
undermines their profile, making themselves untrustworthy.  
 The same thing can be said to the case of the states in the pre-modern 
states, since they are also the residents of the chaotic world. Much worse, 
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the pre-modern states are usually the dictatorial or failed states. Their 
internal systems to sustain themselves as a coherent unit is so weak. The 
government may be able to rule only parts of their states, but not 
comprehensively. The rulers (the officers of the government and authorities 
and the powerful) are usually corrupted and the biggest abusers of the rules, 
regulations and laws in the states. As seen in the modern world, the internal 
condition of the states disciplines them to behave self-help, exploit the 
weaker and enjoy their privilege in society. This means that the states in the 
pre-modern world possess the very weak sense of the “rules of 
appropriateness” or the “logic of appropriateness.” As seen in the modern 
world, the rulers in the pre-modern world also enjoy impunity and no 
punishment scheme on them exists. They simply do not need to play any 
game with their subjects when the subjects are too weak to effectively resist.  
 What the rulers are afraid most is an external claim to question their 
legitimacy. Until the claim is made, the rulers can behave as the government, 
leaders, or head of states outwardly, even though they may not be elected 
through fair elections by their peoples. In the 21st century, however, the 
possibility to make this claim may be small, even though there can be a voice 
to demand responsibility of the government of the states to rule the peoples 
in the light of human rights. The former colonial powers are reluctant to buy 
suspicion or behave as a policeman in the international community due to 
the decline of power and resources to do so. They are timid with making 
such a claim. In any case, the states in the pre-modern and modern worlds 
are fundamentally less trained to become cooperative or more disciplined to 
be aggressive at the internal level. Therefore, their actions at the 
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international level tend to be dragged by the internal preference. The lack or 
weakness of democracy at the internal level affects their behavioural and 
ideological norms so profoundly. Therefore, socialisation and a long-term 
engagement in relations with other members of the international community 
is so important to correct the attitude and way of thinking of the states in pre-
modern and modern worlds. Probably, there is no other alternative way to 
resort if their norms are adjusted, since the elites, who come to the 
international stage as the representative of these states, are enjoying 
impunity in their internal societies.  
 In this sense, the rule of law is an essential element of the post-modern 
civilisation as Niall Ferguson insists in his Civilisation and BBC’s Reith 
Lectures, supposing that Ferguson’s Western civilisation seems to be close 
to Cooper’s post-modern world27. What the post-modern world separates 
from the pre-modern and modern worlds is a phenomenon in which the 
rulers put themselves under law and subordinate to it. With the practice of 
the norm, the complex system of democracy with the rule of law effectively 
works, mitigates conflicts over interests in society, coordinates individuals 
and groups of peoples to be a coherent unit called a state and realises a 
positive peace. The internal condition educates the elites, leaders and 
representatives of the states in the post-modern world about how to deal with 
the complexity of the governing system, continue the system and, in the 
extension, organise cooperation at the internal and international levels. The 
states in the pre-modern and modern worlds lack this internal condition or 
                                            
27 There are six “killer applications” of the Western civilisation, according to 
Ferguson: economic competition; the scientific revolution; modern medicine; 
the consumer society, the work ethic and the rule of law. 
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training. In addition, the internal and external condition of the states in the 
pre-modern and moderns world enhances the elites’ myopic nature, since, in 
chaos whichever internal or external, future is uncertain unless it is 
guaranteed by means of imposition over others, like police or military forces. 
The rule of law and democratic institutions may provide predictability and 
regularity to society. The states in the pre-modern and modern states do not 
equip with these institutions. Therefore, what the elites in the states of the 
pre-modern and modern worlds believe as a rational choice sounds like a 
strategic move for a short-time period. For them, a choice based on a long-
term thinking is felt unwise.  
 
1.3.2. Rationality Problems 
 
Accordingly, logic and actions considered as “rational” are a reflection of the 
value system that one has. In order to get Axelrod’s theory of cooperation 
work, state actors must be rational and intelligent to understand through a 
long-term process of interaction with other state actors that maximising the 
state interests in some cases requires to curb its enthusiasm to attempt to 
get the biggest gain and be content with the secondary best with giving some 
away to other state actors. Yet, as argued, the difference of the belonging 
worlds shapes the state preference without being clearly noticed by state 
actors. The different worlds have the respective logic of appropriateness. 
The sense of “how things should be done” at the practical level is not 
identical over the three worlds. The difference of the value system, therefore, 
constitutes a difficulty to proceed Axelrod’s theory as a remedy.  
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 The constant communication, therefore, is necessary to know this 
rationality gap among Cooper’s worlds, since international cooperation 
sometimes has to be done by the states actors in all three worlds. 
Institutional settings to realise the communication should be understand as 
an infrastructure of international affairs. Even with such an effort, the 
preference over strategic moves by the states in the pre-modern and modern 
worlds may annoy the post-modern efforts for international coordination and 
cooperation. This is a battle between the short-term interests in the realist 
sense and the long-term interests in the liberal sense. It is also a battle 
between the realist view on the state actor’s preference (self-help) and the 
liberal view on it (relatively amicable).   
 Nevertheless, the on-going globalisation is more and more decreasing 
the opportunity to let a state completely ignore the international community. 
Although the international concerns may not reach every detail of internal 
affairs of a state, any states have to engage in a long-term relationship with 
other states or the international community and do not know when it ends, as 
Axelrod’s experiment sets as a prerequisite, due to political and economic 
reasons. At least, the elites of states from all three worlds experience this 
reality. The relationship is multi-layered and there is no way to make a simple 
method to make a matrix to calculate state interests and losses in a move 
not only of state diplomacy but also of private business. The totality of these 
things is too complex. Therefore, future is uncertain. Yet, any states want to 
secure as much as possible their future. As an insurance policy for such a 
need, international cooperation is the logical choice, if the long-term view is 
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employed in the foreign policy decisions. Fiona McGillivray and Alastair 
Smith note:  
 
‘Nations behaving myopically can never cooperate in 
[the Prisoner’s Dilemma] game; the incentives to 
defect and exploit the other party dominate. Yet, 
despite the temptation to defect, nations can 
cooperate through conditioning future cooperation on 
current behavior. By threatening to withdraw future 
cooperation as punishment for exploitative behavior, 
nations make their partners trustworthy. Provided 
that the long-term benefits of cooperation outweigh 
the short-term gains from exploiting a partner 
conditional punishment strategies make cooperation 
possible.’28 
 
 The more uncertainty lies ahead, cooperation with other actors is the 
logical and safest choice to take. Uncertainty demands a kind of insurance to 
reduce “possible” danger that may come from unexpected processes of 
issues and things. Non-cooperative actions today work for increasing the 
danger in the future. The “shadow of the future” lies here. If state actors are 
enough prudent to extent their thinkings to such an uncertain possibility in 
the future, they will find the benefits and interests of being cooperative in the 
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international community. They might be selfish. Yet, even with their self-help 
nature, they can see the danger.  
 This truth has to be understood by state actors, if they become to 
appreciate the importance and effectiveness of cooperation and international 
institutions and organisations as an embodiment of it. Therefore, state actors 
are hoped to be enough rational and intelligent to perceive the rationality gap, 
adjust own norms to international standards and extend their thinking to the 
uncertain future.  
 
 
1.4: Reasons for Cooperation for State Actors 
 
1.4.1. Effects of Uncertain Future 
 
Apart from the state actor’s capability to cooperate, when and why do states 
like to cooperate? And in particular when the things are about security, what 
motivates states to build up cooperation with other states or through 
international/regional institutions and organisations? The motivation and the 
degree of motivation are important. No matter how much the states which 
are capable of dealing with the complexity of the institutions or systems of 
cooperation, it is difficult to expect that a particular cooperation works in a 
sustainable way without an appropriate motivation and a proper level of it. 
Capability to cooperate and motivation for cooperation must come hand in 
hand, if cooperation is successful. Then, the higher the level of motivation is, 
the more it will compensate for or give a force to overcome obstacles and 
problems in the cooperation. 
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 As suggested, at the most fundamental level, uncertainty of future and 
a need of insurance for that are the most general reason for international 
cooperation, since institutions, systems or rules will work for reducing 
uncertain and unexpected things to happen. In other words, institutions, 
systems or rules, in theory, increase predictability, as long as they are 
followed by state actors. A number of newly independent post-colonial states 
in Africa and Asia affiliated to international organisations after WWII, in 
particular to the UN and the family agencies. They are also developing their 
own regional cooperation through establishing regional organisations, like 
the African Union (AU, the successor of the Organization of African Unity or 
OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
Similarly, the East European countries, after the end of the Cold War, 
became so enthusiastic to join the Western international/regional 
organisations, in particular the EU. Their motivation was largely due to 
uncertainty of themselves, which were fragile, as well as of their external 
economic, political and security environment. Affiliation to international 
organisations mitigates these uncertainties.  
 A number of uncertainties take a variety of shapes in the international 
or inter-state levels. All concerned parties to such uncertainties need to come 
up to solve or improve the situations. Therefore, just as liberals 
‘[emphasizes]’, ‘states enter [the] agreements to help solve coordination 
problems, to prompt third parties to change particular policies, or to help 
enforce bargains.’ International institutions, organisations and regimes are ‘to 
resolve cross-border issues that cannot otherwise be addressed 
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domestically.’29 The international spaces of this type are more “public” and 
less “personal”.  
 The states in the post-modern world relatively takes a liberal approach 
toward international cooperation through inter-state frameworks and 
international institutions and organisations which is for solving the problems 
that they cannot do so separately at the practical level and for making pro-
active mechanisms for any dangers and crises as much as possible. Today, 
the problems are mainly soft security issues that loosely relate to economic, 
environmental and human rights issues. The areas of security are collectively 
called human security at the current time. The post-modern world has been 
offering the individual-centric security concept since the end of the Cold War, 
partly because their mature liberal democratic conditions allow a number of 
individuals to affect national and international politics, if not to control it. With 
the internal experience, the elites of the states have a better understanding 
about how to create, preserve and fortify the complex systems of cooperation 
with democracy as public good. They also know that the effective 
management of complex systems requires to let the systems run by the rule 
of law to generate authority. While they are not completely free from 
temptation to run international affairs at their will through their power in 
international politics, the states in the post-modern world are much more 
aware of the possible risk of unintended results by such actions or 
uncertainties. At the same time, the states in the post-modern worlds are 
sensitive about ethics, morality and mutual respect and afraid of being seen 
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with the image of their colonial past which. It may be true that some of the 
states are enough powerful to make a unilateral action. However, the states 
in the post-modern world are currently not interested in re-constructing 
colonialism, thinking of the cost and morality.  
 This general inclination of the states in the post-modern world may be 
welcome. If international institutions and organisations are run by the rule of 
law, if the powers do not abuse their power, and if the powers are somehow 
willing to empower the structural character of international institutions and 
organisations for the agreed raison d’être, it does not immediately cause a 
serious problem of international cooperation even though the powers are 
inside in them. Probably, politics is still played out. Nevertheless, as long as 
the powers do not step out of the “logic” and “rules” of appropriateness” in 
the international community, the institutions and organisations can preserve 
their fair degree of legitimacy. If a sphere of cooperation consists of only the 
states in the post-modern world, the risk of free-riding and defection is likely 
low due to their norms to follow the rule of law and restrict themselves from 
overplaying their power and influence. 
 However, there are other relatively powerful states in another kind, 
which convince themselves of the effectiveness of their political “clout” to 
navigate their external environment or international relations at their will, 
rather aim to create a means to influence their power. This is the position 
that realism takes. ‘The most powerful states in the system create and shape 
institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even 
increase it.’ Thus, ‘institutions are essentially “arenas for acting out power 
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relationships.”’ 30  If the powers intentionally run the institutions and 
organisations by the competition of their political “clout” or the distribution or 
projection of power, the quality of international cooperation and legitimacy 
may be vitiated, since raison d’être the cooperation is, in practice, replaced 
with the virtual intension of the powers that is uncritical supports for their 
interests and policies, though the replacement may not be clearly noticed by 
the outsiders and the intension may be undisclosed.  
 The distribution or projection of power in the realist institutional theory 
may be convenient for accounting for, for example, the decision-making 
system of the UN Security Council in which the so-called permanent five 
have the exclusive right to cast a veto. The UN is primarily a product of the 
pre-1945 international security thinking, like balance of power, hegemony or 
colonialism under which militarily powerful states determined the fate of the 
other parts of the world. However, the theories may not be capable of 
explaining why, for example, NATO’s decision-making system is unanimity, 
since the US led the formation of the organisation in the 1950s and its 
contribution to the military alliance has been clearly greater than any other 
member states. Rather, it can be said that NATO is run by the rule of law and 
US’s voluntary restrain of influence in a certain degree. 
 The norm of the distribution or projection of power tends to appear in 
the pre-modern and modern worlds. With the lack of deep trust (or the 
accumulation of the positive history of the games/relations to let actors bet 
on the future), the security-biased mode of thinking of the states in the pre-
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modern and modern worlds has been firmly normalised and translated into 
their behaviour. The stake of cooperation in these worlds is high in the 
suspicious minds of the leaders. Then, it is absolutely difficult for them to 
switch to the post-modern cooperative mode of thinking and behaviour when 
they come to the international community where the post-modern thinking 
has been already poured at least at the level of language and wordings. In 
the pre-modern and modern worlds, if the states take cooperative actions, 
there is a high possibility that the cooperation is rather a temporary pretence, 
intrigue or plan to get things go in their favour. Uncertainty of future may not 
be always enough to persuade them to “risk” themselves offering 
cooperation first as Axelrod proposes.  
 
1.4.2. When Non-Cooperative State Actors Initiate Cooperation 
 
Despite their generally non-cooperative preference, the states in the pre-
modern and modern worlds may step into cooperation when interests are so 
clear, physical, practical and specified. With the visible interests, they can 
adapt (temporarily or strategically) the attitude of cooperation, if not a 
genuine or permanent cooperation, as long as the “baits” continue to exist. 
Or, the states may be learn from the failures of non-cooperation in the past 
and change their patterns of actions.  
 Russia, in Cooper’s categorisation, belongs to somewhere between the 
pre-modern and modern worlds, and, for example, is infamous in having 
made a number of strategic moves and defections in the energy business 
world. In the 2000s, the Russian government worked hard to “legally” expel 
                                            
eds. Theories of War and Peace. 2nd printing. Cambridge, Massachusetts 
  54 
foreign energy corporations, like the British Petroleum (BP), from Russia, 
imposing a number of inconvenient regulations for international business 
(like the visa for foreign workers or cross-border money transactions) and 
questioning environmental damages, after Russian energy companies 
received the investment money from the foreign corporation. The Russian 
strategic moves successfully removed foreign energy giant corporations and 
allowed Gazprom or Rosneft, which are virtually the “Kremlin inc.”, to rule the 
Russian natural resources and market. In the 2010s, however, due to the 
development of shale gas extraction technology by the Western energy 
companies and the delay of the Russian companies to catch up the 
development, the Russian government has shifted its energy policy into a 
cooperative mode. The shale gas revolution in the US since 2008 (after the 
Georgian War) has collapsed the gas price at the international market. The 
cheap price, then, has derailed the revenue plan of the Russian government. 
Russian internal demand of oil and gas is also increasing along with the 
economic development and the government has realised that it has to 
distribute the energy products to the internal market where profits are limited 
in comparison to the international market. Therefore, the country is under 
pressure in the financial term. In addition, the Russian energy companies are 
suffering from the lack or limitation of technology to drill out and distribute 
their energy products. These problems and reality point the need of 
international cooperation with the foreign energy corporations that the 
Russian government used to expel from the Russian business. In April 2012, 
Rosneft signed a deal with Exxon Mobile over the exploitation of the Arctic’s 
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resources, which was hailed as a landmark deal.31 In October, BP made a 
similar deal with the Russian company through a trade of the stock of a 
Russian-British joint project company, TNK-BP.32 It still requires the future 
observation for some years to come to judge whether Russia in this specific 
issue has adjusted the aggressive behavioural norm to the international 
standards or is hiding its pro-defection nature aiming at free-riding. 
Nevertheless, this fact indicates that the states in the pre-modern and 
modern worlds can be cooperative in some circumstances, even though the 
cooperation is a result of the strategic thinking. If Russian leaders, in 
particular Vladimir Putin, have learned from the lesson of uncertainty (in this 
case, the technological development), Russia may gradually adapt itself to 
the international standards of international business and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that Russia has joined in 2012, at last.  
 What the case of Russia also implies is that security is not all about 
national military security or physical territorial defence. States need 
economic security to sustain themselves as a coherent unit. In particular, the 
powers require a certain scale of economy to feed their state organs to 
manage the internal affairs, at least. In the pre-modern and modern worlds, 
the powers are also less-democracies or non-democracies. And, like the 
radical case of China,33 internal instability may cost heavily to deal with. The 
elites of the powers in the worlds are also likely corrupted. The corrupt elites 
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in the states usually need to economically feed the persons in their circle to 
sustain their power. For the less/non-democratic governments, therefore, 
economic security is about the survival of the less/non-democratic regimes. 
In many cases, the economic activities require to link with other states. Even 
North Korea, which is probably one of the most isolated countries in the 
world, has to resort to trade with, for example, China, Iran or some African 
countries in foods, natural resources or arms to get enough economic 
resources to sustain the Kim (dynastic) regime.  
 Therefore, the reasons of individual states to render international 
cooperation are not necessarily all about military hard security and the 
territorial defence of states anymore. This expansion of the fields and kinds 
of security is a source of the deepening complication of international relations 
that increases uncertainty.  
 
1.4.3. Deepening Complexity in International Peace and Security and 
the Roles of Rules 
 
In fact, the post-Cold War era is confusingly chaotic, yet not necessarily so 
anarchic under the realist term. Chaotic, because hard or military security 
thinking does not fully provide a foundational set of values to calculate and 
justify state actions anymore. State interests used to be a synonymous to 
national security. However, state interests in the post-modern world have 
other priorities of state businesses, due to the reduction of the possibility of a 
global scale of war and small wars as the surrogates of the confrontation 
between the superpowers. Just looking at international security, in addition to 
the field of traditional inter-state hard security, there are terrorism, refugees, 
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organised crimes and human rights. Globalisation of economy is also 
contributing to the deepening complexity of the world as seen in the case of 
Russia above.  
 These issues were not treated as a priority when the Cold War structure 
absorbed nearly all energy and focus of international politics into 
international hard or military security. On the contrary, today, these issues 
are standing on the front line of international peace and security. They are 
most normally discussed, even though international hard or military security 
field does not completely lose its significance. At the same time, the amount 
of issues that should be deal with is quantitatively so vast for the most of 
states nowadays. The deepening complexity makes any states difficult to 
calculate the relations between state interests, state actions and the 
consequences to produce the maximum benefits. Furthermore, issues are 
crossing the line between “internal” and “external” of states. The theoretical 
separation of “internal” and “external” levels is being beaten by the global 
reality. Internal affairs affect foreign policy, and external affairs do internal 
policy. The phenomena are accumulated into the so-called two-level game 
theory.34 While it used to be a realist trademark in theory, the separation 
between “internal” and “external” levels is more and more becoming 
irrelevant in the ever complicating world. The development of the two-level 
                                            
34 The two-level game theory is often employed in explaining the former 
communist states’ affiliation to European regional organisations after the 
demise of communism in the 1990s, though the application of the theory can 
be wider. A basic assumption in the theory is that external or international 
actors and factors, such as affiliation to international organisations, can be 
used not only for arranging the international political environment 
surrounding states, but also for steering internal political situations over 
critical internal issues, such as democratisation. See: Mansfield, Edward D., 
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game theory is a response to the shifting trend of the reality. Then, the 
complexity just continues to complicate. 
 Therefore, as Axelrod’s game theory shows, there is possibility that the 
self-help state actors can be cooperative, even though they may not be 
immediately willing to make cooperation, because international cooperation 
is fundamentally an answer for the deepening complexity of international 
relations in the post-Cold War world from the post-modern world. The call for 
institutions for cooperation means that state actors would like to have 
structural mechanisms to deal with a number of issues, problems and conflict 
through non-personal and systematic approaches. Why non-personal? 
Because that better, if not perfectly, assures equality, impartiality and the rule 
of law inside the structures. Why systematic? Because threats and crises 
can unexpectedly emerge anytime and anywhere, so that the international 
community needs to be ready all the time. In fact, like humanitarian crises, 
international organisations provide an opportunity to initiate counter-
measures at the permanent base. International institutions and organisations 
can also work to increase predictability through the functions of rule-making, 
rule-enforcing and rule-observing. These means to increase predictability is 
more important in the increasing complexity of security agendas ever than 
before, since the functions and effects of rules go beyond just regulations.  
 What do rules do?  
 
‘Rules, for example, increase action capabilities and 
efficiency — the ability to solve policy problems and 
                                            
and Jon C. Pevehouse. (2006). Democratization and International 
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produce services. Yet the consequences of rules go 
beyond regulating strategic behavior by providing 
incentive structures and impacting transaction costs. 
Rules provide codes of meaning that facilitate 
interpretation of ambiguous worlds. They embody 
collective and individual roles, identities, rights, 
obligations, interests, values world views and 
memory, thus constrain the allocation of attention, 
standards of evaluation, priorities, perceptions and 
resources. Rules make it possible to coordinate 
many simultaneous activities in a way that makes 
them mutually consistent and reduces uncertainty, 
for example by creating predictable time-rhythms 
through election and budget cycles ….’35 
 
If the broadest reason for states to commit international cooperation is the 
increasing uncertainty of international relations and the states would like to 
enhance predictability in future through making a rule-governed world, what 
are subordinate reasons for the cooperation to that?  
 First, there is legitimacy. In some situations, state actors need to earn 
legitimacy. International institutions and organisations are likely the only 
                                            
Organizations. International Organization. Vol. 60, Winter. pp.137-167. 
35 March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. (2009). The Logic of 
Appropriateness. ARENA Working Paper WP 04/09. ARENA Centre for 
European Studies (University of Oslo). Online: 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2004/wp04_9.pdf (accessed on 
2012-Sep-08), p.10-11. 
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means to get it at the current time. The post-Cold War era is witnessing the 
wane of the powerful states including the US. Mainly, the reasons come from 
the economic decline of the West in the world, while the developing countries, 
like the so-called BRICs countries, have grown. The Western countries are 
not so wealthy and militarily resourceful as they used to be. The most of 
them cannot construct or maintain the power projection style of international 
cooperation and institutions anymore. In other words, They are no longer 
capable of making and imposing an international order at their will, and the 
degree of unilateralism by the Western countries has clearly declined. The 
US may still have an edge to do that as seen in the constructing military 
alliance in invading Iraq in 2003, for example. Nevertheless, it arguably 
needed to use the UN to perform a “show” for legitimacy. A series of military 
mobilisations in the past two decades has made the US exhausted. The solo 
superpower of the world now would like to stay in the sphere of cooperation 
and the rule-driven and non-personal governing international institutional 
settings to cut the cost for its foreign policy. 
 Institutions can produce a sense of authorities and legitimacy. 
Legitimacy may be defined ‘as “a property of a rule or rule-making institution 
which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively 
because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into 
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right 
process.” Those principles guide the ways in which units of an international 
system act or behave.’ Further, ‘[l]egitimacy will ultimately depend on who is 
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gaining the monopoly of interpreting a given action as just and procedurally 
fair.’36  
 Traditionally, the monopoly has been given to the Western civilisation 
and, the reason may tend to be presented as the Western political influence 
in international institutions and organisations to deal with the procedures of 
international legitimacy. This is partially true, since a number of concepts and 
ideas of international law were first translated or codified by the Western 
civilisation in the Western languages. However, at the same time, the reason 
why the Western languages have been accepted in international law, 
institutions and organisations is because the logic (or translation or 
codification) sounds reasonable even for the other countries in other 
civilisations to a large extent. The reasonability is the ground for universality 
and the “logic of appropriateness.” 
 Legitimacy is about the “logic of appropriateness” based on how things 
should be done or the “rules of appropriateness”. The sense of legitimacy 
increases when things are run by the rule-driven, less personal or public-
minded way. While laws can be made by the powerful in society in their 
favour, these laws are likely to be regarded as too personal to be fair (= the 
rules are not appropriate). Unfortunately for the powerful, therefore, the 
possession of power does not guarantee the sense of fairness in general and 
legitimacy over their actions, though ‘“power and legitimacy are not 
antithetical but complementary[ ]”….’ If regarded as legitimate, the powerful 
need to strike a bargain with the weaker and create a moral agreement that 
the powerful follow the rules. In other words, ‘while the former agrees to stay 
                                            
36 Prantl, Jochen. (2005). Informal Groups of States and the UN Security 
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within the constitutional boundaries of the international system, the latter 
acknowledge the leading role of the hegemon in maintaining international 
peace and security.’37  The powerful have to show a satisfactory degree of 
its compliance to institutions to produce confidence on institutions, if they 
need to earn a meaningful legitimacy.  
 Earning a meaningful legitimacy is especially important in dealing with 
security issues related to humanitarian crises. The crises are likely the 
situations that the traditional (Westphalian) state sovereignty needs to be 
violated in order to bring the third parties for mitigating the tragic situations 
and founding the basis of peace. It is a post-modern idea that the violation of 
human rights and humanitarian crises should override the traditional state 
sovereignty. The states in the pre-modern and modern worlds are not 
comfortable for the idea. The first concern of the states of the pre-modern 
world is still the consolidation of the features of the state unitarity in the 
external relationship and they hope that the traditional state sovereignty 
guarantees non-intervention over their internal affairs whatever are 
happening inside their states including humanitarian disasters. The states in 
the modern worlds may be more solid in their internal state system. Yet, 
some of them are non/less-democracies and likely have a number of human 
rights issues that they would like to hide from external inquiries. Therefore, in 
some way, international institutions and organisations as the collectives of all 
these states, when occasions rise, decide an international intervention with 
the agreed terms and the formal procedures by the international community 
                                            
Council. International Organization. Vol. 59, Summer. p.582. 
37 Prantl, Jochen. (2005). Informal Groups of States and the UN Security 
Council. International Organization. Vol. 59, Summer. pp.582-583. 
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or all these states. No matter there are some states which are unhappy for 
the decision, the decision itself does not lose legitimacy.  
 Second, international legitimacy makes it possible to divide 
responsibility (or irresponsibility) in relation to decisions among state actors 
over issues. Through international institutions and organisations, state actors 
actually escape from taking the whole responsibility when some kinds of 
intervention are carried out.  
 In the Cold War, the two superpowers relatively had carte blanche to do 
even illegitimate actions in the places where they thought that the regions 
were their sphere of influence and could do, for example, clandestine military 
and espionage activities. While these illegitimate actions were not clearly 
announced by the governments of the two superpowers, there was a certain 
level of doubts and circumstantial evidences that suggested the links to the 
influence of the superpowers. Yet, the two superpowers were confident that 
their illegitimate actions would not be scrutinised and indicted by any 
authorities due to their outstanding power. In the post-Cold War era, 
although there are differences of the degree of influence on international 
politics, there is no single state that dominantly put all members of the 
international community under its control. Although there are powers in 
international politics, there is no superpower anymore. Illegitimate and 
forcible actions are brought into the international public scrutiny. Reputation 
is at stake and matters in a space where there are similarly powerful actors 
gathering. Where once the two superpowers enjoyed impunity has been 
replaced with critical inquiries.  
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 The so-called solo superpower, the US, today is unwilling to play a role 
of the world police. The solo superpower has realised that acting like the 
world police does not produce a result that the US would like to have. Rather, 
‘[I]t would … be criticized if it intervened in [some] situations, such as 
disputes elsewhere in the Middle East, in most of Latin America and much of 
Africa and in many other parts of the world.’38 This tendency has been 
enhanced under President Obama. Therefore, when and where legitimacy 
lacks and the right of impunity is not guaranteed, none of states are willing to 
take responsibility for their international actions.  
 At the same time, legitimate collective actions under the authorities of 
international collectives, like the UN, divide responsibility to the actions into 
some portions and distribute to the international collectives and, 
consequently, to the member states. Therefore, the collective actions can 
reduce the portions of responsibility that the powers respectively take in the 
moral and capability terms. 
 Third, legitimacy produces the positive profiles of actors in the 
international community. Legitimacy in the moral sense is a form of the 
“history of the game” and the “shadow of the future.” With it, states actors 
built up a kind of reputation as fairly responsible players in the light of respect 
of agreements and the rule of law in the international community. That 
reputation helps to reduce the cost of future diplomacy in a variety of 
situations. In the time when none of states can enjoy a complete impunity in 
                                            
38 Mendez, Ruben P. ‘Global Public Good’ in: Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg 
and Marc A. Stern [eds.]. Global Public Goods - International Cooperation in 
the 21st Century. UNDP. Oxford University Press: New York, Oxford, p.391. 
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their international actions, the positive reputation is a very valuable asset and 
not so easy to recover after it is damaged by illegitimate or forcible actions. 
 Forth, the division of resources also matters even for state actors that 
wish to solve some cross-border problems or improve the situations, but do 
not have sufficient resources to deal with. The resources consist of finance, 
material resources and human resources. Today’s cross-border issues of 
terrorism, refugees, organised crimes and human rights need a great amount 
of the resources, if they are properly dealt with in some way. Without a 
question, international institutions and organisations are the huge pools of 
the resources. Normally, the governments of states are suffering from a 
shortage of incomes and do. Therefore, the international pooling system of 
finance is in any way welcome.  
 Yet, it is also a fact that the most of international institutions and 
organisations are troubled in financing, in particular, by non-payment of the 
membership fees by some of their member states. The UN is chronically 
anaemic in the financial term since many member states do not pay their 
dues. The EU’s budgetary problem is threatening the continuation of the EU 
itself, especially after the deterioration of the Euro crisis. Yet, the EU’s 
problems may be, so far, still a better case. The member states are not 
working hard to break the Union and the issues are still fundamentally 
monetary. The IMF may have its own way of generating finance working as 
“the international bank” lending money to and getting interests from  a 
number of states. However, the IMF is an exception. Who pays for 
cooperation is really a big issue.  
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 In the field of international peace and security especially when issues 
require to mobilise international military intervention, the three types of 
resources always become the problems immediately and simultaneously. 
Along with finance, material and human resources in this field are hard to 
collect even when the peace operations have the international institutional 
endorsements. Except the case that the US’s willingness of intervention is 
high enough to let it engage in obtaining an international legitimacy and 
preparing its military troops in the name of international peace operations, 
like the case of Iraq War in 2003, there are few ways to get the satisfactory 
amount of the financial, material and human resources. Knowing this 
weakness, however, it can be said that international institutional frameworks 
still mitigate the shortage of the resources to some extent, extending the 
calls for asking cooperation not only to individual states but also to other 
international/regional institutions and organisations in order to divide the 
necessary resources into the more number of actors. 
 Nevertheless, the spreading of responsibility over the resources may 
have a dark side. As seen in the CIS and Russian peacekeeping operations 
in some former Soviet Union republics, the surrogated peace operations to 
individual states and/or international/regional organisations may assist to 
create and consolidate the hegemony in a region by a state, since the 
operations likely involve military aspects. This relates to regional order, which 
will be discussed later.  
 The states which prefer the projection of power can steal legitimacy 
through the surrogated operations. In fact, the CIS and Russian 
peacekeeping operations have to be said as a sham for Russia’s die-hard 
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appetite to be the regional superpower, due to the lack of accountability to 
the international community, in particular to the UN, the surrogating body of 
the operations. A similar interpretation would have been applied to the US’ 
actions on Iraq and Afghanistan under the name of the international coalition 
forces or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which is provided by 
NATO, respectively. The difference is that the US’ operations are joined by 
other powers in the West, like Britain, and relatively under the scrutiny of 
international media, while the CIS/Russian operations are largely hidden.  
 This is a reflection of the current international community which consists 
of Cooper’s three worlds. Peace operations joined by the states from the 
post-modern world are qualitatively different from peace operations joined 
(solely) by the states from the pre-modern and modern worlds in terms of the 
reasons, styles and degree of international cooperation. The liberal post-
modern world is the soft power world: rule-driven, norm-counted and 
structure-forcing. The realist, pre-modern and modern worlds tend to be the 
hard power world: power-driven, power-distribution or power-quelling. The 
difference between the worlds produces different qualitative consequences 
even from the ostensibly same actions. Then, a huge question lies in the fact 
that the international community consists of state actors from all these worlds 
that can be fragmented into, at least, the two contrasting spheres or the three 
worlds as Cooper says.  
 The UN and OSCE are the outstanding examples of this reality due to 
their geographic covering range. The EU, until the Euro Crisis had revealed, 
might have been (mis)understood as a collection of similarly mature 
democracies (or the state actors of the post-modern world). Now, we are 
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observing the North-South and mature and young democracy divisions within 
the EU-Europe. Are these divisions only a matter of economy or something 
greater? Are they not divided between the post-modern and the modern 
worlds? Under the reality of the international community, how can coherency 
of international institutions, organisations and regimes with the state actors 
from all three worlds be established under the name of international 
cooperation? Is there a kind of glue to stick the worlds together?  
 
1.4.4. Common Good, Public Good and International Institutions and 
Organisations 
 
In a closed space of the international community, the members have to 
continue to play the game of international interaction and independency in 
the indefinite period of time. The calculation of individual interests is so 
complex and information about other state actors is not perfectly clear. 
Therefore, a set of necessary conditions for generating cooperation is 
enough in the light of Axelrod’s theory on cooperation. Yet, cooperation 
needs more to initiate among self-help state actors, if a long term (therefore, 
not strategic) cooperation is produced. What provides sufficient conditions?  
 A possible answer is to raise awareness on and foster the idea of 
“common good” with another term, “public good”. Here, “common good” is 
discussed, while “public good” will be in the next chapter. “Common good,” 
has already appeared in this thesis here and there. According to Bruce 
Cronin, “common good” is ‘a concept of interest that transcends parochial 
definitions of expected utility’ and ‘state must recognize some type of benefit 
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or value that cannot be reduced to calculations of individual self-interest’39. 
“Common good”, following Cronin’s image, is a set of shared interests that 
serve all of a framework but not for one or a few. This may be a useful notion 
to expound on why some moral-based principles, norms and values which 
are not directly connected to state’s gains or losses in international relations 
are promoted, spread and even sometimes institutionalised, such as human 
rights, the rule of law or democracy, through the collectives of states.  
 As anyone can notice, this view sounds very much like a post-modern 
idea. Due to the relatively strong influence of the states in the post-modern 
world, human security mainly consisting of human rights, the rule of law or 
democracy has become an international standard in the major international 
organisations, like the UN, the EU and the OSCE. However, it is hard to see 
a direct connection between state’s interests and other states’ conditions 
over human rights, the rule of law and democracy. The realist view tends to 
curtail its consideration over internal conditions of states in its IR thinking and 
the traditional liberalist view derives cooperation primarily from economically 
mutual interests across states through international trade. Although 
liberalism in general has a flexible perception of interests and a capacity to 
accept the beliefs as part of state interests, there is not so much articulation 
even in liberalism in defining human rights, the rule of law and democracy as 
a state’s national interest in foreign policy, other than relying on an 
ambiguous moral authority. Therefore, “common good” is something beyond 
the scope of realism and liberalism in a conventional sense. Cronin explains 
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Protection regimes in International Society. Cambridge, New York, 
Melbourne and Cape Town: Cambridge University Press. p.12. 
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that “common good” is located in ‘a deeper level of interdependence than the 
liberal concept; it is based not only on a recognition of mutual vulnerability (or 
sensitivity) to each other’s actions, but also on a shared sense that all states 
have a positive stake in building and maintaining long-term [relationships].’40  
 Socialisation in the version of Sociological IR, in this sense, may be in 
the better position of discussing on the deeper level of interdependence and 
why some, if not all, state actors in the post-modern international community 
promote the beliefs that are unlikely to immediately provide clear and 
tangible state foreign policy goals in a foreseeable future. What makes the 
concept of interests transcend the parochial concept of interests and has 
state actors more aware of some type of benefit or value that cannot be 
reduced to calculations of individual self-interest? 
 In the post-Cold War era, in fact, there is the increase of demand for the 
further normalisation of human rights, the rule of law and democracy in the 
international community as a whole not just as a slogan but as a real task. It 
is not only for coming from the states of the post-modern world but also 
some — though not all — of the pre-modern and modern worlds, if one tries 
to listen the voices not only from the elites of states but also from the 
ordinary populations. In the nature of human rights, the rule of law and 
democracy, there is something that transcends the difference of the three 
worlds.  
 There are few, if not none of, groups of people, states, cultures or 
civilisations in the world that immediately deny the concepts and value of 
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Melbourne and Cape Town: Cambridge University Press. p.16. 
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human rights, the rule of law and democracy. In particular about human 
rights, since they are concerned to all human beings on this planet, the call 
for the protection of the rights can get a great number of support. Although 
the codification of human rights in international law has been done largely by 
the Western civilisation which is the current post-modern world, many people, 
cultures or civilisations in the non-Western worlds insist that the same or 
similar ideas exist in their worlds too, like the Islamic world. There must be 
some differences in details, and the way of practicing the rights is not 
identical to the Western world. Nevertheless, they would like to claim that 
human rights are also cherished even in their worlds for a long time, and not 
exclusively Western.  
 In a sense, this is correct. The most of civilisations possess the idea to 
care for humanity because caring other humans, like own children, parents, 
relatives and the members of the own community, is essential and necessary 
for any human life. Therefore, it is possible to regard that the idea to care for 
humanity, whatever the name is, is transcendent across the world. In another 
sense, however, the belief is wrong. Developing a vague idea into a solid 
ideology that everyone can clearly identify is not just what a culture or 
civilisation may have a similar idea. Normalisation, codification and 
legalisation of an idea require a “leap” through the verbalisation of the idea 
with detailing the elements, curtailing ambiguous parts and bringing to the 
public for enquiries. Then, finally, the idea becomes a form which can be put 
into the process to make it into agreements or laws. The process takes for 
years, decades or centuries, and the success needs a very conscious 
approach to the idea. Therefore, although they can be transcendent all over 
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the world at the primordial level, human rights at the legal level are 
essentially a product of the Western civilisation written in the Western 
language. 
 Nevertheless, the transcendent nature of human rights at the primordial 
level certainly produces a greater acceptance of the idea even though it has 
already been transformed into a set of rights. The nature at the primordial 
level leads what some call “universality.” Then, the nature and the quality of 
universality make a greater number of individuals, groups of peoples and 
states sense a moral threshold and stake in action that may breach the rights. 
International human rights law further enhances the sense and consolidate 
the rights as enforceable ones, even though the practice and application of 
human rights law vary according to states, cultures and civilisations. Human 
rights are probably one of the most basic and important conceptual 
infrastructures in the international community in order to share the world 
where different individuals from different states, cultures and civilisations 
come and go between them. In this sense, human rights are a common good 
(and even a public good) not only for individuals but also for international 
relations in the post-Cold War. 
 Democracy and the rule of law, however, may possess a lesser degree 
of universality than human rights. They are about governance and directly 
relate to the interests of the elites of states. The elites of some states are not 
welcome democracy which may minimise their power. Then, when they are 
verbally expounded, democracy and the rule of law are too sophisticated and 
Western to be immediately understood and sensed with reality by the 
average peoples in the world due to the lack or short of experience of them. 
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It should be reminded that, even today after a number of countries have 
converted into democracy since the end of the Cold War, democracies, 
especially mature democracies, are minorities, while non-democracies are 
majority. Democracy and the rule of law are not capable of deeply reaching 
individuals, groups of peoples, states, cultures and civilisations as much as 
human rights are, since they are not primordially shared. Nevertheless, 
democracy and the rule of law are becoming the very important components 
of the post-Cold War security concept along with human rights. The concept 
is called human security and enthusiastically promoted by the Western-led 
international institutions and organisations, even though the influence of the 
West may be waning. 
 This phenomenon can be considered in a critical sense as a soft case 
of the distribution and projection of power, since the effort does not directly 
connect to material state interests of the Western countries which are usually 
the states in the post-modern world. Furthermore, human security, if 
achieved and properly applied, does not construct a Western empire or 
superpower, even though the West is the mother of the idea. This looks an 
unselfish act in a short-term tactical view. In a long-term strategic view, 
however, it is possible to interpret that the success of the effort will provide 
safer environment of international relations, based on the theory of 
democratic peace that has become fashionable among the prominent 
leaders and politicians among the states in the post-modern world in the 
post-Cold War era. At the same time, it can be an insurance policy for the 
declining power of the West (or the rising power of some developing 
countries) to comfortably survive in the international community in the future 
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with making the states in the pre-modern and modern worlds satisfactory 
democratic as much as possible and conditioning them for the scheme of the 
democratic peace theory.  
 Whatever the West’s true intention is (or no matter there is an absence 
of the intention), the concepts of human security, human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law are undeniably sustainable for the long-term campaign 
over decades, since they are, at the conceptually fundamental level, morally 
and simply justifiable. They cover the welfare of a greater number of peoples 
regardless of their nationalities and ethnicities, providing a language to claim 
the rights. In addition, since the means of the scheme are the Western soft 
power and weight on “attraction” rather than “imposition”, “domination” or 
“subjugation”, in a sense, this Western attempt is a stealth way of building a 
conceptual institution and a sphere of cooperation based on some concepts 
or ideologies that the West successfully verbalised before other civilisations 
did. Then, it seems that the states in the pre-modern and modern worlds lack 
a counter-soft power to conspicuously deny the attempt.  
 
 
1.5: Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines the possibility of cooperation by active, self-help 
realistic state actors. They are the most difficult actors to form international 
cooperation in terms of not only their egoistic preference but also their 
capability to behave orderly, institutionally and coherently. Cooper’s three 
worlds provide a useful categorisation to explain why there are some states 
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which are positive in making cooperation and some which are negative in 
doing so. The background of states’ external environments counts about this 
point.  
 However, if there are means to introduce self-help state actors into a 
sphere of cooperation, they make them “susceptible” to uncertainty of future 
or the shadow of future and ever-increasing complexity to calculate interests 
transaction. With the unexpected change of circumstances, the self-help 
state actors may start cooperation strategically. Even so, it is the beginning 
and the possibility of genuine cooperation may be led through the indefinite 
number of interaction among other state actors. There are ways that self-
help state actors can learn cooperation as Axelrods suggests.  
 It is possible to connect self-help state actors through making them 
recognise the existence of a number of “common goods”. They may not 
serve the national interests of a state in a short term. Nevertheless, like the 
insurance policy of the declining Western great powers, they may serve that 
in a long term.  
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2: Theories of International 
Cooperation for Structural 
Actors  
 
Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin appropriately cast a question; ‘[how] 
are we to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in 
expanding international institutions, if such institutions are lacking in 
[significance]’ 41 ? Indeed, international institutions are, in some way, 
important in international relations. Yet, rational theorists or the game theory 
supporters in realism are not so positive for international institutions. They 
are fundamentally negative for, if not completely deny, ideas that values will 
shape non-materialistic assets, like respect, trust, norms or expectation, and 
generate influence over materialistic interests. These assets do not fit to the 
zero-sum game thinking that is traditionally adored by realists in IR due to 
their materialistic and calculable preference.  
 Since realism was relatively the dominating theory in IR until the end of 
the Cold War, liberalism had been defensive in expounding what the liberal 
language about trust, norms and expansion really means. Liberal emphasis 
on international economy probably sounded an evasion for realist ears. The 
end of the Cold War reduced the portion of hard security and increased that 
of soft security in international security thinking to take into account in the 
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process of theorisation. As a result, realism lost the reality that the theory 
would soundly work, while liberalism was re-evaluated.  
 In sum, the traditional realism works in the reality in which hard security 
in inter-state relations overrides any other interests from non-hard security 
fields and there is a relatively clear distinction between enemies and allies. It 
suits strategic thinking based on a short-term view, a tactical move and 
material and calculable interests in the confrontation between the enemies 
and allies. It focuses on active actors who can show selfishness as a 
character, while it is less aware of the cooperative character of active actors 
and structural actors who rather possess a non-personal nature. The theory 
sets itself and lays the base of its logic in a confrontational mode. Realists 
may unconsciously presuppose that states will aim only at hegemony, 
dominance and control over other states and never choose to put 
themselves under the rule of law in international institutions, as the 
supporters of free-market economy have a strong belief that the right way is 
“growth at any cost” and “no governmental interference in any situation”.  
 Since the end of the Cold War changed the balance of hard and soft 
security in foreign policy and security thinking, the IR theory must incorporate 
with what are counted in soft security which includes economy, natural 
environment, organised crimes, terrorism, human rights and governance. 
International cooperation, institutions and organisations are also given a 
greater focus more than ever before due to the function to coordinate active 
state actors through the institutional frameworks. These concerns of soft 
security have been treated rather by the liberal sector of the IR theory. The 
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post-Cold War reality in the peace and security field is filled with these 
concerns and requires structures as institutions to deal with them effectively. 
Therefore, structural actors also deserve an equal attention to active actors.  
 Yet, structural actors are not always and immediately noticeable unlike 
active actors. Since they are usually non-personal and exist as environment 
surrounding active actors (e.g., states), it takes a more effort to identify 
structural actors and their roles and effects. In this sense, structural actors 
may look like passive actors in contrast to active actors in terms of character. 
Structure actors take a variety of (non-personal) forms. In international 
relations, they include the international/regional orders and systems, the 
global (natural) environment, international norms and rules, and 
international/regional institutions and organisations. They are, in a liberal 
sense, defined as ‘explicit arrangements, negotiated among international 
actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behaviour.’42 Here, the 
“explicit arrangements” mean ‘treaties and conventions, that regulate 
behavior.’43 
 Structural actors like these “arrangements” do not shape themselves 
and are in some cases consciously constructed by active actors for some 
purposes. However, structural actors, in fact, influence the actions and 
decisions of active actors who are involved in them. Structural actors even 
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impose some results on active actors as inevitable things. Therefore, 
structural actors can be generally defined as ‘the “rule of the game” of a 
particular social group, or a set of norms that shape behavior in a social 
space’44. In an extension, international structural actors turn out to be norms, 
rules and values in the international community, and have to wait to be 
engaged by active actors in the process of the social space. The degree of 
strength or weakness in engagement by active actors determines the 
durability and the forms of structural actors. 
 However, recently, some well-constructed and workable 
international/regional organisations gradually start showing a certain degree 
of “activeness” or “ego” that is resemble to what active actors are supposed 
to possess, like states, representing their members in some international 
talks. Of course, it is too early and not satisfactory to articulate that 
international institutions and organisations have converted to active actors. 
Probably, they will never do completely and entirely. However, some of 
international institutions and organisations can be regarded as an exception. 
They are a hybrid entity somewhere between “active” actors and “structural” 
ones, in particular when they are engaged by the states in the post-modern 
world which have the post-modern ideas and norms, since the states in the 
world are relatively open for letting the institutions and organisations be 
autonomous even curbing their sovereignty to some extent under the name 
of international cooperation. As already implied, they are aware of necessity 
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of automatic and voluntary functioning of the institutions and organisations, if 
they work satisfactorily in the complex world. 
 International cooperation or non-cooperation is a matter of the 
international orders and systems in the international community. Where 
cooperation functions, it implies that amity, friendship or respect are working 
in the orders and systems. Where non-cooperation appears, it means that 
enmity, confrontation and competition are lurking in the orders and systems. 
If these conditions are noticed in international relations, they can be identified 
as one of the backgrounds behind state’s actions and decisions in foreign 
policy. Thus, international cooperation or non-cooperation can be part of 
structural actors, in particular when it is normalised and institutionalised at a 
permanent base. Such cooperation may be one which is arranged through 
international agreements, institutions and organisations. Therefore, 
international cooperation also becomes a matter of norms and rules. Then, 
these matters are about society.  
 Society has “private” and “public” and the aspects of being a meeting 
space and a processing space in relation to the members of society. 
International institutions and organisations usually belong to the “public” side 
functioning as a meeting and processing spaces of the members of the 
institutions and organisations. This is because they have been made through 
inter-governmental agreements by the governments of states which are 
public actors in society. What “publicness” does is to generate and sustain 
public goods to make society function smoothly. The international community 
with deepening complexity in the 21st century needs public institutions to 
deal with a number of problems that cannot be solved by a state alone but by 
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a number of states. Public goods include the rule of law in international 
institutions and organisations that brings institutionally automatic and 
systematic functions of institutional norms and rules over presupposed 
situations.  
 Among the problems, the most overarching public good in the 
international community lies in the field of international peace and security 
where each member of the community becomes very cynical, strategic and 
realistic due to what is at stake. This section considers international public 
goods as raison d’être of international cooperation, institutions and 
organisations. It also examines international cooperation from the view of 
structural actors, keeping in mind international peace and security. Structural 
actors concerning with international peace and security include not only 
international cooperation, international institutions and organisations, but 
also regionality such as regional orders and systems as well as regional 
cooperation/non-cooperation. Cooper’s three worlds are also connected to 
regionality in relation to international/regional institutions and organisations, 
as already insinuated to some extent. The political environment surrounding 
states geographically and/or conceptually affects what type of cooperation 
appears. In other words, the condition limits the qualities and kinds of 
cooperation. Cooper’s divisions of the world are again useful to know which 
type of cooperation is likely to rise in a geographical and/or conceptual 
region, a circumstance and a relationship of states. 
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2.1: Private Property or Public Goods - Raison 
d'être of International Institutions and 
Organisations 
 
Public institutions and organisations must have public purposes as raison 
d’être. With them, the institutions and organisations can be justified even 
when they are malfunctioning and obsolete. The institutions and 
organisations may be given opportunities to reform, reorganise or be reborn 
into new institutions and organisations. As long as they work for public goods 
— including peace —, their necessity can last for a very long term.  
 In the following argument, there are the concepts of “publicness”, 
“public goods” and “public policies” as well as “privateness”, “private goods” 
and “private policies”. The concepts of “publicness”, “public goods” and 
“public policies” largely related to “global public goods” by, for example, Inge 
Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern. 
 
‘Global public goods must meet two criteria. The first 
is that their benefits have strong qualities of 
publicness — that is, they are marked by nonrivalry 
in consumption and nonexcludability. These features 
place them in the general category of public goods. 
The second criterion is that their benefits are quasi 
universal in terms of countries (covering more than 
one group of countries), people (accruing to several, 
preferably all, population groups), and generations 
(extending to both current and future generations, or 
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at least meeting the needs of current generations 
without foreclosing development options for future 
generations). This property makes humanity as a 
whole the publicum or beneficiary of global public 
goods.’45 
 
The definition of “global public goods” surely stems from public goods in 
economics. The idea, however, can be traced back to David Hume’s 
“common good” appeared in his Treaties of Human Nature (1739).  
 According to Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, public goods are divided into 
two categories — pure public goods and impure public goods. Pure public 
goods are understood as something perfectly nonrivalrous in consumption 
and nonexcludability. They are rare and short supply. Peace is arguably 
categorised as a pure public good. Defence (such as national defence 
system or military) is more controversial than peace is, though it is relatively 
taken as an example of a pure public good. Impure public goods fall into two 
categories — ‘[g]oods that are nonrivalrous in consumption but excludable’ 
and ‘[g]ood that are mostly nonexcludable but rivalrous in consumption’. The 
former is ‘club goods’, and the latter is ‘common pool resources’.46 
 What makes a thing a public good is the existence of positive 
externalities with it. Externalities are ‘by-products of certain activities — 
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spillovers into the public sphere’. 47  Some international and/or regional 
institutions and organisations possess positive externalities that bring them 
beyond their institutional boundaries and let them unintentionally deliver 
positive by-products to the greater world. Some international and/or regional 
institutions and organisations, however, less do so or do not.  
 Precisely saying, international organisations are international inter-
governmental organisations and belong to the public sector. Ostensibly and 
theoretically, the government of states is a public institution, so that the 
collection of the governments from a number of states in the form of 
international institutions and organisations are expected to act like a public 
personality who is neutral, impartial, fair and authoritative in the international 
community. Ideally, they should possess the ability to coordinate and 
arbitrate the conflicts of interests among state actors and, if necessary, to 
judge  and punish the violators of institutional agreements and rules.  
 Despite such an expectation, not all international institutions and 
organisations are acting and functioning following such expectation. There 
are many reasons why some of international institutions and organisations 
are able or unable to function like a public personality. Fundamentally, it 
depends on whether they have the institutionally formulated purposes that 
can intentionally or unintentionally produce and deliver positive externalities 
to the international community as a whole or not.  
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 If the positive externalities emerge by an institution and organisation, 
then, it bears “publicness” or the “public character”. Then, the “public 
character” of the purposes makes the institution and organisation stand for 
the long-lasting test of time, since the necessity, reasoning and desirability of 
"publicness" are relatively irrelevant to the difference of times, places, 
individual or state's positions and situations in society or a unit. If the 
purposes can survive for the long term, in the other way round, it proves the 
existence of the “public character” or positive externalities in the purposes. 
Human rights are one of this kind of things. Furthermore, it also depends on 
whether international institutions or organisations are run by the internal 
“distribution or projection of power” or run by the internal “rule of law.” The 
style of management of international institutions and organisations, in fact, 
influences on whether they can preserve for a long time the “public character” 
or not.  
 The rule-driven or rule of law management minimises possibility that a 
powerful state actor in an international institution or organisation distorts the 
course of action and hijacks it for its individual interests through the 
distribution or projection of power over the institution or organisation. On the 
contrary, the distribution or projection of power style of management is for 
the power or powers which are likely to dictate the course of the cooperation.  
 The rule of law style of management is opposite to the dictation. It is 
fundamentally for transparency, which is not always what the powers 
welcome. Although “who wrote the rule for whom” may be problematic, the 
style of management of international institutions or organisations more or 
less generates “publicness”. The institutions or organisations function as 
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“public goods” for the members of them, if they are associated with the rule 
of law style of management. The distribution or projection of power style of 
management may be close to the old type of diplomacy which the powers 
negotiate, transact and dictate the fate of the small states and the course of 
the international relations behind a door. Yet, if this style of diplomacy 
becomes the practice and norm of an international institution or organisation, 
the institutional nature and character of the institution or organisation may 
turn into a “private” entity for the power or powers for their individual national 
interests. As a result, transparency is reduced and, therefore, “publicness” is 
weakened even if “privateness” of a specific powerful state is not so 
conspicuous. 
 
2.1.1. The Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO 
 
The contrast between the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may be a good example of the 
combination of the issue of “publicness” and “privateness”, the style of 
institutional/organisational management and raison d’être of international 
institutions and organisations that make the institutional life expectancy last 
long.  The WTO went out when the Soviet Union demised, since it lost not 
only the organisational sponsor, which was the Soviet Union, but also the 
purposes through crumbling itself. For the most of the member states, NATO 
and the West were not the enemy, at least, at the time of 1991. There had 
been the imposition of the Soviet Union which forced the East European 
states to stay in the sphere of the Soviet Union and made the West the 
enemy. When the Soviet Union demised, the East European states were 
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released from the imposition and could not find any benefit to continue the 
WTO. They rather needed cooperative relations to the West to lead their 
economies into the liberal capitalism world. The WTO’s organisational 
purposes were the Soviet power-projection and hegemony as well as the 
control of the East Europe to deploy the Soviet military troops and nuclear 
missiles for the protection and threats from the enemy West. Without the 
Soviet Union, no other state in the member of the WTO was interested in 
running the organisation. It was a “private” property of the Soviet Union, so 
that it was natural that the WTO simply vanished into a thin air, because the 
purposes of the WTO were quite specifically operational and beneficial only 
for the Soviet Union.  
 On the contrary, the arch-rival military alliance, NATO, still exists even 
after the enemy was history. Of course, it was in the winning side of the Cold 
War. Yet, the survival after ending its primary purpose needed something 
more than just winning the Cold War. In retrospect, NATO was given a new 
role in a wider scheme of a new international security concept in the post-
Cold War and capable of playing the role. As many agree, the situation of the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s was a strong reason for the NATO’s survival 
and the emergence of the security concept in the international community. 
NATO’s military capabilities were essential for containing the civil wars and 
limiting ethnic cleansing. And, the international community, in particular the 
Western countries felt the necessity to protect individuals and ethnic 
minorities on the moral bases and their internal political mood. After the 
failures of the EU mediation and the UN’s safe zones due to the lack of 
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military capabilities, NATO was the last institutional framework to mobilise 
military power to the situation in the international community.  
 The NATO’s military mobilisation was not for the power projection or 
hegemony of the powerful or, in this case, the US. The US’s decision of 
using NATO’s institutional framework, rather than intervening by itself alone 
or with other allied countries under bilateral/multilateral agreements, was a 
departure from the modern world mode of state behaviour. The former 
Yugoslavia was not a direct issue for the US, if national security was 
paramount in the US security thinking. The fragmenting country was far away 
from the US homeland and the Soviet Union had gone. There was no 
tangible traditional security interest there. In this sense, the NATO’s military 
mobilisation had a kind of the public character. Of course, it was 
controversial and some were skeptical about the West’s intension. The 
Russian Federation, the successor state of the Soviet international 
commitments, was instinctively furious about the Western-led initiative, 
insinuating the theory of the US conspiracy. Nevertheless, the atrocities in 
the former Yugoslavia were too much for the most of the world audience to 
quell the traditional concern of invasion and justified the necessity of the 
international intervention. The European states, however, had some direct 
interests over the conflicts in terms of refugees and Europe’s peace itself. It 
is nothing strange if the Western European states had enthusiasm on the 
intervention. Yet, these concerns were far from the intention of colonisation. 
In addition, they had to work to get the US agree to the NATO’s mobilisation. 
The unanimity of the decision-making rule contributed to produce the 
"publicness" of the decision to some extent.  
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 Institutionally, NATO found a niche to survive in the post-Cold War era 
when it was becoming obvious that the post-modern world was crashing with 
the pre-modern and modern worlds in this period. NATO was and is an 
answer from the post-modern world to the chaos of the pre-modern and 
modern world. NATO’s military capabilities are a legacy of the Cold War era 
and has put the organisation into a quite unique position in the paradigm of 
the today’s international peace and security. No other international and 
regional organisation and private military contractors (PMCs) can do the 
same job yet. NATO can use the military power for a public purpose without 
losing a sense of publicness, if the process and procedures of the 
mobilisation are properly done.  
 Of course, a source of NATO’s publicness lies in its design of the 
decision-making that employs the unanimity rule, despite the US’s 
outstanding contribution to the capabilities and finance. Potentially, NATO 
can be the place of the US’s power projection or hegemony or of the 
competition among the US and some politically strong Western states which 
possess skills to negotiate with the US. Contrary to the WTO, however, 
NATO is comparatively more democratic than the WTO and has been 
keeping its institutional transparency to the international public eyes.  
 In sum, NATO has survived the last two decades because it possesses 
the unique military capabilities that can work for public purposes in the 
international community and has become a useful “public good” in the 
scheme of international peace and security in the post-Cold War. NATO has 
successfully converted its original raison d’être to a newly given one that is to 
become a “public good” not only for the NATO member states but also the 
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greater international community. NATO, of course, is still a military alliance 
under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and, when one of the member 
states is attacked, all member states have obligation to join the 
organisational collective response to the attack. Yet, when it is called by, for 
example, the UN for greater purposes than its organisational one, NATO can 
respond to the call and rent to the unique military capability. In addition, the 
interpretation of what the enemies are has been greatly expanded with the 
development of the post-Cold War. The enemies are not necessarily the 
military troops of a state and/or a military alliance. They may be terrorists 
and/or civil wars, as seen in the first mobilisation of Article 5 that was actually 
against the 9/11 Al-Qaeda’s attacks to the US in 2001. The expansion has 
had NATO evolve and transform into what is demanded in the post-Cold War 
peace and security paradigm. 
 
2.1.2. The UN 
 
If NATO has been successful in surviving the post-Cold War era without the 
existence of a clear enemy state like the Soviet Union due to its capabilities 
to work for public purposes as a public good, what are the reasons for the 
UN’s survival for more than half a century with the rather troublesome record 
in the field of peace and security? Fairly saying, limited to the military 
operations, NATO has been relatively effective, if not successful, when it 
goes to the missions. On the contrary, it is hard to say so about the UN, 
which is primarily an international peace and security organisation which is 
supposed to have the highest authority in theory. The so-called UN troops 
envisaged in the UN Charter are still a dream. The military capabilities of the 
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UN are severely limited. The organisation always has to assemble the peace 
operation forces borrowing the military personnel from the member states. 
Ostensibly, the right to command them is in the hands of the UN. In practice, 
each participating state tends to keep its control over its own troops. The 
UN’s failures or incapability can be found, for example, in the former 
Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s and Sri Lank in 2009 on 
which the UN has recently publicly admitted. Thinking of the fact that the UN 
was originally established to work most in the field of international peace and 
security, its record is hardly impressive. 
 Nevertheless, the UN still exists as an important institutional actor at the 
international stage. No state actively engages in disbanding it, no matter how 
apparent the constitutive flaws are. Cooper points:  
 
‘The proof of this is in the many failures the United 
Nations has survived. Success needs no legitimation, 
but to survive failure after failure and still attract 
loyalty requires special qualities. Napoleon put his 
finger on it when he said that the king could be 
defeated any number of times and still remain king; 
Napoleon needed to be defeated only once to cease 
being Emperor.  The difference between them was 
one of legitimacy.’48 
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What are implied in the “special qualities”?  
 The UN’s most important function is legitimation at the highest level in 
the international community, no matter how the international institutional 
order is controversial. The UN’s raison d’être or purposes to exist is 
supposed to be international peace and security and human rights.49 In 
particular, the commitment to human rights as the last and ultimate authority 
sustains the UN’s “special qualities” to survive the series of the failures. Jack 
Donnelly explains about human rights:  
 
‘Human rights are a special class of rights, the rights 
that one has simply because one is a human being. 
They are thus moral rights of the highest order. 
Usually, however, they are closely related to parallel 
“lower” rights, or the struggle to establish such 
rights.’50   
 
Human rights as such special rights are called for under a special 
circumstance ‘where legal or other remedies seem unlikely to work or have 
already failed’, such as a case that the regime of a state oppresses its own 
citizens and an appropriate law enforcement procedure according to the 
state’s laws, if exist, cannot be expected. In such a case, ‘the special 
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function of human rights virtually requires that they be claimed precisely 
when they are unenforceable by ordinary legal or political means.’51 
 The UN’s “special qualities” that have helped the UN’s survival partly 
come from the fact that the organisation has been given the position of the 
ultimate authority about human rights rather than the authority about peace 
and security with a traditional sense which is concerned mainly with inter-
state war. Although the UN is militarily unreliable to make and keep peace to 
conflicts, the weakness and the fact that it is the largest collective of states in 
the international institutional order empower the prestige of the moral 
authority. NATO cannot have this level of prestige, because of their small 
number of the member states, which are biased to the politically, 
economically, and military strong West, and its high capabilities in military 
actions, which make the organisation possible to impose the influence. In 
other words, the moral authority needs impartiality that cannot come from the 
force of imposition.  
 Further, human rights are more for individuals rather than for states. 
‘[I]ndividuals are members of communities, but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, in circumstances where the security of the individual may 
actually be threatened by the state itself.’ 52  Some international/regional 
human rights institutions work for individuals with fighting against their states. 
The UN occupies the highest authority in the area. Therefore, the 
organisational commitment, in theory, can reach to a greater number of 
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individuals all over the world. That makes the organisation a greater public 
good. The trend of the international peace and security thinking in the 21st 
century is directing to the so-called “human security”. ‘Denial of human rights, 
ill-treatment and persecution for reasons of gender or sexual orientation, the 
deprivations of famine and poverty, these are all factors which threaten the 
security of individuals and fall within the purview of the new security 
studies.’53 This accentuation of individuals in the international peace and 
security concept is understood as ‘a considerable step forward’ since it 
‘implies that human beings matter more than states.’54 This means that the 
UN stands for human rights of individuals in their states, even when the 
individuals and their states are at odds. The public function, whatever 
actually working or struggling, and the actual stand against some states 
based on humanitarian reasons earn the organisational reputation, survival 
or life expectancy.  
 If there is something that vitiates the UN’s legitimacy, it is the veto 
system of the Security Council and the nature of the veto states, some of 
which are non-democratic, non-rule of law and non-human rights abiding 
states. Since the UN Charter promotes these elements, the existence of the 
non-democratic states reduces the prestige of the Security Council and its 
decisions, in particular when it fails to make any action in front of a 
humanitarian disaster due to politics among the veto states and their national 
interests. While it is obvious that the Security Council needs a reform about 
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the veto system and the veto state’s politics, this probably will not be done, at 
least, in the foreseeable future, since it is unthinkable that the five permanent 
veto states easily agree to the relinquishment of their privilege in the most 
legitimate international organisation in the world.  
 Unfortunately, the UN is a product of the modern world thinking at the 
point of 1945 when the powers were dictating international politics through 
balance or distribution of power. The decision-making system simply reflects 
the idea of the time. Therefore, it does not fit to the post-modern paradigm. 
Troublesome is that, while the US, Britain and France relatively belong to the 
post-modern world, Russia and China are somewhere in the pre-modern and 
modern worlds and incline to take strategic actions in the Security Council 
which are often at odds against humanitarian intervention, peace operations 
or interference of internal affairs of states. That constitutes incoherence of 
the UN and damages the organisational prestige, reputation and legitimacy 
to a large extent. Nevertheless, the UN’s publicness seems to be larger than 
the deficit. It has been somehow saving the organisation and sustaining its 
organisational authority over the international community. The lack of a 
candidate to replace the UN is the biggest reason. The international 
community will uphold the UN until the next great change of the international 
order that may cease or replace the current UN and generate a new 
framework of international cooperation.  
 
2.1.3. The OSCE 
 
The OSCE has the UN-like prestige, reputation and flaws, because of the 
OSCE’s geographical reach that creates a structural setting which is similar 
  96 
to the UN. The OSCE’s physical capabilities including military and policing 
ones are severely limited. Yet, its emphasis on the human dimension has 
contributed to the extension of its life expectancy after the landmark 
achievement of the Helsinki FInal Act in 1975 and to the promotion of its 
profile as a human security organisation that oversees the internal conditions 
of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The OSCE’s commitment to 
the humanitarian field gives a distinctive feature of the organisation and, 
since human rights are contemplated in some way as something superior to 
other security agendas in the 21st century, its “publicness” tends to be 
regarded higher than NATO which, in comparison to the OSCE, is run by the 
smaller number of states that are largely the Western states. As a regional 
organisation, however, the OSCE is strictly under-funded and required to 
make some reforms. Ostensibly, the reforms are for making a deeper 
connection to the current security situations in the OSCE region. However, 
the actual meaning of the demand is likely about cutting the budget in some 
way.  
 Apart from the face of a human security regional organisation, it has 
another function, utility or raison d’être which is to bridge the East and the 
West. This relatively understated raison d’être gives a feature of “publicness” 
to the organisation and comes out of the course of its history. Briefly saying, 
after the end of the Cold War, this function, utility or raison d’être of the 
CSCE/OSCE seemed to be demoted, since many believed that the 
successor states of the Soviet Union would be ordinary states like the 
Western countries in time. However, the adversary mood between the East 
and the West has returned to the OSCE and the general diplomatic relations 
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between the post-modern West and the pre-modern and modern East since 
Russia entered the Vladimir Putin’s rule from 2000.  
 The term, the "East of Vienna", indicates that the Russians led quasi-
group mainly consisting of the CIS states. The group of the "East of Vienna" 
is currently challenging the "West of Vienna" on the basis of the 
organisational principles, norms and values. Many countries of the "East of 
Vienna" are less liberal and democratic. Human rights are rather put under 
national security or social stability. This Eastern norm crashes against the 
OSCE's operational purposes. It is, however, unlikely that the West confronts 
the Russian-led East in the way that they did during the Cold war. The 
current CIS countries are much more connected to the international 
community, in particular to international economy where some oil and gas 
rich CIS republics sell their natural resources. So are the Western countries. 
Especially, the EU-European countries including Germany, the heart of the 
European economy, are getting energy resources from the former adversary 
states in the East. Therefore, the Cold War cannot return in the way that it 
was. Both sides have each vulnerability and strength.  
 Under such a situation, Russia’s participation of the Western-generated 
regional organisations is limited to the Council of Europe (CoE) and the 
OSCE in Europe. It is unthinkable that Russia and other CIS states will join 
the EU and NATO formally, though they have a kind of outsourcing talking 
occasions associated with these organisations. The CoE’s profile to the 
general public may be lower than the OSCE, and the organisational agendas 
are limited to human rights, democracy and the rule of law which overlap the 
OSCE’s human dimension engaged by the Office for Democratic Institutions 
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and Human Rights (ODIHR) in a wider way. Although there is recently the 
increase of Russian individuals who use the CoE framework to indict the 
Russian governmental authorities or officers on the ground of the violation of 
human rights in a CoE’s sub-organ, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), the CoE is not so attractive for the Russian government which 
would like to show its stand against the West across the wider range of 
issues. For the Russian government, in this sense, the participation in the 
OSCE is a valuable and reserved seat. Therefore, the OSCE still holds the 
function, utility or raison d’être to bridge the East and the West in the 21st 
century.  
 Although the much of things will be discussed later, the OSCE’s some 
decision-making procedures and a number of activities in the human 
dimension indicate that the organisation is delegated a certain degree of 
authority and autonomy by and from the Participating States, which is greater 
than the most of other international/regional institutions and organisations 
and helps the OSCE step into the territory of a hybrid actor between “active” 
and “structural” at the international level.  
 It is true that the OSCE seems to be in struggle in keeping its position in 
the international community in the 21st century. In comparison to the 1990s, 
it seems to have stopped to produce an innovative idea to be transformed 
into a principle or practice. Some, in particular for those who pay attention to 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 or the 7th July 2005 London Bombing, may 
consider that the OSCE is not so much connected to the current peace and 
security concerns in the OSCE and international community. The election 
monitoring missions, workshops in the local cities or checking journalism 
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situations are looked as so routine nowadays, and do not give impression as 
fresh as they used to be during the 1990s. Nevertheless, this sort of views on 
the OSCE may root in the organisational discreet mode of public relations. 
The low-key degree of exposure to media in general does not give a “bait” to 
the politicians in the major Participating States who may raise more 
effectively the profile of the organisation and make the OSCE easier to earn 
a more budget.  
 No matter how much routine, the constant and lasting monitoring role of 
security, governance and human rights situations is one of the OSCE’s 
values and common and public goods among the Participating States as well 
as the international community. Since the OSCE is for proactive responses 
rather than for reactive ones, these routines actually produce the meaning of 
the OSCE.  
 
2.1.4. The EU 
 
If the combination of common and public goods for all humanity and the 
publicness of raison d’être of international institutions and organisations is a 
key for a long-term survival of them, the current Euro crisis may be a 
meaningful test on what the EU member states are standing on.  
 The EU is more inclining common goods of the limited number of the 
member states, but not public goods which must have greater externalities 
than that of common goods beyond the benefits for the EU member states. 
Despite that, the EU’s publicness may be high, even though it is only over 
the member states. This is primarily because ‘[t]he EU itself is a community 
built on the rule of law, on treaties, in many areas working on the basis of 
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consensus.’55 The EU’s activities are currently on politico-economic issues 
rather than regional peace and security. Yet, the project was founded on the 
idea that a common economy over the European states (mainly minded 
Germany and France) would create a lasting peace, so that there is a view 
on the recent EU enlargement that ‘[t]he enlargement process itself is often 
seen as the main peacebuilding success of the EU, and each enlargement 
has brought new expertise to the EU of relevance for conflict prevention.’56  
 The EU has a common armed forces unit under the on-going 
development of the Synchronised Armed Forces Europe (SAFE) alongside 
the Western European Union (WEU) which is urged to dissolve by the 2009 
Treaty of Lisbon.57 Yet, the EU members are usually the NATO members, 
and, when a joint action is mobilised for peace operations, the EU states 
rather employ the NATO framework. Therefore, the EU is primarily a political 
organisation expected to play a role of the higher government over the 
member states. Therefore, it is natural that the EU is unprecedented in the 
history of international institutions as the rule-driven governance body and 
probably the champion of the rule of law style management. What makes this 
possible is the lack of the single prominent regional superpower which may 
dictate the course of the organisation and the fact that the most of the 
member states are mature democracies which are accustomed to following 
rules and laws.  
                                            
55 Hazelzet, Hadewych. (2006). ‘Human Rights Aspects of EU Crisis 
Management Operations: From Nuisance to Necessity’ in International 
Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.4, December 2006,Taylor & Francis, p.567. 
56 Hazelzet, Hadewych. (2006). ‘Human Rights Aspects of EU Crisis 
Management Operations: From Nuisance to Necessity’ in International 
Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.4, December 2006,Taylor & Francis, p.567. 
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 What the current Euro crisis tests is whether the EU is truly and still on 
the politico-economic approach for regional peace and security as initially 
intended, or on the construction of a greater scale of bureaucracy for the 
European elites, which insinuates that the voices of the peoples of Europe 
are not satisfactorily counted and somehow reduces the “publicness” and 
“legitimacy” of the EU. More than two decades after the end of the Cold War, 
the possibility of a large scale of inter-state war in Europe has become 
unthinkable. This relatively long peace time may have been decaying the 
original raison d’être of the European integration process without being 
expressively explained. The EU has transformed it into a pooling system of 
finance or a simple larger market than a single state’s one. Even if the EU 
still holds the peace and security reason for itself, it is questionable whether 
the means to achieve it — attempting to vanquish state sovereignty as much 
as possible through unifying the laws and regulations throughout the member 
states and using the same currency disregarding the differences of economic 
capabilities of each state— are absolutely necessary or not. What the Euro 
crisis has revealed is that unifying into one single currency does not 
necessarily stabilise European economy for a long-term, and the financial 
predicament may ruin not only the European Monetary Union (EMU) at 
minimum but also the whole EU system at maximum. The economic 
difficulties of some EU states may destabilise their social stability. Is the case 
of the EU the mistake of choosing the means to achieve raison d’être of the 
organisation, or the loss of raison d’être of the organisation due to the 
change of the regional security environment?  
                                            
57 See: Article 42 of the EU Treaty of Lisbon (signed 2007, effective since 
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 Although the survival of the monetary part of the EU system is unclear, 
it can be more optimistic about the security part of the system that is 
probably more durable since the original raison d’être of the organisation is 
European regional peace and security which is a greater common good in 
Europe than the EMU is. Although the malfunction of the EMU may raise 
antagonism and percussion between the rich countries and the poor ones, it 
takes a number of steps if the antagonism transforms into inter-state war. 
There is a long way to go to the stage and it is fairly reasonable to presume 
that some measures will have been already taken before the situation 
reaches the stage. Furthermore, thinking of the reduced military budgets of 
the member states respectively and the joint military scheme under the 
SAFE and/or the WEU, such a drastic development is quite unlikely. In 
anyway, the current Euro crisis is a test of the durability of the EU. 
 In this sense, the degree of nobleness, morality, publicness and 
legitimacy in raison d’être of international institutions and organisations is 
important for the life expectancy of international institutions and 
organisations. The higher degree of these elements in raison d’être of 
international institutions and organisations provides survivability from failure 
after failure seen in the UN in the field of international peace and security. 
International/regional institutions and organisations in the post-modern world 
(or largely consisting of the states coming from the world) tend to hold the 
higher degree of the elements as well as the rule of law style management. 
As seen in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) above, when an 
international institution or organisation is run by the distribution of power and 
                                            
2009). 
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the power projection by the most powerful in it, it is far less that we can see 
the combination.  
 While it is not necessarily the decisive point to identify “publicness”, if it 
is considered that an international institution or organisation bears 
“publicness”, a certain degree of democratic methods and transparency 
surround the decision-making system can be observable in the institution or 
organisation. The decision-making system talked here includes the initiation 
of talks, the negotiation process and the final decision of an agenda. The UN, 
NATO, the OSCE and the EU are relatively open for outside observers 
including journalists, and documents are often published through media 
including their own internet sites. The moments of the decisions are 
witnessed by these observers and, in some cases, broadcasted through 
internet or other telecommunication means. The outside observers are also 
able to get information about politics surrounding and between the member 
states of these organisations. In total, therefore, transparency exists in a 
relatively clear form in the international/regional institutions and organisations 
in the post-modern world.  
 
2.1.5. The CIS and SCO 
 
It is difficult to articulate that the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) 
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which are coming out of 
the pre-modern and modern worlds, have the same degree of transparency 
and “publicness” to the European international/regional organisations. In the 
CIS, although the most of the former Soviet Union republics voluntarily joined 
the organisation after the demise of the Soviet Union, ‘Turkmenistan and 
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Uzbekistan have never ratified the CIS treaty and regularly fail to show up for 
the bloc’s summits.’ 58  With the fact, it can be understood that the 
organisational rule of law is quite questionable or weak. The so-called 
member states’ willingness to coordinate and cooperate the joint actions is 
unreliable. Regularity and routines of the organisational works seem to have 
been replaced with irregularity, improvisation, faits accomplis and ad hoc 
manners. If these emergency methods continue and are normalised, 
transparency and legitimacy are also ruined. Predictability that institutions 
should produce cannot be expected in such an organisation.  
 The decision-making system is generally by consensus.59 Yet, since 
the member states have a habit not to turn out in the meetings when they are 
not interested in the agendas, the legitimacy of consensus and decisions 
may be questionable. The organisational course of actions, therefore, heavily 
relies on the negotiation or dialogue processes among the member states 
inside and outside of the organisational frameworks. Therefore, it is a 
mystery how the organisational actions are coordinated in a coherent and 
systematic way. Other than assuming the existence of politics over the 
member states, in which the distribution or projection of power works, there 
is no possible explanation how and why they reach a decision as the 
organisation.  
 When an international institution or organisation is run by the 
distribution or projection of power and sets up to serve for the power or 
                                            
58 Coalson, Robert. (7th October, 2009). ‘What if the CIS Holds a Summit, 
and no One Comes?’, RFE/RL: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/What_If_The_CIS_Holds_A_Summit_And_No_O
ne_Comes/1846099.html (last checked on 2009-10-07). 
59 See: Article 23 of the CIS Charter (1991). 
  105 
powers in it, the institution or organisation looks like a private good of the 
power or powers. In other words, its raison d’être is virtually the interests of 
the power or powers, no matter what are written in the founding charter or 
other official documents. Then, it is unlikely that such “private” interests are 
always common goods over the member states or equip the institution or 
organisation with externalities to be public goods for the greater international 
community.  
 It is not a secret that the CIS is largely under the Russian influence, if 
not control, while the SCO is the place of clash between the two regional 
powers, China and Russia, in the competition over the organisational 
leadership. Therefore, while these organisations may proclaim cooperation in 
economic and security issues, from the agenda setting to the final decision of 
an issue, the power or powers are likely to dictate the course of the process 
along with their “private” national interests. Of course, there are cases that a 
national interest of the power or powers is a common concern or common 
good among the concerning states. The CIS currently emphasises counter-
terrorism targeting Islamists in the region. This can be considered as an 
action for a common concern over many CIS states at the level of a slogan. 
When it comes to details, like the definition of terrorism or terrorists, however, 
how the counter-terrorist forces are organised or who monitors the activities 
and when/where it is reported, are a place where the regional power may 
exert its influence over the other member states to dictate the course of the 
organisational actions and decisions, and the other member states are 
concerned with the power’s dictation. If the weak member states tacitly 
boycott the negotiation as often happens in the CIS, the power may still push 
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the agenda and do it totally by itself. Yet, this cannot be a real organisational 
joint activity.  
 The SCO as an international/regional organisation is a similar case. 
The crash or cooperation between China and Russia is organised behind the 
closed door or through politics inside/outside the organisation. Since these 
two states are historically suspicious each other, the SCO may be working 
just as a weakly organised talking point. In addition, these two organisations 
are never allowed to have any space of autonomy in the organisational 
activities. The OSCE, for example, has a greater freedom from the 
governments of the Participating States in the everyday activities in, for 
example, monitoring human rights conditions, freedom of speech and 
elections. These activities are not instructed by a particular government, but 
institutionalised under the organisation. This level of the organisational 
autonomy in activities cannot be found in the CIS and SCO. In other words, 
the level of delegation of power by the member states, which makes the 
organisational autonomy free from them, is so different between the OSCE, 
and the CIS and SCO. 
 The CIS and SCO are far away from the post-modern or Western level 
of international organisations. While the states in the post-modern world can 
let their international/regional institutions and organisations make their 
choices in a greater number of agendas, if not all, the states in the pre-
modern and modern worlds are reluctant to produce the new external third 
parties that may monitor and criticise the member states’ conditions. They 
scarcely delegate power to their international/regional institutions and 
organisations to work freely.  
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 In addition, the raison d’être of these organisations does not have so 
much externalities to be public goods that the external parties look up. The 
CIS started in order to keep status quo in the regional order of the post-
Soviet region after the demise of the Soviet Union. Today, it is tacitly working 
for making an excuse to keep the post-Soviet republics (except the Baltics) 
under a loose umbrella of Russian influence. The SCO can be understood as 
an effort to generate multilateral cooperation often seen among the Western 
countries in order to pretend the member states coming from the pre-modern 
world as fully-fledged states. It creates a cooperation scheme for, for 
example, counter-terrorism over the member states to protect the 
governments or regimes of the member states, while it is almost silence 
about human rights that cast a question of the rule of the governments or 
regimes. Thus, it is hard to see externalities in their raison d’être. 
 
2.1.6. The Post-Modern World vs. the Pre-Modern and Modern World 
over International Institutions and Organisations 
 
The differences between the Western international institutions and 
organisations and the Eastern or Asiatic ones well linked to the Cooper’s 
three worlds. Cooper’s worlds partially represent the division between the 
democratic world (relatively belonging to the post-modern world) and the 
non/immature-democratic world (relatively belonging to the pre-modern and 
modern worlds). As already suggested, the states from the post-modern 
world, where democracies are gathering, are much more capable of creating 
and running the complex systems of cooperation and this ability of the states 
is naturally brought into international institutions and organisations. Therefore, 
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when an international institution or organisation consists of only such states 
and the raison d’être is related to common goods for the community, the 
raison d’être is systematically approached with the organisational rule of law, 
transparency and legitimacy, since the states are already trained to behave 
in such a way at the national level. Then, the approach and the rule of law 
style of management produce legitimacy, publicness and positive reputation. 
The institution or organisation can be also a public good institution or 
organisation, if the raison d’être contains positive externalities that the 
greater international community appreciates.  
 On the contrary, the states from the non-democratic worlds are not so. 
The states are run by the rule of a small number of the powerful persons in 
many cases. The powerful do not put them under the rule of law, 
transparency and accountability, since they prefer arbitrary arrangements, 
which they can choose to apply or not to do so case by case, to laws, which 
are in theory applicable anytime for anybody in the states until the laws are 
changed through institutional procedures. The powerful have physical power, 
such as police forces, to impose their convenience over the populations. 
Since they do not need to extend their thoughts beyond their “private” 
interests which are inevitably narrowly defined, the powerful lose 
opportunities to train their thought to imagine and recognise the “public” 
interests of their states containing the peoples and the international 
community. They also lose opportunities to run the complex systems of 
democracy and to learn how to restrict themselves under the rule of law, 
since their forces quell oppositions. Then, they lose opportunities to foster a 
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long-term thinking because their short-term thinking and strategic moves are 
always paid off within their states by their forces.  
 These preferences of the powerful are brought to the international level 
when the non-democratic states form international institutions and 
organisations, and reduce “publicness” or increase “privateness” of them. 
Therefore, it is understandable why the UN’s “publicness” as well as 
legitimacy is reduced to some extent, since it is a hybrid international 
organisation consisting of both the democratic/post-modern and non-
democratic/pre-modern and modern states. 
 In the recent on-going civil war in Syria, Russia and China are acting to 
block any peace operation by the UN, presumably because both countries 
are arms suppliers to the Syrian government and afraid of losing their 
customer. Furthermore, they are reluctant to see that international 
intervention for internal affairs becomes an international norm and legal 
action especially because of humanitarian issues of which their records are 
shameful. Russia and China have been making their very best effort to block 
UN Security Council Resolutions concerning humanitarian intervention at 
every corner of events that may potentially mobilise humanitarian 
intervention including the current Syrian case. As a result, the UN reduces 
“publicness” with collapsing the organisational coherency in the light of the 
UN Charter. However, it does not immediately ruin the UN since it collects 
the largest number of states among international institutions and 
organisations in the world. This fact adds a certain degree of “publicness” 
and legitimacy, so that the lost “publicness” due to the non-democracies in 
the Security Council is compensated.  
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 The hybrid problem is also in the OSCE. The hybrid problem tends to 
happen when the organisational reach in geography becomes greater. The 
greater geographical reach means that there have to hold a variety of 
differences in values, cultures or civilisations that may compete and confront 
each other. Accordingly, it is possible to an explanation that the patterns of 
international/regional cooperation, Cooper’s three worlds and the geographic 
reach of international/regional institutions and organisations relate to 
something about regionality and regional orders. This theme is followed in 
the next section.  
 
2.2: Regional Orders, Security Systems, and 
Cooperation 
 
Neighbouring countries share a number of interests due to their geographic 
approximation that creates many linkages of issues among the countries. 
This phenomenon is “region”. It is generally agreed among regional studies 
scholars that ‘there is no precise geographical concept of a “region.’’60 
Moreover, ‘there is no way to identify regions, through geography….’61 The 
difficulty to define a “region” was seen in writing the UN Charter in particular 
for the part of Chapter VIII “Regional Arrangements” which is the section 
                                            
60 Gioia, Andrea. (1997). The United Nations and Regional Organizations in 
the Maintenance of Peace and Secuerity. In: Bothe, Michael., Natalino 
Ronzitti and Alan Rosas, eds. The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and 
Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes. The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997. 
p.196. 
61 Morgan, Patrick M. (1997). Regional Security Complexes and Regional 
Orders. In: Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: 
Building Security in a New World. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p.20. 
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often referred to when an regional organisation defines itself. In fact, ‘[m]any 
hours were wasted at the 1945 United Nations Conference in San Francisco 
trying to define it precisely’62, and achieved nothing. It has so many layers of 
things to be included along with geography. Nevertheless, it is also true that 
there is a fuzzy way to identify a region from other regions and apply the 
identification to a variety of issues. 
 “Region”, therefore, is multiple, and must be understood as the totality 
of anything occurring due to a geographic approximation. Therefore, it can 
be interpreted: 
 
‘… the notion of space itself can have several 
meanings: territorial space; political space and the 
space of social interaction; economic space; 
functional space. A region is the result of the meeting 
of various concepts of space. It is also an institutional 
system, either in the form of a regional government 
or as a group of institutions operating on a territory.’63   
 
At the same time, it should be noted that we may be selective and narrow the 
regional features to pick up when we apply the identification of a region to 
deal with a specific issue.  
                                            
62 Nye, Jr., Joseph S. (1968). Introduction. In: Nye, jr., Joseph S., ed. 
International Regionalism. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968. p.vi. 
63 Keating, Michael. (1998). Is there a Regional Level of Government in 
Europe?. In: Le Galès, Patrick., and Christian Lequesne, eds. Regions in 
Europe. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. p.11. 
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 In many cases, neighbouring countries in a region have a history of 
conflict over the interests. In an early part of the history of international 
relations after the modern state system came in the 17th century, the 
relations tended to be hegemony, balance of power and strategic 
cooperation such as (temporary) military alliances. These are Cooper’s pre-
modern and modern worlds where realism in IR fits most and the sphere of 
international cooperation is small or does not exist. After WWII, a solid 
regional cooperation started taking a shape in the form of regional institutions 
and organisations, and the numbers have increased, especially in Africa, 
Asia and South America. As a phenomenon, therefore, regional institutions 
and organisations are relatively contemporary, and today they are the most 
common form of international organisations. Nevertheless, there are few 
regional institutions and organisations that can be said that they form 
international/regional cooperation liberated from norms and values in the pre-
modern and modern worlds and times. As a result, while 
international/regional cooperation is possible, the quality of cooperation 
somewhat stays in the strategic mode, and regional institutions and 
organisations as the end products of the effort to produce cooperation turn 
out to be another space for political competition or the distribution and 
projection of power among the concerning states. Yet, there are a few 
institutions and organisations that have been generating more genuine and 
meaningful cooperation and being delegated a certain amount of power and 
autonomy to work independently as third parties to the concerning states. 
The independence, of course, is far lesser the degree than that of the state 
actors is. Nevertheless, they are not totally a tool of the state actors. In this 
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sense, Cooper’s three worlds present a useful framework to identify the kinds 
of international cooperation — based on the rule or law or power 
projection/hegemony — that also signify the character of the cooperation — 
“public” or “private” — in the raison d’être.  
 Cooper’s three worlds may not strictly mind about geography. 
Nevertheless, it is very difficult to escape from a geographic consideration 
facing the reality of the current world. As implied above, international 
institutions and organisations bearing the “public” character with well-
functioning features tend to appear in the Western world — Europe and/or 
North America or the so-called developed countries where the most of the 
mature democracies sit geographically together and have generated a 
sphere of cooperation. The rule of law works not only within the states but 
also between the states and in the international institutions and organisations. 
This is the territory of what Cooper calls the post-modern world.  
 On the contrary, International institutions and organisations bearing the 
“private” character are often seen in the former Second World (the former 
communist states) and the Third World — Eurasia, Africa and Asia or the 
developing countries where a number of non-/less-democracies still cannot 
leave competition through military capabilities, economy and politics in their 
relations. The “private” use or abuse of power by the powerful is recognisably 
clear within and between the states. The preference is brought to the 
international institutions and organisations in their sphere of the world. This is 
the territory of Cooper’s pre-modern and modern worlds. 
 The division of Cooper’s three worlds associates with the division of the 
democratic and non-democratic worlds. The division of the democratic and 
  114 
non-democratic worlds leads the differences of the quality of international 
cooperation, institutions and organisations. The appearances of the 
cooperation in Cooper’s three worlds and the democratic/non-democratic 
worlds are, at a glance, quite similar. However, the contents and externalities 
are quite different. As a result, we see a high level of synchronization 
between geography, governing systems of states and the types and degree 
of international/regional cooperation to appear.  
 Where does the synchronization matter most in international relations? 
The answer can be the field of international peace and security, since it is 
most fundamental for the state’s survival whether they have the friendly 
neighbourhood or adversary one. When geography and peace and security 
matter, the combination of these becomes an issue of regional orders. A 
Regional order is shaped by the region’s security conditions that include 
power balance among the states and the security thinking of the rulers, 
leaders or elites of the states in the region who form state’s policies, attitude 
towards the international/regional community and, in a long term, 
preferences and norms. Therefore, it is possible to predict what type and 
degree of regional cooperation, institutions and organisations will/will not be 
produced from a region through examining the regional order (or the regional 
pattern of relations among the states). In this sense, geography is a 
structural setting or environment. It partially makes the state actors in the 
limited space of a region to force or persuade to generate political, 
economical, social and security dynamics of regionality — regionalism — 
through interacting each other.  
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 The Cooper’s idea of the pre-modern, modern and post-modern worlds 
to some extent corresponds with the geographic divisions in the world and is 
concerned with regional order and security systems. The idea, however, 
needs further clarification, sophistication and details to analyse regionalism 
to predict what type and degree of regional cooperation, institutions and 
organisations to be (or not to be) produced in a certain region and how the 
institutions and organisations for regional cooperation work (or do not work). 
The following is the introduction of some scholars who present their theories 
on regional orders. Their theories can elaborate on Cooper’s idea. 
 
2.2.1. Buzan’s RSCs 
 
One of the useful conceptual frameworks to contemplate regions, regional 
orders, and regional security is “Regional Security Complexes (RSCs)” by 
Barry Buzan. He presents a relatively hard security-minded version of 
regional orders and systems. His focus on “region” stems from what 
geographical approximation has produced, noting that ‘[b]ecause threats 
operate more potently over short distances, security interactions with 
neighbours will tend to have first priority.’64 ‘[R]egional security subsystems 
can be seen in terms of patterns of amity and enmity that are substantially 
confined within some particular geographical area.’ Buzan defines his RSCs 
‘as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
                                            
64 Buzan, Barry. (1991). People, States and Fear: An Agenda for 
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd Edition. New 
York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
pp.189-191.  The definition of the security complex is in p. 191. 
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sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be 
considered apart from one another.’65  
 Furthermore, Buzan adds:  
 
‘Within the overall seamless web of security 
interdependence, one can thus expect to find 
patterns shaped by the different intensities of the 
lines of amity and enmity. A security complex exists 
where a set of security relationships stands out from 
the general background by virtue of its relatively 
strong, inward-looking character, and the relative 
weakness of its outward security interaction with its 
neighbours.’66 
 
Then, it is possible to see a sort of overlap with Cooper’s three worlds: 
Cooper’s pre-modern and modern worlds overlap with Buzan’s enmity-driven 
security complex, and Cooper’s post-modern world to some extent 
corresponds with Buzan’s amity-driven security complex.  
 Yet, it may be possible to interpret that Buzan’s weight of regional 
relations is more on enmity than on amity, and more on peace and security 
than on economic and social interaction in the formation of RSCs. Buzan 
                                            
65 Buzan, Barry. (1991). People, States and Fear: An Agenda for 
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd Edition. New 
York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
p.190, [italics as original]. 
66 Buzan, Barry. (1991). People, States and Fear: An Agenda for 
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd Edition. New 
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construes the existence of regional organisations as something that ‘defines 
lines of regional rivalry’,67  though he remains open to the possibility of 
cultural and racial factors in identifying a security complex. In this sense, as 
Patrick M. Morgan notices, 68  Buzan’s notion may reflect more the 
distribution of power in the realist’s notion than the promotion of socialisation 
and interactive processing among the actors in the sociological IR theories. 
 Buzan’s models are developed into a further detailed version with 
collaboration with Ole Wæver. Buzan and Wæver present their Models of 
RSCs in Regions and Powers: The Structure of International security in 2003. 
In this, Buzan makes linkages to the global level of international security, 
employing the differentiation of state actors according to their significance in 
international peace and security along with the distribution of power into 
three categories – superpowers, great powers and regional powers, 
considering their roles both at the regional and global level, and implicating 
how the differences in degree of the powers’ significance generate the 
variation of RSCs. Buzan and Wæver deploy four models of RSCs – 
standard, centred, great powers and supercomplexes – and two special 
                                            
York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
p.193. 
67 Buzan, Barry. (1991). People, States and Fear: An Agenda for 
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd Edition. New 
York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
p.194, and p.196. 
68 Morgan, Patrick M. (1997). Regional Security Complexes and Regional 
Orders. In: Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: 
Building Security in a New World. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p.25. 
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cases of RSCs – overlaid and unconstructed. 69  These models are 
fundamentally about the regions where the distribution of power is working.  
 Nevertheless, there are two models that may be interesting from an 
institutionalist point of view. First, it is the institutional version of centred 
RSCs, which is a deviation from their preference on the distribution of power. 
This is the only model in their RSCs that the portion of amity in regional 
relations is larger than enmity. The institutional RSCs ‘[involve] a region 
integrated by institutions rather than by a single power.’ The institutional 
RSCs are ‘based on the security actions and concerns of actors: an RSC 
must contain dynamics of securitisation.’ Then, ‘the development of a 
security community is marked by processes of desecuritisation, or what 
Wendt would think of as a Kantian social structure: actors stop treating each 
other as security problems and start behaving as friends.’ Without any doubt, 
the EU is what Buzan and Wæver have in mind as an example. In their view, 
the EU ‘[hangs] halfway between being a region in the form of a highly 
developed security community, and being a great power in its own right with 
actor quality at the global level.’70   
 The other notable RSC is supercomplexes. The model happens when 
the superpower or great powers RSCs spill over their security dynamics and 
reach to a relatively weak neighbouring RSCs. The examples are taken from 
East and South Asia where, in terms of Buzan’ s and Wæver’s geographic 
division, China and Japan, consciously or unconsciously, cast their influence 
                                            
69 Buzan, Barry., and Ole Wæver. (2003). Regions and Powers: The 
Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
In particularly, pp.40-82. 
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over the regions. At the same time, the OSCE region, which will be 
discussed in a later chapter, can be identified as a supercomplex, including 
the European RSC and the post-Soviet RSC, to a lesser degree.   
 
                                            
70 Buzan, Barry., and Ole Wæver. (2003). Regions and Powers: The 
Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
p.56. 
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Table 2.1: Buzan and Wæver’s summary of types of security complexes 
Type Key features Example(s) 
Standard  Polarity determined by regional powers 
Middle East, South 
America, Southeast 
Asia, Horn, Southern 
Africa 
Centred  
Superpower Unipolar centred on a superpower North America 
Great Power Unipolar centred on a great power 
CIS, potentially South 
Asia 
[Regional Power] Unipolar centred on a regional power None 
Institutional 
Region acquires actor 
quality through 
institutions 
EU 
Superpower Complex 
Strong interregional level 
of security dynamics of 
arising from great power 
spillover into adjacent 
regions 
East and South Asia 
Lacks of RSC 
 Overlaid Some RSCs are overlapping in a region  
Unconstructed 
No RSC can be 
identified due to a lack of 
either power-polar or the 
region’s actor quality in a 
region 
 
Based on Buzan and Wæver’s Table about RSCs with some modifications.  
Source: Buzan, Barry., and Ole Wæver. (2003). Regions and Powers: The 
Structure of International Security. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
p.62. 
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 It is possible to presume that the institutional version of centred RSCs is 
an amity-driven complex and belongs to Cooper’s post-modern world, while 
other RSCs are basically the enmity-driven security complexes and fall in 
Cooper’s modern world. Although Copper’s pre-modern world may be 
sometimes included in somewhere in standard, centred, great powers and 
supercomplexes, the pre-modern world is usually in unconstructed RSC. 
Thus, the enmity-driven RSCs are usually run by either distribution or 
projection of power, balance of power or hegemony, and the behavioural 
norms are likely dominated by strategic moves, relatively short-term thinking 
and the logic of consequences. The amity-driven or institutional version of 
centred RSC is likely run by cooperation based on the norms of the rule of 
law, transparency, accountability and the logic of appropriateness.  
 Accordingly, supercomplexes are possibly run by the competition 
between enmity-driven and amity-driven norm groups, seen in the UN’s 
universal world and the OSCE region, and either regional security systems, 
orders or institutions in the complexes are draggled by the tension in 
organising international/regional cooperation. 
 
2.2.2. Morgan’s RSCs 
 
The accounts of Cooper’s three worlds and Buzan RSCs may be further 
added some elaboration by Patrick M. Morgan’s research on regional 
security systems. 
 Morgan refines Buzan’s RSCs. First, Morgan emphasises an 
importance of inclusion of psychological factors which constitute a sense of 
insecurity. He adds the factors for identifying RSCs, since he thinks that 
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these also contribute to the establishment of Buzan’s “patterns of amity and 
enmity”. Second, Morgan tries to make clear a link between international 
regions and regional security complexes, outlining the five elements which 
define the regions and seek some commonalities with Buzan’s RSCs.71 
Third, Morgan attempts to see differences between phenomena under the 
global systems and under the RSC systems. The comparison could give 
evidence of the significance of RSCs which are working with relative 
autonomy from the global systems. Finally, Morgan suggests the possibility 
of external members for a RSC. They do not have a pure geographical 
linkage, but should be included due to the existence of non-geographical 
connections or externalities between the RSC and the external members. 
Then, Morgan proposes a typology of RSCs. He offers five models: power 
restraining power (or balance of power), great-power concert, collective 
security, pluralistic security community (PSC) and integration. These models 
are listed in the order from negative or non-cooperative models to positive or 
cooperative models.  
                                            
71 The five elements to define international regions, which Morgan considers 
as ‘most frequently cited’ are (1) ‘Self-consciousness of members that they 
constitute a region, and perceptions by others that one exists,’ (2) 
‘Geographical propinquity of members,’ (3) ‘Evidence of some autonomy and 
distinctiveness from the global system, so that it “refracts” the power of that 
system,’ (4) ‘Regular and intense interactions among members – notable 
interdependence,’ and finally (5) ‘A high level of political, economic, and 
cultural affinities.’ 
See: Morgan, Patrick M. (1997). Regional Security Complexes and Regional 
Orders. In: Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: 
Building Security in a New World. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p.26. 
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 The power restraining power model is the most royal follower of the 
distribution of power vision in the realist sectors among the Morgan’s models. 
It is difficult to treat interstate conflicts through international/regional 
arrangement under the system. ‘[I]ntrastate conflicts are of concern primarily 
in terms of their impact on the distribution of power [among the member 
states of the system]. The members put great emphasis on autonomy and 
manipulate their relationships primarily on the basis of relative power 
capabilities, with intrastate conflicts of significance only in this context.’72 
Intrastate conflicts under this system have difficulty in getting a sufficient 
degree of external involvements even when it is appropriate, since the states 
within the system are very cautious of being exploited in their internal 
problems by other states which may or may not attempt to weaken their state 
power, especially military capabilities. State sovereignty in the power 
restraining power model, therefore, is a harder shell than in other systems.   
 Great power concert seems to be minded European inter-state relations 
in the past, such as the Concert of Europe (or the Congress System) after 
the Napoleonic War, though the Concert may be included by some IR 
scholars into the examples of collective security. The emphasis is on the 
great powers’ responsibility and determination to control peace and security 
under their spheres of influence that would be a platform of cooperation 
among the powers.73   
                                            
72 Morgan, Patrick M. (1997). Regional Security Complexes and Regional 
Orders. In: Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: 
Building Security in a New World. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p.33. 
73 Morgan, Patrick M. (1997). Regional Security Complexes and Regional 
Orders. In: Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: 
  124 
 The basic idea of collective security is to collectively respond to shared 
threats. NATO was founded to counter the Soviet threat shared by the West.  
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty imposes the members’ obligation to join 
an organisational collective response when one or more numbers of the 
member states are attacked. NATO during the Cold War was a collective 
defence, which is a kind of collective security. There is another approach to 
collective security with an emphasis on universalism and inclusiveness, seen 
in the League of Nations or the current UN. This approach attempts to 
persuade cooperation among and/or dissuade any member states from 
resorting to the use of force or any other violently coercive means. In either 
case, a RSC of collective security, as Morgan notes, is a collective 
management of peace and security that ‘is not solely the prerogative of major 
states; their actions are to have collective endorsement’ and ‘is collectively 
enforced via a punitive response when necessary.’74   
 The models of power restraining power, great power concert and 
collective security are the orders based on a realist vision that state’s power 
comes largely, if not comprehensively, out of physical, material, and military 
aspects. On the contrary, a vision of the pluralistic security community or 
PSC is closer to liberal thinking than the other models. Under the PSC, ‘the 
members give no thought to using violence in their relations with one 
another…. Hence enforcement of peace is unnecessary, and there is no 
organized collective capability for it. What makes it “pluralistic” is that the 
                                            
Building Security in a New World. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p.34. 
74 Morgan, Patrick M. (1997). Regional Security Complexes and Regional 
Orders. In: Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: 
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members retain national autonomy.’75 The Morgan’s RSC model is Buzan’s 
institutional version of centred RSC model in terms of that both of them mind 
European regional institutions in particular the EU, where something deeper 
than a simple national and regional hard-security concerns successfully 
produces a durable cooperation in the region beyond the traditional notion of 
security.  
 Nevertheless, what the EU is, in theory, aiming at is Morgan’s 
integration model, which may have not been realised by any regional 
institutions in any regions including the EU which has not reached that level 
of regional cooperation yet. The integration model is supposed to ‘[involve] 
transnational institutions to handle important interaction’, ‘commitment to far 
broader norms bearing on many more sectors’, the creation of an 
‘amalgamated security community where even the use force for members’ 
internal security would be subject to some collective supervision.’76 In the 
integration model, national autonomy does not exist. While the EU with other 
European regional institutions clearly directs the integration model attempting 
the introduction of the pan-European Constitution, the failures of some 
referendums in several EU member states for the EU Constitution in the 
recent years have shown that the process toward the European integration 
has a long way to go. Nevertheless, Europe and the regional institutions are 
                                            
Building Security in a New World. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p.35. 
75 Morgan, Patrick M. (1997). Regional Security Complexes and Regional 
Orders. In: Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: 
Building Security in a New World. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p.36. 
76 Morgan, Patrick M. (1997). Regional Security Complexes and Regional 
Orders. In: Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: 
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most successful in institutionalising a regional order based on pluralism in 
the light of the degree of commitment to the shared goals, norms, principles, 
rules and values. The durability of its regional institutions has transformed 
the region into a place where the use of force in regional relations is 
unthinkable, ‘[h]ence enforcement of peace is unnecessary, and there is no 
organized collective capability for it.’77  
 While it is easy to apply Cooper’s post-modern world to Morgan’s PSC 
and integration models, it becomes difficult to do so when Morgan’s 
collective security model is a matter. It may belong to the post-modern and 
amity-driven world where regional cooperation, systems, institutions and 
organisations can be run by the post-modern norms. NATO can be identified 
as a post-modern regional organisation due to its management style. 
However, collective security can include other types of military alliances like 
the defunct Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in which the Soviet 
hegemony was working. The WTO was rather a modern world and enmity-
driven organisation in which the Soviet hegemon was strictly controlling other 
member states that were “forced to cooperate”. In this sense, collective 
security seems to be the dividing line between amity and enmity in 
international relations. 
 
 
 
                                            
Building Security in a New World. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p.38. 
77 Morgan, Patrick M. (1997). Regional Security Complexes and Regional 
Orders. In: Lake, David A., and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: 
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2.2.3. Papayoanou’s RSCs 
 
A similar effort to construct the models of RSCs can be seen in Paul A. 
Papayoanou’s categorisation, though it mostly draws from Morgan’s models. 
His list consists of hegemony, balance of power, concert, collective security 
and pluralistic security community. While integration disappeared from 
Papayoanou’s list due to the lack of the real example, hegemony is included. 
Morgan regards hegemony as a variation of the balance of power systems. 
Papayoanou rather treats hegemony as a distinctive case and suggests 
three approaches which may be taken by a single great power in a 
hegemonic system: balancer approach, Bismarckian alliance system, and 
hegemonic stability.78 In any case, ‘[the] hegemonic regional order depends 
on a single great power being part of a regional security complex and having 
significant economic, ideological, or ethnic ties to, or human rights concerns 
with, states in that region.’79  
                                            
Building Security in a New World. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p.36. 
78 The three approaches mean  
 
*Balancer approach: ‘a great power is not permanently identified with 
the policies of particular nations or groups of states and only seeks to 
maintain the stability, or “balance,” of the system by alternating its 
support between different sides in a regional conflict.’ 
*Bismarckian alliance system: ‘a great power attempts to provide for 
regional security through a network of alliances with smaller powers in 
the region.’ 
*Hegemonic stability: ‘a hegemon may employ its disproportionate 
power over lesser states in a region to establish order….’   
 
See: Papayoanou, Paul A. (1997). Great Powers and Regional Orders: 
Possibilities and Prospects After the Cold War. In: Lake, David A., and, 
Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. 
University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1997. pp.132-33. 
79 Papayoanou, Paul A. (1997). Great Powers and Regional Orders: 
Possibilities and Prospects After the Cold War. In: Lake, David A., and, 
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 In this light, Hegemony may lead and sustain a stability or peace. Of 
course, there are some issues on hegemonic peace theory. There has not 
been an eternal hegemony in history, so that the sustainability may be in 
question. The hegemonic power’s willingness to lead the stability or peace is 
also a problem. The motivation should be under scrutiny, since it may be 
exploitative. There is a vision of the benevolent hegemon. Yet, this may be 
just a pretence or mixed with exploitative motivations. It should be also asked 
through what kind of means the hegemon exerts as its influence. Is it limited 
to politico-economic means or does it go to politico-military ones? Then, if 
the hegemonic peace is a benevolent one, can it be identified as an 
international/regional system or order run by the post-modern norms and an 
amity-driven relation?  
 This is an interesting question, since in the modern world where a great 
power would like to enjoy the position of the hegemon and be regarded as a 
legitimate rule over the region, the model of the benevolent hegemonic 
peace may sound a highly valid and attractive excuse to justify the rule. The 
peace may allow the hegemon to abuse its power, to have its prerogative of 
impunity and, yet, to pretend that the hegemon is popular.  
 The benevolent hegemony may hit a cord of the peoples of the centre 
of some civilisations, such as Russians and Chinese, both of which the past 
has a number of the prolonged dynastic rules and imperial traditions that 
were rather harsh, oppressive and, in some times, inhuman. The theory of 
the benevolent Tsar/emperor is a typical method to glorify the (negative) past 
                                            
Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. 
University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1997. pp.125-39. 
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and hide it from not only the ruled at that times, but also the current 
populations whose the identity may come from the glory of the past.  
 Such a psychological preference of the peoples will be projected over 
relations with neighbouring countries, regional systems, orders, institutions 
and organisations. No matter how much the clam of popularity is stressed, 
the hegemonic peace is not a product of the post-modern paradigm 
associated with the post-modern norms and values. It has a potential that it 
works with extra-legal or judicial and ad hoc manners too much that hinder a 
peace from developing into genuinely institutionalised relations over the state 
actors within the regional system and order. 
 
                                                                                                     
 
 
Cooper’s pre-modern and modern worlds correspond to the sphere of 
distribution, projection or balance of power that turns out the most of Buzan 
and Wæver’s RSCs except institutional version of centred RSCs and 
unconstructed RSCs, and Morgan’s power restraining power, great power 
concert, and possibly collective security RSCs. Here is also the sphere of a 
logic of consequences. In this sphere, international/regional cooperation, 
institutions and organisations tends to be strategic, tactic and realistic moves 
of the concerning state actors.  
 Possibility of defection from agreements and sudden adverse moves is 
always lurking in the enmity-driven relations among the state actors in the 
sphere. Therefore, it is hard for the state actors in the sphere to work for a 
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long-term peace with having a long-term perspective, which is so uncertain 
for betting on positive and amicable relations with the neighbouring states. 
The enmity-driven environment urges, if not forces, the state actors to be 
realistic to the immediate reality. If they fail to be so, their states are in 
danger for survival. Hard security is more focused, since hard power can 
impose influence on other states more physically effectively. Soft power is 
marginalised in the sphere. Cooperation is inevitably fragile threatened by 
the environment that refrains cooperation from growing.  
 Yet, the level of Morgan’s collective security RSCs can be a turning 
point between enmity and amity in inter-state relations. It depends on how 
collective security cooperation, institutions and organisations are carried out, 
and, if a collective security framework is run by the management and 
maintenance style of the rule of law, transparency and accountability (the 
post-modern norms), the framework can be the foundation of a weakly amity-
driven international/regional relationship and belong to the post-modern 
sphere. On the contrary, if the collective security framework is dominated by 
the style of dictation or competition of the powers inside it, it likely falls into 
the pre-modern and modern sphere.  
 Cooper’s post-modern world corresponds to Buzan and Wæver’s 
institutional version of centred RSCs as well as Morgan’s pluralistic security 
community (PSC) and integration models. Although Buzan and Wæver seem 
to be unclear, the weakly amity-driven collective security described above 
may be possibly included in their institutional version of centred RSCs where 
Buzan and Wæver think of rather the EU than NATO. Here is the sphere of 
cooperation, institutions and organisations among states neighbouring 
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together. It is also the sphere of a logic of appropriateness that enhances of 
soft power, such as morality and rules, to attract rather than subjugate. 
Driven by the post-modern norms in international/regional relations, possibly 
after a certain period of calm, if not peaceful, time that has fostered a sense 
of trust, the state actors in the sphere are more willing to bet on cooperation. 
This willingness is what Buzan calls amity. With the greater willingness or the 
deep trust in other neighbouring states, cooperation more likely meets 
cooperation or a meaningful reaction in return. The post-modern norms in 
managing and maintaining international/regional relations and the certain 
period of time of continuation of the norms condition the state actors’ mind 
set and behaviours for amicable relations that are the foundation of genuine 
cooperation, meaningful institutions and better-working organisations for 
international/regional peace and security. 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
 
The following table shows the summary of this chapter’s argument. The pre-
modern and modern features should be taken that the security complexes 
have relatively a “private” tendency, while the security complexes associated 
with post-modern features have more “public” tendency. The distinctions and 
differences of regions connect what kind of regional orders come to emerge 
and work. The kinds affect to the type of peace in regions and of the 
management style of international/regional institutions and organisations. 
That determines the quality of cooperation of international/regional 
institutions and organisations.  
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 The next chapter will see the OSCE as an example of 
international/regional organisation that is affected by Cooper’s three worlds 
and some overlapping security complexes.  
 
 
 
Table 2.2: The Relations between the Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), the 
Degree of Institutionalisation of Regional Cooperation, and the Features of 
Regions 
Morgan’s RSC 
Models 
Buzan & 
Wæver’s RSC 
Models 
Institutionalisati
on of Regional 
Cooperation 
Features of 
Regions 
 Unconstructed Chaos in the realist term. 
The pre-modern 
world possibly 
with the 
distribution or 
projection of 
power or 
completely 
chaotic condition, 
associating with 
the logic of 
consequences. 
Power Restraining 
Power 
 
Standard RSCs, 
Great Power 
RSCs 
Least 
institutionalised, 
the preference in 
regional relations 
is based on 
enmity. 
The modern world 
with the 
distribution or 
projection of 
power, 
associating with 
the logic of 
consequences. 
Great Power 
Concert 
 
Great Power 
RSCs 
 
Less 
institutionalised, 
still enmity is the 
preference in 
regional relations, 
though 
cooperation may 
be possible. 
The modern world 
with the 
distribution or 
projection of 
power, 
associating either 
the logic of 
consequences or 
the logic of 
appropriateness. 
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Collective Security 
Standard RSCs, 
Centred RSCs, 
Great Power 
RSCs 
Institutionalised. 
The preference in 
regional relation 
may be either 
enmity or amity 
and contractive. 
State may gather 
from either the 
post-modern with 
the logic of 
appropriateness 
or the pre-modern 
and modern world 
with the logic of 
consequences. 
Pluralistic Security 
Community (PSC) 
(Institutionalised 
Centred RSCs) 
More 
institutionalised. 
The preference in 
regional relation is 
amity. A variety of 
interaction is 
possible. 
 
The post-modern 
world and the 
logic of 
appropriateness 
are working. 
Integration None 
Most 
institutionalised. 
The preference in 
regional relation is 
amity.  Perfectly 
united. 
The post-modern 
world and the 
logic of 
appropriateness 
are working. 
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3: The OSCE Region and its 
Cooperation 
 
The choice of the OSCE may be not so attractive or popular in the study of 
international/regional institutions and organisations. Partly, a reason is its 
powerlessness. Unlike the EU, it cannot offer economic advantages to follow, 
and, unlike NATO, it does not have military means to forcefully achieve the 
aims of its missions. Other than by cooperation with the states concerned, 
local civil communities and international NGOs, it does not effectively 
function. This may be taken as the lack of a tangible attraction in the zero-
sum or realist thinking and felt as too much structural and passive an actor to 
deserve observation. Yet, the OSCE's structural nature is not necessarily 
passive, in comparison to other international/regional institutions and 
organisations all over the world. It has a face of "intrusive" and "proactive" 
over the threats against human security.  
 Because of the powerlessness in the realist thinking, it can be a good 
test for how strong or weak the post-modern and post-Cold War international 
security thinking, which much more weights on individually-centred rather 
than state-centred securitisation, is. The OSCE is standing on the values 
from the post-modern world of Europe, even though the organisation is a 
place of crash between the post-modern world and the pre-modern and 
modern worlds. In this sense, the OSCE's challenge as an 
international/regional organisation is greater than the EU and NATO's ones. 
The OSCE's values are under the constant attack of other contrasting values 
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from the pre-modern and modern worlds. Nevertheless, the areas of the 
OSCE activities are important for the scheme of human security and the 
project of democratic peace in the post-modern and post-Cold War idea. It is 
concerned with everyday life of the Participating States. In other words, the 
norms of the states are the subject of securitisation.  
 The OSCE was the vanguard of this approach in the 1990s, which is 
now widely appreciated at the level of concept. At the level of practice, 
however, the implementation of proactive manners for the peace and 
security concept has a number of problems. This chapter explains about the 
OSCE as a preparation for the following chapters that will reveals the 
obstacle of the post-modern peace and security scheme. 
 
3.1. The OSCE Region 
 
Where and how do the OSCE and its region fit to the models of regional 
security complexes (RSCs)? The OSCE is one of the European inter-
governmental institutions for the regional peace and security. In Europe as 
the most advanced region in inter-state relationship, the OSCE occupies the 
position and role of the norm formulation universal organisation while the EU 
covers the political-economic order and NATO takes the field of military or 
hard security function. These three prominent regional organisations form 
what Ole Wæver calls the European Security Triangle (seen below) sharing 
the common agenda which is the European peace and security and dividing 
labour and responsibility.  
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 However, the OSCE cannot be taken as a pure European regional 
organisation in various reasons. First, the organisational region is unusually 
huge as a regional organisation no matter how clearly it defines itself as a 
regional organisation in the light of Chapter VIII in the UN Charter. Rather, it 
is closest to the UN’s universal nature among other regional organisation. 
The OSCE is a collection of 57 states (at the time of November 2012 after 
Mongolia joined). The geographical reach makes the organisation contain (at 
least) three types of Buzan’s RSCs — a superpower centred RSC (North 
America), an institutional centred RSC (the EU-Europe) and a great power 
centred RSC (the CIS region). Therefore, it can be understood that Buzan’s 
superpower complex and overlaid models simultaneously exist and form the 
OSCE regional security complex. More specifically, in terms of Buzan and 
Wæver’s RSCs, the OSCE region consists of the European RSC, the post-
Soviet RSC, and the North American RSC in the participating states, plus the 
Middle Eastern RSC and the Asian Supercomplex in the Partnership 
States.80 Buzan and Wæver see that ‘[t]he OSCE in contrast [(to NATO)] 
has been only moderately developed as the main institutional expression of 
the supercomplex covering EU-Europe and the post Soviet space. Its relative 
weakness indicates no strengthening of this supercomplex.’81 It holds the 
RSCs of Morgan’s power restraining power (the CIS-Central Asia), collective 
security (the EU-NATO Europe), and pluralistic security community (PSC) 
(the EU-Europe). 
                                            
80 See: Map 3.1. Patterns of Regional Security Post-Cold War Complex by 
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver” in this thesis. 
81 Buzan, Barry., and Ole Wæver. (2003). Regions and Powers: The 
Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
p.372. 
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Furthermore, Cooper’s pre-modern, modern and post-modern worlds sit 
together in the OSCE region. 
 What does this geographical condition mean? In terms of distribution or 
projection of hard power, there are some regional great powers in the 
organisational map that are identified as the core states over their sphere of 
influence respectively. In terms of distribution or projection of soft power, the 
regional great powers in hard power separate into two camps — the East 
and the West — similar to the Cold War map, though the dividing line 
between the East and the West is located at slightly more East than that in 
the during the Cold War in a pure geographic sense. The meaning of the 
East-West division in soft power is significant for the norm formulation 
organisation, since it implies that the function of norm formulation is always 
at risk. The OSCE’s formal norms, practices and values rather belong to the 
West, so that the Eastern Participating States of the organisation have been 
uncomfortable for the situation. Furthermore, the organisational norms, 
practices and values are the post-modern Western values, while it must be 
recognised that the much of the East in the OSCE region is in the pre-
modern and modern modes. 
 What is more ominous is that this division is associated with the 
existence of a certain level of hard power as Buzan and Wæver’s RSCs 
models suggest. The division always contains the possibility to develop into a 
certain level of the use of hard power or a low-intensive violent conflict by 
some of the regional great powers when the East-West dissension takes a 
clear shape in a variety of issues. In other words, the OSCE geographic 
condition founds a value war. The OSCE stresses human rights, democracy 
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and the rule of law which are largely narrated in the post-modern Western 
civilisational language. Yet, why these values should be upheld in such a 
certain manner starts from how to think of these things. The East does not 
think of the values in the way that the West does.  
 It is nothing strange if the organisation has the problem of contradiction 
over these things as long as it covers from Vancouver to Vladivostok as its 
own cliché describes. Furthermore, the organisation also extends its 
connection to the surrounding areas of the OSCE region in the form of 
“Partnership.” The Partnership type of cooperation currently extends over 
some Mediterranean countries, Afghanistan, Thailand, South Korea and 
Japan. Through the Mediterranean Partnership, the OSCE reaches the 
Middle East and North Africa.82 It must be admitted that the OSCE region 
does not have a strong regional peculiarity and a coherent regionalism to 
unite the Participating States. The OSCE region consists of a number and 
variety of regions, states and security problems, having separate, respective 
and independent regionalism, regional awareness and regional identity in 
each of the regions. Because of that, the OSCE is much more like the UN 
than any other regional organisations. This reality means that, if it aims to be 
a norm formulation institution, it must rely on the force of a logic of 
appropriateness in arguing the formation of the organisational norms, 
practices and values that leads a sort of universality that can morally break a 
logic of consequences that serves the interests of a small number of people 
and belongs to the pre-modern and modern worlds or the Eastern countries 
                                            
82 Mongolia used to be a Partnership state, and has now joined the OSCE 
on November 2012. The Mediterranean Partnership includes Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
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in the OSCE region. Unless the organisational norms, practices and values 
are artificially tailored in the post-modern Western civilisational language, the 
OSCE cannot have a ground to build its organisational premises, principles 
and directions for activities as it is doing today.  
 The West or the most of European states including the three Baltic 
states are currently directing liberal democracy under the umbrella of the EU 
where democracy sustains human rights and is supported by the rule of law. 
What is usually regarded as “democracy” cannot escape from the linkage 
between these three elements at minimum. To protect the linkage, the post-
modern Western civilisation is active for revising the concept of state 
sovereignty that had defended the regime of states from the external 
intervention in any form providing a logic of justification even in the cases 
that severe violation of human rights by the state authorities was identified. 
The development of the concept of international peace and security in the 
post-Cold War era is lowering this protection. The OSCE has been one of the 
forefronts in the shift.  
 On the other hand, the most of the CIS states are non-democracies 
dragged by the history of the region which do not have the history of 
democracy. They are quite negative about the post-modern version of state 
sovereignty that is partly introduced by the OSCE’s innovative and intrusive 
mechanisms on the field of human rights during the 1990s. The CIS states 
are, therefore, more accommodated to the traditional interpretation on state 
sovereignty associated with the inviolability of the state borders and internal 
affairs. Their low-degree of understanding and commitment to the rule of law 
lie in their tradition in which the rule by the most powerful person dictates the 
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whole society. This feature shows that they are still in the pre-modern society. 
Among the CIS states, Russia is probably the most Europeanised state that 
somehow makes it into the territory of a modern state rather than a pre-
modern one. Ukraine may be closer to the position of Russia influenced by 
the neighbouring Poland which is now an EU member. Georgia is struggling 
to separate itself from the pre-modern mode of states. In sum, the CIS states 
are largely non-democracies, and, much worse, do not necessarily make an 
active effort to democratise themselves.  
 The East-West division was carefully put aside during the 1990s when 
the West was somehow triumphant due to the “victory” over communism and 
the East was in confusion after losing its ideological ground. The East was 
also in turmoil due to the change of the economic system from the planned 
economy to the market economy. In fact, during the 1990s, the countries in 
the East of the OSCE were much more keen to adopt the Western values, at 
least, in terms of democracy and human rights. 
 In the 1990s, for example, Kyrgyzstan acquired a relatively positive 
reputation in the post-Soviet democratisation. In retrospect, however, the 
efforts by the Central Asian former Soviet republics to democratise seemed 
to be done largely to lure the economically rich Western countries to provide 
some financial subsidiaries. The cooperative gesture in the Western-led 
international/regional organisations during the period was a strategic move. 
This does not mean that such a strategic move is meaningless. A change 
may start from it and lead democracy and modernisation leaving the pre-
modern norms and old (negative) tradition. However, the change must be 
sustained by continuous incentives. The CIS states are distant from the EU 
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region, and the West-EU-OSCE countries’ interests over the CIS region was 
not so high either politically and economically. The West was not so helpful 
in these aspects. The West was probably complacent about democracy. The 
ideal alone was not enough to bring the CIS states into the post-modern 
world. Nevertheless, when the regional great power of the East, Russia, was 
so weak to challenge the Western-led international community, the division 
of the East and the West did not surface as a serious problem.  
 At the beginning of the 21st century, however, the division started 
taking a clear shape and turning into a dissension. This dissension can be 
recognised as a value war between the East and the West or a war of the 
pre-modern and modern worlds vs. the post-modern world. Within the OSCE, 
the value war is often symbolised by a phrase of “the East of Vienna” and 
“the West of Vienna”. The set of terms implies a fact that the activities of the 
OSCE, in particular those of the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR), have been concentrated on the Eastern states in 
the organisation. In fact, until the British general election in 2010, ‘all OSCE 
activities have been directed towards Eastern and South-Eastern European, 
Caucasian and Central Asian states but never towards a Western European 
or North [American] one…’.83 For some, the record can be taken as an 
‘expression or variant of the existing hegemony of the big powers.’84 The 
observer mission on 2010 British general election is tacitly regarded in the 
                                            
83 Tudyka, Kurt P. (1998). The margin beyond intergovernmentalism: The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In: Reinalda, Bob., and 
Bertjan Verbeek, eds. Autonomous Policy Making by International 
Organizations. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. p.110. 
84 Tudyka, Kurt P. (1998). The margin beyond intergovernmentalism: The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In: Reinalda, Bob., and 
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OSCE community as an organisational political act to avoid the criticism of 
the possible bias in choosing the countries for the missions. 
 In a sense, it is nothing strange that the states of “the East of Vienna” 
have been the subjects of monitoring in the light of the OSCE’s agendas as 
long as the West is the model of the organisation’s ideals and the agendas 
are formulated with the post-modern Western civilisational values, 
philosophy and language. Then, there is an opinion that there is no such a 
bias, such as told by, for example, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus at 
the Permanent Council on 8th March, 2007, during a three-day working 
conference in Vienna. He said that ‘[t]he dichotomy’ with the distinction ‘holds 
no meaning’.85 In fact, the region of the East of Vienna is far behind from 
achieving genuine human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
Theoretically, that is a negative legacy of the Soviet rule and the OSCE 
simply attempts to improve the situaion as the organisational purposes 
instruct. Nevertheless, the fact stirs the Eastern face values and causes a 
political problem not only in the OSCE but also in the international 
community.  
 A symptom of the East-West dissension, for example, was seen in 2005. 
About it, Andrej Benedejčič, the Slovenian ambassador to Russia in 2006, 
notes that ‘[t]he failure of participating states to adopt the Political 
Declaration in Ljubljana [in the 13th OSCE Ministerial Council in December 
2005 under the Slovenian Chairmanship], on account of their inability to 
                                            
Bertjan Verbeek, eds. Autonomous Policy Making by International 
Organizations. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. p.110. 
85 This is the part of the address by Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus 
on 8 March 2007 at the Permanent Council of the OSCE. See: OSCE. (2007). 
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reach a compromise wording on the implementation of the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty and the Istanbul Commitments of 1999, in particular 
as they related to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova, serves as 
a clear reflection of this unfortunate reality.’86 The dissension has been 
providing fundamental differences over how to identify security agendas. In 
other words, when the West puts an agenda of human rights of a state in the 
East, the East counters it with the traditional Westphalian state sovereignty 
to dodge the inquiry and avoids to discuss it.  
 The division needs to find a way of merging the differences between 
them into a coherent view on peace and security under the organisation. 
George Papandreou, then Prime and Foreign Minister of Greece as well as 
the OSCE Chairman-in-Office in 2009, stressed in the occasion of the 2009 
Ministerial Council in Athens:  
 
‘Dividing lines also remain in our minds. Distrust, 
prejudices and misperceptions can only but divide. 
We have to eliminate them. And the best way to do 
so is to engage in an open, frank and bona fide 
dialogue. We have to understand each other; to 
understand the perspectives, concerns and 
                                            
Cherishing the vision of a Europe “whole and free”: Adamukus. OSCE 
Magazine. April. p.14. 
86 Benedejčič, Andrej. (2006. The specific date is unknown). The OSCE and 
a New Culture of Dialogue©. Moscow Times. Online. Available at: 
http://www.osce.si/docs/2006-01-11-clanek-benedejcic-moscow-times-osce-
and-new-culture-of-dialog.pdf (accessed on 24th September 2008, in the 
PDF format). 
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specificities, but also understand how much we have 
in common’.87 
 
However, is there an open, frank and bona fide dialogue between the two 
parties with a strong aspiration to share the regional peace and security? 
 The main protagonist and leading role of raising the voice of “the East 
of Vienna” is the Russian Federation, the largest successor state of the 
Soviet Union and the regional great power in the Buzan’s sense in the CIS 
region and one of the powers in the OSCE. Within the CIS region, there is 
‘the disproportionate power of Russia’ in the realist term.88 Although the 
power is not tantamount to the Soviet Union and impossible to win over the 
West, Russia still holds an overwhelming hard and soft power over the CIS 
region. At the same time, historically, Russia is the centre of the civilisation 
covering the region and, in some way, opposing the Western civilisation with 
a sense of rivalry.  
 Because of that, it is another fact that Russia’s attitude affects the 
OSCE’s efficiency, coherency and nature as a norm formulation organisation. 
Russia during the 1990s under Boris Yeltsin’s rule was strategically 
cooperative to the West due to the instability of the state and a number of 
economic problems in the process of marketisation, though Yeltsin exploited 
the Western expectation which regarded Yeltsin as the “only” hope to lead 
                                            
87 OSCE. (2nd December 2009). Declaration adopted at OSCE Ministerial 
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Press Release. Online. Available at: http://www.osce.org/cio/51689 
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88 Roeder, Philip G. (1997). From Hierarchy to Hegemony: The Post-Soviet 
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Russia to an ordinary (more or less) democratic state. The period of Russian 
strategic cooperation helped the OSCE write the principles in the post-
modern Western values and language and produce the innovative 
mechanisms to lower the threshold of state sovereignty, at least, on paper. 
This strategic cooperation started fading with the advent of Vladimir Putin 
and the oil boom in the early half of the 2000s that drastically changed the 
OSCE’s circumstance and gave some economic strength and social stability 
to Russia.   
 Russia under Putin’s first presidency exploited the opportunity to 
consolidate a Russian version of democracy or what some Russian 
politicians surrounding Putin call “sovereign democracy” that does not qualify 
as democracy and rather looks like authoritarianism in the Western sense. 
Nevertheless, upholding the strange “democracy”, Russia has started 
criticising the OSCE’s interpretation of state sovereignty. This Russian 
position echoes over many of the CIS states, for example, Belarus with the 
dictatorial rule of Alexander Lukashenko, Turkmenistan which detests state 
sovereignty under the OSCE’s interpretation with the personal cultic 
totalitarianism and Kazakhstan with holding the dubious human rights record. 
Since Russia is the political, economic, cultural and civilisational centre of the 
CIS region, Russia’s adverse attitude against the OSCE’s state sovereignty 
and principles in the human dimension can collect a certain support from 
these states and poses a great threat to the OSCE in terms of the 
organisational coherency and ability to produce innovative methods to 
observe human rights, democracy and the rule of law.  
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 The CIS states are, in fact, not overwhelmingly and comprehensively 
supporting Russia. Two decade after the demise of the Soviet Union, they 
have developed the sense of their individual state sovereignty and national 
interests. This sense, however, matches to the traditional Westphalian state 
sovereignty. The elites in the non-democracies of the CIS states have desire 
to keep their territories off any external intervention. Therefore, they follow 
Russian over the issue of the East and West of Vienna in the OSCE.  
 Russian under Putin also has contributed to the change of the RSCs’ 
formation over the OSCE region, according to Buzan and Wæver in the early 
2000s. They note that ‘[i]n the first post-Cold War years, a large ‘OSCE’ 
Europe began to form which included Russia.’ However, Russia ‘increasingly 
drifted off to become the centre of its own RSC.’ As a result, in one sense, 
the two RSCs are currently distinctive, but, in another sense, ‘[t]he 
geographic closeness of Europe’s two great powers (EU and Russia) makes 
a reunification of the two complexes a possibility and today they form a loose 
supercomplex’. It is considered that the two regions or RSCs ‘have decisively 
curbed its traditional power balancing and friction.’89 
 This means that the dissension between the two RSCs is like the one 
seen in the Cold War; the surface of the relation is calm, while the inside of it 
is confronting. Yet, as a regional norm formulation organisation, the OSCE 
needs something more than a strategic relation between the two RSCs, even 
though it does not reach to a complete merger of them. Furthermore, 
Russian attitude towards the OSCE is not only a challenge to the 
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organisation alone but also to the whole European identity to the 
international community: whether Europe keeps belonging to the post-
modern world or going back to the modern world, and whether Europe stays 
on the sphere of the rule of law or returns to the sphere of the rule of the 
powerful. Russia is attempting to form an anti-Western cooperation uniting 
the CIS states and possibly adding China under the framework of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). 
 The OSCE cannot leave this Russian geographic coincidence and 
consequences. This problem will continue, at least, for a foreseeable future, 
since Putin was re-elected in 2012 and, according to some Russian watchers’ 
speculation, will be the president until 2024, unless any unexpected thing 
happens and block Putin’s next victory of the presidential election in 2018. It 
is unclear how much this Russian challenge escalates or how long it 
continues. Currently, Russia is losing its economic fortune that existed during 
the Putin’s first presidency, so that the situation may favour the OSCE.  
 If Russia becomes cooperative to the OSCE’s norms, practices, 
principles and values in some way, there is a better possibility to guide other 
CIS states into more pro-OSCE the direction. At least, the most of the anti-
OSCE CIS states would lose the strong guardian to keep off the OSCE and 
other external intrusion over their governance. Therefore, the OSCE’s 
geographic reach has given the organisation an extraordinary complexity and 
an agenda to solve.  
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3.2. The Development of the OSCE’s Peace and 
Security Concept 
 
The OSCE made some innovations in the epistemological aspect related to 
international peace and security during the 1990s when the end of the Cold 
War confused the international order and the international community 
needed a new set of ideas to deal with a number of violent and local conflicts 
in Africa, Europe and Eurasia. The later two regions were and are under the 
OSCE’s framework. Although some may regard that the innovative character 
of the organisation has stopped since the beginning of the 21st century, the 
achievement should not be marginalised. In fact, the OSCE’s innovations 
have been in part stimulating the current on-going development of the 
concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and of state sovereignty as a 
whole. 
 The background of the OSCE’s innovations undoubtedly comes out of 
the Western civilisation which has entered the post-modern mode after the 
end of the Cold War. The importance of the Western civilisation to form the 
current international peace and security concept cannot be exaggerated. In 
essence, ‘the West … is the unrivalled normative center of the international 
[community]; its norms are the ones that really count.’90 This is because the 
current Western norms and values that sustain the norms are fundamentally 
individually-centred, so that they have capacities to win individuals’ heart and 
mind all over the world in general. The nature opens possibility to acquire 
                                            
90 Jackson, Robert H. (1995). International Community beyond the Cold War. 
In: Lyons, Gene M., and Michael Mastanduno, eds. Beyond Westphalia?: 
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universality and the quality of a common and public good, since the norms 
and values are largely everybody’s interests. The individually-centred nature, 
however, does not unconditionally give a free hand to any individuals as 
human rights. After the decades or centuries of the incubation period, it is 
tailored in the way that the rights of individuals are equal under laws and 
valid as long as an individual’s exercise of the rights does not harm, reduce 
or vitiate other’s rights. With these limitations at minimum, human rights for 
individuals have been developed. The human rights are what the OSCE 
stands for. The human rights, however, are often challenged by the state 
power. For the protection of the rights, the OSCE has been working, having 
made some innovations in the concept of international peace and security. 
Partly introducing the history of the organisation, the following section 
examines the OSCE’s peace and security concept. 
 
 
3.2.1. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act 
 
The OSCE’s current peace and security concept has been developed over 
the three decades with three landmark documents that may be regarded as 
the OSCE’s most foundational and fundamental documents: the Helsinki 
Final Act (1975), the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), and the 
Charter for European Security (1999). Among them, the Helsinki Final Act is 
still the most fundamental and important document, since the OSCE’s 
approach towards peace and security was fundamentally determined by it.  
 The story of the road to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act is rich and colourful. 
The process or the so-called Helsinki process up to 1975 tells how the 
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current human dimension which has determined the nature of the OSCE was 
born. Regrettably, the most of the story has to be curtailed in this thesis due 
to the limitation of the space. Nevertheless, picking up some crucial events in 
the process, what can be known is that the part of the organisational history 
is also the story of the dissension between the East and the West under the 
Cold War map and the OSCE’s fundamental raison d’être had already 
existed even at that time.  
 What is the most innovative in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act is the 
introduction of human rights monitoring in the security agendas along with 
the fields of hard security and economic cooperation. As the first land mark 
document, the Act established the three pillars of the OSCE’s security 
foundations, often called “Baskets”, that would be transformed into the three 
“dimensions” – politico-military, economic and environment, and human 
dimensions – in the post-modern era. In the Act, the “Baskets” are defined in 
the following way: 
 
Basket I ‘was related to politico-military aspects of security: [principles] 
guiding relations between and among participating States (the 
“Decalogue”)91 and military confidence-building measures.’ 
 
Basket II ‘concerned about cooperation in a number of fields [including] 
economics, science and technology and the environment.’ 
 
                                            
91 About the Decalogue, see: Appendix II. 
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Basket III ‘dealt with “co-operation in humanitarian and 
other fields” – a formula covering human rights issues 
under the headings of “human contacts”, “information”, 
“co-operation in the field of culture” and “co-operation in 
the field of education” as well as a specific set of 
recommendations related to Mediterranean issues.’92 
 
 As a package, the three “Baskets” were qualitatively tantamount to the post-
modern and post-Cold War concept of peace and security, inviting soft 
security thinking associated with humanitarian concerns to what used to be 
dominated by hard security thinking. It was and is probably still innovative.  
 What was innovative at the time of 1975 was that ‘[t]his comprehensive 
concept … [put] different dimensions together under the heading of security. 
Human rights, minority rights, [economic] cooperation, education, arms 
control, environmental issues, etc. [were] all considered relevant for the 
development of security in Europe.’ Furthermore, ‘[p]ractices and rules 
concerning these issues [were] interpreted as being instrumental for 
security.’93 In fact, as Janie Leatherman notes, for the East where security 
thinking was more traditional and military-security biased, ‘the CSCE 
definition of security represented a revolution in ideology’, in particular in 
terms of the West’s approach to ‘advocating greater transparency’. Later, 
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Mikhail Gorbachev gained some hints for his “new thinking” and foreign 
policy from the CSCE approach.94 In this sense, even at the point of 1975, 
the Act was written in the post-modern Western civilisational values and 
language and uncomfortably shook the Eastern civilisational values. A 
question is how the Act came to realise, despite the East’s 
uncomfortableness.  
 It is an irony that the Helsinki process that would later lead the 
Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the care-taker 
process of the Act was initiated by the Soviet Union’s proposal in 1954. At 
that point of time, the Basket III or the human dimension in future was not in 
the consideration of the Soviet’s mind. What occupied the Soviet’s mind was 
the defence of the communist borders which were gained as the result of 
WWII extending to the Eastern European countries where the Stalin’s Soviet 
had dramatised the false consent of becoming the communist states. Since 
the Soviet Union was concerned with the legality of the communist states 
under the virtual Soviet control, it hoped to have a certain legal foundation to 
justify. The Soviets brought the idea of the establishment of a pan-European 
security framework, saying that ‘a 50-year treaty be drawn up for signature 
by all European States and be supported by permanent institutional 
machinery.’95 The Soviet initiative, however, understandably met the West’s 
suspicion and the negotiation did not progress around the 1970s.  
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 It was the West led by the US which introduced human rights issues as 
a security agenda to be included in the scheme of the pan-European security 
framework, knowing that those problems were a weak point of the East on 
the moral base and the most of the peoples in the world could align with the 
Western position. The reason of why the West decided to use human rights 
issues in the diplomatic table was the circumstances of the Cold War in the 
1950s and the 1960s. At this early stage of the war, the Soviet Union was at 
a disadvantage in terms of nuclear missile capabilities, though its 
conventional forces quantitatively overwhelmed NATO. Therefore, the West 
had a space to ignore the 1954 Soviet offer. For the West, the offer 
contained possibilities that would make the West untouchable over the 
Eastern Soviet satellite states and exclude the US from the European theatre 
in the military sense that meant the dismantle of NATO. This Western 
speculation fenced off the Soviet offer. The talks over the pan-European 
Security framework up to the beginning of the 1970s were rather a kind of a 
diplomatic preparatory table or a talking point of the rival states.  
 What changed since then was the military power balance between the 
East and the West. Around the 1970s, the Soviets began to overcome its 
military disadvantage against NATO through the increase of the quantities of 
the nuclear missiles in the European theatre.96 In this phase of the Cold War, 
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the two superpowers were indecisive in judging their 
advantage/disadvantage in the confrontation, and the ongoing security 
dilemma between them was raising the cost of the competition that was 
sweeping the economic viability of both states. Thus, some major talks over 
the missile defence were actively negotiated in parallel to the development of 
the Helsinki/CSCE process, and when, the talks of the missile defence were 
in deadlock, the negotiators came to the Helsinki/CSCE process to meet the 
opponents. In this sense, the Helsinki/CSCE process was used as an 
alternative to the deadlocked talks over the missile defence systems, such as 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which would 
be later inherited by Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The Helsinki/CSCE process was a diplomatic insurance policy for 
these talks. 
 Basket III in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 or the current OSCE’s human 
dimension has a root in the diplomatic strategy of the two superpowers in the 
1970s rather than in a pure concern for humanity. The US started using 
human rights issues as a harassment strategy in the Helsinki/CSCE process. 
Human rights were a common and public good covering all humanity and 
could take an upper hand against the Soviet Union whose reputation in this 
regard was undoubtedly low due to Soviet totalitarianism. Although it is 
difficult to assess how much the US humanitarian strategy had a real impact 
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over the missile talks, the talks were intentionally connected to the pan-
European security talks in which the focus was arbitrarily shifted to human 
rights largely by the Western countries including the US. Accordingly, it can 
be said that a meticulous linkage technique in diplomacy was working in the 
whole range of the talks between the East and the West at that time. A 
question was how much the Soviet Union would bite on the pan-European 
security framework in exchange of its own weakness in human rights.  
 In retrospect, it should be judged that the Soviet desire to legitimate the 
communist borderlines was strong enough to result in swallowing Basket III. 
It signed the Helsinki Final Act and agreed to set up the CSCE. The Soviet 
Union as well as the other communist East European states publicized the 
Helsinki Final Act as ‘a monumental achievement in securing the legitimacy 
of post-World War II borders’ in their societies. For the Soviet Union, the 
borders were ‘the overriding importance’ at that time, and the Act meant 
‘achieving a reduction in the level of military preparedness in Europe and … 
relieving the pressures of military spending on the Soviet domestic 
economy.’97  It is also fairly said that the Soviet perception, which was 
relatively careless on human conditions, had the communist government 
'underestimate the long-term effects of Basket III' 98  and trade with the 
legitimacy of the communist borders. The Soviets probably did not so much 
expect that what Basket III was actually going to be pursued in the CSCE 
process in a relatively vigorous manner after the signing. The Act stipulates 
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that ‘[the participating States] will promote and encourage the effective 
exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and 
freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person 
and are essential for his free and full development.’99 These articles, in fact, 
‘set out the standard of behaviour towards their citizens which European 
states were expected to observe.’100  
 This standard-setting function had existed from the start of the 
CSCE/OSCE and even today echoes the CIS region. Due to the existence of 
the standards, the peoples can know what are their rights and whether their 
rights are protected or violated. 
 In fact, the immediate effect of Basket III in the 1970s was the 
awakening of the intellectual dissidents in the East. The clear notification of 
what were their neglected rights pushed them into the actions of ‘building 
informal links across the East-West divide, and … submitting the domestic 
policies of East European regimes to Western scrutiny.’ These networking 
movements, often collectively called the Helsinki Monitoring Groups, were 
given opportunities to publicise their reports through the Helsinki/CSCE 
process. ‘The Helsinki process, the growing visibility of dissidence, the 
evident weakness of the regimes of East-Central Europe and their efforts to 
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differentiate themselves from the Soviet Union, all helped to transform the 
prevailing West European image of the socialist world from that of an alien 
monolithic bloc into one of European nations held back by authoritarian 
regimes.’101 Furthermore, the CSCE was formed as the care-taker process 
to carry out the Act. This follow-up procedure actually met the Soviet 
ignorance. With their military supremacy in quantity against NATO, ‘[t]he 
Soviets … became progressively less interested in a meaningful follow-up 
arrangement as it became clear that a major purpose of such an 
arrangement would be to review their implementation record.’102 The Soviet 
indifference caused a series of crises over the follow-up meetings (Belgrade 
in 1977-78, Madrid in 1980-83) on which the survival of the CSCE process 
was staked. 
 Nevertheless, a set-up of monitoring human rights conditions and 
making feedbacks and reports were very innovative and progressive at that 
time, thinking of the strong existence of the traditional Westphalian state 
sovereignty that included inviolability of internal affairs. Without a question, 
the OSCE’s epistemological innovativeness and operational intrusiveness 
were formed in the Helsinki process and the Act in 1975. However, until the 
advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as the Soviet leader in the middle of the 1980s, 
the crises of the Helsinki/CSCE process continued. It was Gorbachev's New 
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Thinking in foreign policy resuscitated the CSCE process. He was interested 
in the process as a part of his foreign policy strategy aiming at 
rapprochement with the West.  
 Basket III or the human dimension has spun out of the position of a 
decorative clause and developed into the foundation of the most vigorous 
area of the OSCE’s activities. It covers ‘all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, human contacts and other issues of a related humanitarian 
character’. 103  As the current international community has reached an 
understanding, the protection of these freedoms and rights requires a proper 
governing system of states, which usually means democracy. The three 
major organisational institutions within the OSCE, the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM), and the Representative of Freedom of Media (FoM), 
have been established through interpretation of Basket III. Basket III is the 
source of the OSCE’s intrusiveness, since these three institutions in the 
OSCE essentially cover the vast range of the domestic or internal affairs of 
states ‘which are distant from the traditional concerns of foreign and security 
policy.’ If the OSCE develops into ‘a system for international monitoring of 
domestic behaviour’, ‘this will be a further break with the tradition of 
sovereignty in the European state system, which will take all the OSCE 
countries (or all those who play by the rules) decisively into a postmodern 
world.’104  
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 As referred to, the birth and follow-ups of Basket III were a result of the 
Western diplomatic strategy during the Cold War of putting pressure on the 
Soviet Union from a non-military angle. In this sense, Basket III may be 
understood as an accident. Nonetheless, Basket III has given the very post-
modern character to the OSCE’s peace and security concept.  
 In sum, while it can be seen the much of the influence of the Western 
civilisation in it, the Act contains “flexibility” to provide an extra capacity to 
reach out to newly coming security concerns as time goes by through re-
reading and re-interpreting the lines of the Act. In this sense, the OSCE’s 
security concept seems to be open-ended and always on the table for minor 
alteration. While the agendas in Basket I or the politico-military dimension 
are already stylised, Basket II or the economic and environment dimension 
and Basket III or the human dimension need to be extensive to reach out to 
new agendas emerging from an unexpected place due to the natures of the 
security fields. For example, the recent rise of awareness of global warming 
and its effects has made the issue become an agenda in the economic and 
environmental dimension. The possibility of conflict over water shortage is 
also in this category. Although it has been marginalised for a long time, the 
economic and environmental dimension seems to be on the rise in 
significance, due to the development of natural environmental issues. Basket 
III or the human dimension has been conceptually expanding since the 
1990s, due to the fact that the former communist states had a number of 
conflicts and social turmoil after the end of the Cold War and human rights 
issues were connected to the problems.  
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 Despite such flexibility, the Act’s security concept has contributed to the 
consolidation of the concept of human security in the post-Cold War era, 
which had not been recognised as international “security” issues for a long 
time in a clear way. The consolidation has allowed to step in the relations 
between a state and an individual, and/or an individual and a social 
environment in which one lives. The step grants the CSCE/OSCE a feature 
of the post-modern world. 
 As Jef Huysmans notes, ‘security is the key concept in the 
[CSCE/OSCE’s] understanding of Europe.’ The understanding may be 
biased towards the Western liberal notion in which justice, economic 
prosperity, human rights and democracy have some significance. However, 
the CSCE/OSCE has been defining security with the notion. The elements of 
the notion ‘are subordinated to security.’105 As long as “security” is defined 
with the connection to the elements, what the OSCE is doing is to bring the 
OSCE region into the paradigm in which justice, economic prosperity, human 
rights and democracy have a weight equal to inter-state hard security. It is a 
construction of a shared value-based space or region based on the Western 
liberal notion as the foundation of the set of values. 
 
 
3.2.2. The 1990 Charter of Paris 
 
It is a fact that the Helsinki/CSCE process was in difficulty due to the Soviet 
resistance to taking its human rights issues as a security agenda, even after 
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the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet Union was not so keen for the series 
of follow-up meetings. This tendency continued until the advent of Mikhail 
Gorbachev in the middle of the 1980s.  
 Ironically, however, this was the time that the Helsinki/CSCE process 
produced some patterns of its behavioural codes in negotiation. The survival 
of the process largely fell in the hands of the so-called neutral and non-
aligned (N+N) states consisting of the Nordic states, in particular Finland 
which had been longing to establish a political presence in international 
politics and hoped to use it for leading their individual national interests. The 
position of the N+N quasi-framework had been established throughout the 
history of the N+N states in which they were sandwiched between the 
USSR/Russia and the other European powers. Under the bleak mood of the 
negotiation between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the N+N 
states initiated a consultation process in which Finland took the leading role. 
Although there was no landmark achievement like the 1975 Helsinki Final 
Act, the N+N states were always successful in achieving the confirmation of 
the next follow-up meeting schedule. 
 Leatherman summarises the N+N states’ contribution to the process: 
 
‘By facilitating work according to the consensus 
decision-making rule, the N+N played face-saving 
roles that helped make it politically possible for East 
and West to sustain their commitment to the CSCE 
process. Given the destabilizing negotiating 
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strategies of the bloc participants, the N+N were 
indispensable in their effort at Belgrade to produce a 
“fair” and balanced, though admittedly meager, 
substantive document. In the Madrid Follow-up, the 
N+N defended the political viability of the CSCE, 
both by promoting concrete, and significant 
substantive results, and by providing face-saving 
interventions to obtain long recesses when good 
results were in jeopardy. Finally, they helped secure 
the linkage promoted by the West between progress 
on human rights and disarmament, thus contributing 
to a multifaceted conception of security in East-West 
relations.’106 
 
Once Gorbachev emerged into the spotlight of Soviet politics, the division of 
the East and the West within the CSCE process was drastically reduced, 
since Gorbachev’s “new thinking” on diplomacy took a more humanitarian 
approach than the previous Soviet internal and foreign policies. 107  The 
change of the leader of the Soviet Union brought a historical chance to break 
the deadlock in the Helsinki/CSCE process.  
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 Behind the scene, the Helsinki/CSCE process proceeded the follow-up 
meetings in Vienna (1986-1989) and Paris (Conference, 1990). Then, it 
reached the CSCE Paris Conference that adopted the Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe (on 21st November, 1990). However, the collapse of the Soviet 
block was associated with a number of conflicts in the former communist 
states, such as Yugoslavia, Georgia, Moldova or Nagorno-Karabakh 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Reflecting the situation, ‘the concluding 
document of the 19th Helsinki Summit [in 1992], The Challenges of Change, 
[began] with the sober observation that “for the first time in decades, we are 
facing warfare in the CSCE region.”’108  
 The Charter of Paris ideologically re-constructed and broadened what 
had been already referred to in the Helsinki Final Act as the focusing and 
concerning areas and issues in a more Western and liberal language. In a 
sense, the Charter of Paris was written with a high confidence on the 
Western political, economic and value systems due to the “victory” of the 
Cold War.  
 Reflecting the backdrop, the Charter of Paris stresses a link between 
human rights, democracy and rule of law. It articulates that ‘[the] protection 
and promotion [of human rights] is the first responsibility of government’, 
‘[r]espect for them is an essential safeguard against an over-mighty State’, 
and ‘[t]heir observance and full exercise are the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace.’ For the protection of human rights, ‘[d]emocracy is the 
best safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance of all groups of society, 
and equality of opportunity for each person’, since it ‘entails accountability to 
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the electorate, the obligation of public authorities to comply with the law and 
justice administered impartially.’ 109  Thus, with the Charter of Paris, the 
OSCE has confirmed the trinity of ideological principles in the human 
dimension – human rights, democracy and the rule of law – on which it 
stands and put a larger weight on the dimension than before.  
 A fundamental problem is that the peace and security concept, if 
sincerely implemented, requires to breach the traditional Westphalian state 
sovereignty at the considerable scale in comparison to the traditional version. 
The concept in the Charter of Paris demanded, without clearly stating, the 
revise, re-construction, re-interpretation and normalisation of the concept of 
state sovereignty. 
 The CSCE was one of the earliest voices to make the demand in a 
clear tone in the light of the state responsibility to protect and promote 
human rights. Partly, this move related to the on-going civil wars in the 
Former Yugoslavia which was at the door step of Europe. This move was 
followed by the UN which was equally observing other civil wars in Africa and 
Asia and thinking of effective peace operations over them. Javier Pérez de 
Cuéllar’s address at the University of Bordeaux in the spring of 1991 literarily 
stated ‘the right to intervene’. 110  His successor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
stepped up with An Agenda for Peace in 1992, in which ‘he did emphasize 
the need for governments to understand that sovereignty is not absolute and 
“to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the 
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requirements of an ever more interdependent world.”’111 The statements 
attempted to clarify the legitimate forms of intervention with providing the 
definition of some peace operation’s measures. The 1992 paper was 
followed by the supplement paper in 1995. In 1999 and 2000, ‘Kofi Annan 
made compelling pleas to the international community to try to find, once and 
for all, a new consensus on how to approach [the] issues [of intervention], to 
“forge unity” around the basic questions of principle and process involved.’112 
With the pleas, Annan led the Millennium Declaration in 2000, and the UN 
World Summit Outcome in 2005.113 Both documents reflect the decade-long 
effort of the UN to find out a legitimate way of intervention in the failing, failed 
and/or problematic states that present threats for international peace and 
security. 
 The series of calls is currently taking the shape of Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P), which is a concept initially launched by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 with the 
initiative and support of the Canadian government as a response to the 
Annan’s pleas. The ICISS’s report outlines the R2P in the “Synopsis” that 
fundamentally acknowledges the missing link between absoluteness of state 
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sovereignty and state’s obligations during the latter half of the 20th century. 
The “Basic Principles” in the “Core Principles” of R2P just simply note that 
‘[s]tate sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for 
the protection of its people lies with the state itself.’ When a state fails to 
carry out the responsibility, it has to accept an external intervention 
dispatched by a legitimated authority in the international community, since 
the situation ‘yields to the international responsibility to protect.’114 In other 
words, R2P is of a conditional state sovereignty and, as the report itself 
annunciates, the “right of humanitarian intervention.” 115  The conditional 
version of state sovereign also appeared in the 2005 UN World Summit 
Outcome. Paragraph 138 in the resolution prescribes state’s ‘responsibility to 
protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.’116 The description is understood that ‘intervention 
in a state’s internal affairs is permitted’ in such occasions, ‘if that state is 
unwilling or unable to protect its own people.’117  
 The idea that the government or regime of a state should have 
responsibility and obligation to govern the state not to spill out the internal 
problems is not the product of the 20th or 21st century. In the time when the 
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Peace of Westphalia concluded in 1648, which is usually considered the 
beginning of the modern state and international system, European monarchs 
were much more interested in their neighbour’s ‘domestic development’ that 
‘could undermine their own security’ and their ‘values related only loosely to 
material or security interests’ that would [prompt] states to pressure others to 
change the way in which they [might] treat their own subjects or citizens.’  In 
other words, ‘[e]xternal interference in the relationship between ruler and 
ruled has been an enduring and pervasive characteristic of the sovereign 
state system since its very inception.’ 118  Since internal affairs of 
neighbouring states were taken as very important for the state’s security, the 
premise of inviolability of states and non-intervention in internal affairs in the 
Peace was based on a tacit agreement that “each state (or monarch) would 
take care of the internal affairs” in order not to spill over the troubles to other 
states.” This would be a duty and responsibility of the monarchs or the rulers 
of states. On the other side of the same coin, state sovereignty implied that, 
when the premise was broken, there would be intervention. 
 The supposed state capacity has not been achieved by all states in the 
world even in the 21st century, in particular when human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law are the standards. The international community has at 
last started stipulating the responsibility of the government of states over its 
populations in terms of human rights, and made the linkage to democracy 
and the rule of law as the supports for human rights. And the government of 
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states are supposed to be obligated to accept external interference over the 
issues of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Therefore, the shift to 
the post-modern version of state sovereignty is becoming clearer. The post-
modern version is the conditional state sovereignty unlike the traditional 
version of it. Accordingly, the 1990 Charter of Paris was one of the 
frontrunners to articulate the beginning of the shift. At the same time, it 
should be noted that the articulation of the shift was possible due to the 
absence of an opposing force against the Western democratic model, a lack 
of a clear perspective on the new international order and a growing 
expectation over international institutions in the 1990s.  
 The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia particularly provided an 
opportunity to the OSCE to work as a care-taker of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, and other former communist states in Central-East Europe 
looked up the CSCE/OSCE as one of the major guides for their 
democratisation processes. The environment allowed the CSCE/OSCE to 
build up the organisation’s fundamental approaches towards its regional 
security with the reflection of the Western liberal norms, principles and 
values under the name of the universal values. In particular, the absence of 
the Soviet Union or the existence of a weak Russian Federation to provide 
an alternative set of values helped the CSCE/OSCE to tilt the organisational 
stance over the human dimension, since the development of the dimension 
required a drastic change in thinking of state sovereignty. As result, it was 
possible to set up a number of innovative mechanisms and procedures that 
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would break the traditional notion of state sovereignty. The mechanisms and 
procedures are explained later in this chapter. 
 
 
3.2.3. The 1999 Charter for European Security 
 
With the backdrop of the rapid development of the European security 
environment, the CSCE was transformed into the OSCE, a permanent 
regional organisation, in 1995. The OSCE was standing on a unique position 
where the EU and NATO were less prepared for playing a role. With the 
increase of local conflicts and spill-over issues, the perception of security 
threats was largely on internal affairs of states which were now taken as 
international concerns. Thus, the CSCE/OSCE put itself into a niche where 
Basket III or the human dimension would be the centre of the organisational 
activities. Although the CSCE/OSCE was still working on some hard military-
related issues, such as the CFE Treaty and the Open Sky Treaty as a part of 
CSBMs, the organisation started to be associated more with 
democracy/democratisation and human rights. That carved out its character 
as a soft security organisation.  
 Until the 1999 Charter for European Security appeared, the 
circumstances of the OSCE were favourable for the dictation of the Western 
civilisational values and language. There were still some nagging problems, 
such as the so-called frozen conflicts (notably Nagorno-Karabkh in 
Azerbaijan, Transdnistria in Moldova, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
Georgia), which are still waiting for being solved. Nevertheless, in terms of 
the epistemological level, the OSCE was in the time that it could be still 
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innovative in deepening the post-modern version of state sovereignty. 
Therefore, the Charter of European Security was also written in the post-
modern Western civilisational values and language.  
 The 1999 Charter of European Security may be regarded as the apex 
of the momentum of Western liberal values, in retrospect, in terms of timing, 
though ‘it arguably lacked vision’ that the Charter of Paris had.119  The 
Charter ‘[analyses] … the risks and challenges to the security of post-
Communist Europe (‘Our Common Challenges’, paragraphs 2-6) and 
[reaffirms] … pan-European principles (‘Our Common Foundations’, 
paragraphs 7-11), that instrument provides for the strengthening of the 
structures of the OSCE (‘Our Common Response’, paragraphs 12-33) and, 
more particularly, … its operational capacities (‘Our Common Instruments’, 
paragraphs 34-47)’. In addition, the Platform for Cooperative Security 
‘guidelines for a new partnership co-operation with other security 
organisations.’ 120  In Victor-Yves Ghebali’s observation, ‘the Charter 
represents one of the major texts of the post-Cold War OSCE.’ 
 
‘Its main merit has to do with the fact that its 
substantial core is more operational than normative; 
it bears witness to the growing political relevance in 
Europe of an otherwise low-profile organisation 
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which[, in] the same year, has also updated its 
CSBM’s regime (Vienna Document 1999), 
established in Kosovo a field Mission totalling several 
thousand people and accepted major special 
responsibilities relating to the management of the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.’121 
 
The 1999 Charter for European Security adds awareness of newly emerging 
security concerns at that time which are ‘international terrorism, violent 
extremism, organized crime and drug trafficking’ to the OSCE’s security 
agendas. 122  It calls for cooperation with other international/regional 
organisations to deal with the widened security agendas, providing the 
“Platform for Co-operative Security” formula with an expectation for a forum 
among international/regional security organisations. It also refers to 
corruption as a security issue that ‘poses a great threat to the OSCE’s 
shared values’ in the economic and environmental dimension. The provision 
of the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) appears 
with the decision to set up an Operation Centre in the Conflict Prevention 
Centre to support REACT. 
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 The concerns of terrorism and extremism in the Charter for European 
Security stem from intolerance, xenophobia or minority issues, which 
generate discrimination, rather than religious ideologies, partly since the 
Charter was written before the 9/11 terrorist attacks (in 2001). Organised 
crime and drug trafficking are linked with failed and weak state problems that 
are spilling over largely from some of the former communist states in the 
OSCE region. Similarly, human trafficking is also frequently referred to in the 
OSCE’s other recent documents and statements. These issues are probably 
‘less visible’. ‘[N]onetheless[,] they are ‘very important and relevant for the 
stability and predictability of the international environment’. In this sense, the 
OSCE is a rare voice for addressing such less visible issues at the 
international/regional level of politics. Therefore, the three decades after the 
Helsinki Final Act, ‘[t]he OSCE principles remain today as relevant as in the 
past, if not more, when dealing with present challenges, even though their 
practical translation should be adapted to the new environment.’123 
 
 
3.2.4. In the 2000s 
 
The 2000s may be regarded as a stasis of the organisation which was so 
active to produce a set of new norms, practices and values over international 
peace and security in the 1990s. Partly, this is because the epistemological 
development has now got into in the stage of consolidating the 
institutionalisation through the repetition of application of the rules and 
                                            
123 Stoudmann, Gérard. (2004). The way forward or is the OSCE fit for the 
21st century?. Helsinki Monitor. No.4. p.294. 
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regulations stemmed from the development. The development has affected 
not only the OSCE but the international community as a whole.  
 Nevertheless, the rise of the “East of Vienna” has started making 
negative responses to the institutionalisation. In particular, the Georgian-
Russian War in 2008 was a great shock for the OSCE as well as the whole 
pan-European peace and security scheme. The OSCE has launched the 
Cofu Process in 2009 to provide a regular meeting place for OSCE 
ambassadors in order to restore confidence and promote dialogue among 
the Participating States. 
 
3.2.5. The Trinity of the OSCE’s Peace and Security Concept 
 
Following the Helsinki/CSCE/OSCE process, it is noticeable that what makes 
the concept of international peace and security post-modern is the focus on 
individuals to be protected, while what makes the concept modern is the 
focus on state entities to be protected. The difference, however, does not 
mean that which international peace and security concept is better. This 
should not be easily judged with a Darwinian sense, so that the phrase of  
“post-modern” does not imply “superior” to “modern” in the discussion of 
international peace and security concept. The difference is brought by the 
respective way of recognising threats. Therefore, in future, if our recognition 
of threats changes, the concept of international peace and security will 
transform again.  
 The “current” post-modern concept of international peace and security 
is human security, and all prescriptions for the security are based on what 
are threats to individuals. In the light of human security, states are potential 
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enemies to individuals. ‘[I]ndividuals are members of communities, but also, 
and perhaps more importantly, in circumstances where the security of the 
individual may actually be threatened by the state itself. Denial of human 
rights, ill-treatment and persecution for reasons of gender or sexual 
orientation, the deprivations of famine and poverty, these are all factors 
which threaten the security of individuals and fall within the purview of the 
new security studies.’ 124  The accentuation of individual’s security, once 
interwoven into the international peace and security concept, makes ‘a 
considerable step forward’ since it ‘implies that human beings matter more 
than states.’125  
 Individuals need human rights, democracy to protect the rights from 
state authorities and the rule of law to protect it from any sources of threats 
within their states. The OSCE’s linkage of these elements is all about the 
security for individuals. The Helsinki/CSCE/OSCE process has crystallised 
that the post-modern and individual-centric peace and security concept are 
possible to realise, at least, under the mutual and reciprocal relations over 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law in a state which works together 
as the trinity of the post-modern peace and security concept. The 
government of states must have responsibility and obligation to promote and 
protect these institutions. That is the minimum condition to claim state 
sovereignty under the concept of human security associated with the concept 
of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  
                                            
124 Brown, Chris. (2001). Understanding International Relations. 2nd edition. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and New York: Palgrave. 
p.238. 
125 Vankovska, Biljana. (2007). The Human Security Doctrine for Europe; A 
View from Below. International Peacekeeping. Vol.14, No.2, April. p.265. 
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 In details, however, human security may be still waiting for a clear 
definition. The UN’s approach seems to be on an emphasis of freedom. The 
UN resolution in the World Summit Outcome in 2005 underlines:  
 
‘We stress the right of people to live in freedom and 
dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize 
that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, 
are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from 
want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their 
rights and fully develop their human potential. To this 
end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining 
the notion of human security in the General 
Assembly.’126 
 
The set of freedoms is also referred to in a report of the UN Secretary of 
General to the 59th session of the General Assembly in March 2005, titled as 
In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for 
All.127 Although the concept and definition of human security may not have 
been clearly spelled out yet, it is quite obvious that the most important 
reference for human security is human rights.  
 The international human rights regime is sustained by the 
International Bill of Human Rights consisting of the Universal Declaration of 
                                            
126 Para.143 in: UN. (24th October 2005). The World Summit Outcome. UN 
Doc. A/RES/60/1. 
127 UN. (21st March 2005). In Larger Freedom – Towards Development, 
Security, and Human Rights for All (A report of the Secretary-General). UN 
Doc. A/59/2005 (Agenda items 45 and 55). 
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Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR, 1966) with its two Optional Protocols, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966). These 
resolution and treaties that ‘[v]irtually all states agree … [provide] an 
authoritative list of internationally recognized human rights.’ The list largely 
contains the issues of human rights, such as that a state may violate and 
harm its own citizens in its territory, for example ‘police brutality, torture, an 
arbitrary arrest and detention’. Thus, the Bill can be ‘a special reference’ to 
state’s crimes against its own citizens, though whether the list is properly and 
anytime used or not is a different matter.128 The implementation of the Bill 
apparently requires intervention in internal affairs that had been a taboo 
during the Cold War. If the Cold War era was the time for the codification of 
human rights at the international level, a serious step of the international 
human rights regime actually came after the Cold War, in particular 
stimulated by the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s where the 
European powers could not so easily overlook the effects spilling over from 
the conflicts as well as the response of their own peoples who watched the 
media reports of the conflicts. The gross violation of human rights by the 
state power, which happened in the course of crumbling of the state, actually 
contributed to the development and expansion of humanitarian characters in 
international peace and security under the framework of human security.  
                                            
128 Donnelly, Jack. (1995) State Sovereignty and International intervention: 
The Case of Human Rights. In: Lyons, Gene M., and Michael Mastanduno, 
eds. Beyond Westphalia?: State Sovereignty and International Intervention. 
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. p.116. 
The list of internationally recognised human rights is in “Appendix I” in this 
thesis. 
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 It is commonly considered that democracy is the best form of 
governance for human security. Non-democratic regimes often resort to 
oppression over some or all of the people in the states. Democracy in the 
post-modern and post-Cold War era is a complex system. When it is 
discussed as a system that goes hand in hand with or supports human 
security, it is not enough for a state to qualify as a mature democracy just 
because the state carries out free and competitive elections, which is a 
minimalist definition of democracy rooted in a view by Joseph Schumpeter, 
with which the Soviet Union and Russia in the 1990s may have qualified but 
are difficult to be judged as a mature democracy.129 
 A Schumpeterian, Robert Dahl, provides a list of ramified conditions 
for being identified as democracy. According to Dahl, all members in an ideal 
democracy (though there may be some limitation, like by age) must exercise: 
 
1. Effective participation 
2. Equality in voting 
3. Gaining enlightened understanding 
4. Exercising final control over the agenda 
5. Inclusion of adults130 
 
In the case of a large-scale democracy, we shall also see 
                                            
129 See McFaul, Michael., and Nikolai Petrov. (2004). Elections. In: McFaul, 
Michael., Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov with Mikhail Krasnov, Vladimir 
Petukhov, Victor Sheinis, and Elina Treyger, eds. Between Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform. Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. p.23. 
130 ‘Figure 4. What is democracy?’ in: Dahl, Robert A. (1998). On 
Democracy. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. p.38. 
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1. Elected officials 
2. Free, fair, and frequent elections 
3. Freedom of expression 
4. Alternative sources of information 
5. Associational autonomy 
6. Inclusive citizenship131 
 
Why is democracy good?  Because democracy can produce these desirable 
outcomes: 
 
1. Avoiding tyranny 
2. Essential rights 
3. General freedom 
4. Self determination 
5. Moral autonomy 
6. Human development  
7. Protecting essential personal interests 
8. Political equality 
9. Peace-seeking 
10. Prosperity’132 
 
                                            
131 ‘Figure 6. What political institutions does large-scale democracy require?’ 
in: Dahl, Robert A. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press. p.85. 
132 ‘Figure 5. Why democracy?’ in: Dahl, Robert A. (1998). On Democracy. 
New Haven & London: Yale University Press. p.45. 
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In addition, Larry Diamond also lists the conditions of liberal democracy.   
 
1. ‘Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies, in fact 
as well as in constitutional theory, with elected officials (and not 
democratically unaccountable actors or foreign powers); in particular, 
the military is subordinate to the authority of elected civilian officials. 
2. Executive power is constrained, constitutionally and in fact, by the 
autonomous power of other government institutions (such as an 
independent judiciary, parliament, and other mechanisms of horizontal 
accountability). 
3. Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a significant 
[opposition] vote and the presumption of party alteration in 
government, but no group that adheres to constitutional principles is 
denied the right to form a party and contest elections (even if electoral 
thresholds and other rules exclude small parties from winning 
[representations] in parliament). 
4. Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority group (as well as 
historically disadvantaged majorities) are not prohibited (legally or in 
practice) from expressing their interests in the political process or from 
speaking their language or practicing their culture. 
5. Beyond parties and elections, citizens have multiple, ongoing 
channels for expression and representation of their interests and 
values, including diverse, independent associations and [movements], 
which they have the freedom to form and join. 
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6. There are alternative sources of information (including [independent] 
media) to which citizens have politically unfettered access. 
7. Individuals also have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, 
[discussion], speech, publication, assembly, demonstration, and 
[petition]. 
8. Citizens are politically equal under the law (even though they are 
invariably unequal in their political resources). 
9. Individual and group liberties are effectively protected by an 
[independent], non-discriminatory judiciary, whose decisions are 
enforced and respected by other centers of power. 
10. The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, 
torture, and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the 
state but also by organized non-state or anti-state forces.’133 
 
The mature democracy in the post-modern era is such a complex, 
meticulous and subtle system, if it works. With such complexity at work, 
‘democratic political institutions provide a crucial level of mediation and 
aggregation between, on one side, structural factors and, on the other, not 
                                            
133 These are restated by Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei 
Ryabov for their examination of democracy in Russia.  
See: McFaul, Michael., Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov. (2004). 
Introduction. In: McFaul, Michael., Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov with 
Mikhail Krasnov, Vladimir Petukhov, Victor Sheinis, and Elina Treyger, eds. 
Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political 
Reform. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2004. pp.3-4. 
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only individuals but also the diverse groupings under which society organizes 
its multiple interests and identities.’134 
 As listed, the rule of law is a part of the conditions to be recognised as a 
democracy. Fundamentally, what means the rule of law in terms of the 
discussion of human security is that the government, authorities and 
powerful elites in the public institutions of states are also under law, which is 
one of “the six killer applications of the Western civilisation” by Niall 
Ferguson.135  
 Why is human security essential for “international” peace and security? 
The experience of the 1990s with a number of civil wars gives, at least, two 
lessons. The current on-going Syrian crisis also adds another example of the 
international importance of internal stability sustained by the human security 
elements. The civil wars are likely to produce negative externalities or spill-
over effects to the neighbouring states like refugees and the expansion of 
fighting areas crossing the state borders. This is a material part of the 
reasons. The other reason is of human psychology and popular politics. The 
technological development has make it possible for peoples in other parts of 
the world to “watch” the civil wars, thanks to brave journalists who go to such 
dangerous places and take pictures and videos. Their reports sometimes stir 
the public consciousness of the powerful countries, like the US and the 
European countries and push the governments in the internal politics.  
                                            
134 O’Donnell, Guillermo. (1994). Delegative Democracy. Journal of 
Democracy. Vol. 5, No. 1, January. p.59. 
135 Ferguson, Niall. (2012). The Landscape of Law. The Reith Lectures (A 
BBC Radio 4 programme). First broadcasted July 3rd, 2012. Transcript is 
available: Online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01jmxrx (last chacked 
on November 2012.) 
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 However, in a deeper level, human security, democracy and the rule of 
law are to create circumstances in which comfort of individuals is durable 
enough to solve problems in relations among individuals, groups and state 
authorities and leads the whole society to foster a long-term thinking norm 
with a relatively clear perspective for the future that is given by the stability of 
society. One individual is the last irreducible unit in the society, so that it is 
possible that the society will be peaceful with a better security if such an 
orderly society guarantees their relatively peaceful life and human rights. 
Individuals can have time to interact each other, test their relations and 
extend the relations into trust and cooperation under the peaceful time-
framework. 
 In a chaotic society, individuals have to be a short-term thinker and 
move strategically in a moment, since chaos never guarantees what will 
happen in the immediate future. By the situation, individuals are not allow to 
be a long-term thinker. The situation less promises the development of trust 
and cooperation.  
 Democracy with the rule of law, in comparison to other state 
governance systems, has been relatively successful in introducing such a 
comfortableness of individuals and better making them a long-term thinker 
and worthy of cooperating or being cooperated, after democracy starts 
working. Once a state society of democracy enters this level of stability, it 
also becomes a peaceful country for the neighbouring state, since they do 
not need to spill out their internal problems. On the contrary, the chaotic state 
often employs foreign enemies as scapegoats to diversify their people’s 
anger and complains. The difference of the pretence of individuals, 
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generated by their respective belonging societies, affects the behaviour as a 
state. 
 The theory of democratic peace, therefore, is a part of the foundation of 
the OSCE and current international peace and security. The theory has 
provided a solid ground for the promotion of democracy in the global scale 
with its impressive empirical data. There has been – arguably – no war 
between democracies, though democracies may engage in war against non-
democracies.136 Accordingly, it leads an assumption that, if the entire world 
becomes democracies, there would be no war anymore.137  
 Since it has been largely recognised since the early 1990s, the theory 
has had significant implications.  First, democracy has become the only 
appreciated version of governance system, even though many states in the 
world are still non-democracies, failed democracies or falling democracies. 
The theory may be not sufficient to deal with the variation of democracies. 
Nevertheless, the flaw seems to be not enough focused on. Since other 
versions of governance system, like authoritarianism, totalitarianism, fascism 
or communism, have been seemingly confirmed as “negative” by the human 
history, democracy is regarded as the best form of governance ever tried so 
far even with some problems and a wide range of variations in details.138 
                                            
136 For a reference, see: Russett, Bruce. (1996). The Fact of Democratic 
Peace. In: Brown, Michael E., M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds. 
Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 
England: The MIT Press, 1996. pp. 58-81, in particular Table 1.2. ‘Dispute 
Behavior of Politically Relevant Interstate Dyads, 1946-1986’ in p.80. 
137 See, for example: Jahn, Beate. (2005). Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies 
in International Affairs. International Organization. Vol. 59, Winter. pp.180-
181. 
138 Remember a Winston Churchill’s famous quotation, which is that 
“Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those others that 
have been tried.” 
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The fall of communism in the 1990s has stamped the status of democracy. 
Second, due to its assumed peaceful nature of democracies in relations to 
the same kind of states, the promotion of democracy and/or democratisation 
has become a reasonable foreign policy choice among the Western 
countries which are the group of the most mature democracies and have a 
greater influence over international politics. In other words, the Western 
powers have found a greater and more logical incentive to change the non-
democratic regimes into democracies for the sake of own security. The 
incentive may, to some extent, lead an interventionist foreign policy. In fact, 
their encouragement of democratisation over the former communist states in 
the 1990s was largely sustained by the assumption with the reality that there 
was no other viable model for governance after the failure of communism. In 
addition, the current problems of the failed or falling states have also 
extracted an interpretation that the lack of democratic good governance and 
strong state institutions is a source of the troubles. Thus, the Western foreign 
policy makers tend to aim at democratisation of such problematic states.  
 The rise of terrorism targeting the Western countries and citizens gives 
another twist of the democratic peace foreign policy of the West. The West is 
afraid of possibility that failed or falling states are used as terrorist base 
camps to train terrorists, since their weak governing institutions seen in, for 
example, Afghanistan and Yemen are incapable of preventing from being 
exploited in such a way. When the Western states, either as individual states 
or through international organisations, intervene such states for state-
building, they tend to require an accountable government produced through 
democratic institutions and procedures. To colonise these states is not an 
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option, not only since colonisation has become a taboo in international 
politics, but also since the West no longer has enough resources for 
achieving a total control over the vast scale of territories in the failed or falling 
states. The Western powers call for capable governments and governing 
system in such a pre-modern land that should be cooperative, accountable, 
stable and legitimate in a long term.  
 Finally, the interventionist foreign policy of the Western states logically 
seeks for a way of lowering the threshold of state sovereignty. Somehow 
ironically, the promotion of democratic peace requires a way of intervening 
other states’ internal affairs in order to make non-democratic states become 
democracies. This line of thinking leads the foreign policy of regime change. 
Nevertheless, the policy choice has to be adjusted to the political 
environment in the post-Cold War era. In such an environment, international 
organisations have some roles to play. 
 
3.2.6. The OSCE's Mechanisms 
 
The OSCE developed some measures or “mechanisms” to respond to the 
security agendas in the 1990s. The establishment of the mechanisms is a 
part of the reason why the CSCE/OSCE was hailed in the 1990s since the 
mechanisms manifested an intrusive direction of the CSCE/OSCE process 
and the post-modern way of managing regional peace and security.  
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The politico-military dimension 
 
Confidence- and Security- Building Measures (CSBMs) holds Risk Reduction 
Management” that includes early warning and peaceful settlement of 
disputes. These measures are for transparency and openness on military 
activities across the Participating States of the OSCE region.139  
 
• Risk Reduction Management: The Vienna Document in 1999 updated 
and made three guidelines on the management. They consist of (1) 
the mechanism for consultation and co-operation regarding unusual 
military activities, (2) voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concern about 
military activities, and (3) co-operation regarding hazardous incidents 
of a military nature.140 In theory, it is supposed that the activation of 
risk reduction mechanisms and procedures is triggered by a 
participating State which may concern other state’s military intention. 
In particular, in the case of consultation and co-operation regarding 
unusual military activities, the questioned state or states have to reply 
within 48 hours. Risk reduction with the CSBMs is a quite post-
modern idea in international relations which steps into a territory that 
used to be covert in the name of national security. Within the OSCE, 
therefore, some say that ‘[t]he Vienna Document … is considered to 
be the most comprehensive politically binding agreement on 
confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe.’141  
                                            
139 See: OSCE. (8th June 2004). OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures. p.4. 
140 OSCE. (8th June 2004). OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures. p.4. 
141 Gibson, Barbara. (2007). Slowly but surely, co-operative security 
emerges: Rising to the challenges of change. OSCE Magazine. October – 
November. p.20. 
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• Early Warning Mechanisms and Procedures: They are ‘to draw the 
attention of the Senior Council to a given situation’, and triggered in 
several ways, including by a request of ‘a group of 11 participating 
State not directly involved in the dispute’.142 The Berlin Mechanism 
assumes an emergency situation if a participating State may violate 
‘one of the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act’ or ‘[endanger] peace, 
security or stability.’ The participating State or States which raise 
concerns must submit ‘all relevant information to clarify the situation’ 
within 48 hours. When the situation is unsolved, the CiO may be 
requested to call an Emergency Meeting of the Senior Council.143 As 
the OSCE’s institutional re-organisation progresses, the Senior 
Council was abolished in 2006 and the functions have been 
transferred into the Permanent Council including the role in the Berlin 
Mechanism. The Valletta Mechanism is for peaceful settlement of 
disputes, facilitating ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means’, though these 
activities may remain confidential and any agreements, if made, stay 
non-binding. The Valletta Mechanism has been unused due to such a 
                                            
142 OSCE. (8th June 2004). OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures. p.6.  
 
Early warning mechanism can be triggered by (1) any participating State 
directly involved in a dispute, (2) a group of 11 participating States not 
directly involved in the dispute, (3) the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities in situations he deems escalating into a conflict or exceeding the 
scope of his action, (4) the Consultative Committee of the CPC following the 
use of the mechanism for consultations and co-operation as regards unusual 
military activities, (5) the use of the Human Dimension Mechanism of the 
Valletta Principles for Dispute Settlement and Provisions for a CSCE 
Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.  These routes for the 
activation are passed through the Chairman-in-Office. 
143 OSCE. (8th June 2004). OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures. p.6. 
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political nature which makes the whole process complicated to 
actually implement.144  
• Dispute Settlement: In a legal way, the OSCE has the Convention on 
Conciliation and Arbitration. This is a rare legally binding agreement in 
the organisation and an “optional” convention among the states that 
signed it. The Convention establishes a Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration in Geneva that becomes available only ‘when a dispute is 
submitted to it an ad hoc Conciliation Commission or an ad hoc 
Arbitral Tribunal is established.’145 It has been unused so far.  
 
The human dimension  
The human dimension has two measures: the Vienna Mechanism 
(established in 1989) and the Moscow Mechanism (established in 1991 and 
amended in 1993), which respectively have the history of activation. Both 
measures focus on collecting information of human rights conditions when a 
question arises. 
 
• Vienna Mechanism: This is a preliminary measure.  
• Moscow Mechanism: The Moscow Mechanism ‘[complements] and 
strengthens the Vienna Mechanism’ and instructs to arrange missions 
of experts. The Moscow Mechanism, thus, has much more detailed 
procedures than the Vienna Mechanism. 
 
                                            
144 OSCE. (8th June 2004). OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures. pp.6-7. 
145 OSCE. (8th June 2004). OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures. pp.7-8. 
The number of the signed participating States is 33 at the time of 2004. 
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Importantly, although the issues of humanitarian concerns and human rights 
tend to be internal affairs, the Vienna-Moscow Mechanisms’ initiation can be 
done by ‘other participating States’ than the participating States in 
question.146 In other words, the activation of the mechanisms does not need 
consent by the government of the state that is supposed to have problems 
with human rights and conditions. Theoretically, therefore, the OSCE’s 
human dimension has broken the conventional sense of state sovereignty. 
That was quite innovative in the early half of the 1990s when these 
mechanisms were set up.  
 A major trend in the OSCE’s mechanisms is that raising concerns 
through the activation of the mechanisms can be theoretically done without 
consent of the Participating State or States that are supposed to be causing 
the concerns. This is often dubbed as “consensus minus one” that basically 
‘takes more than one dissenting member to block consensus.’ 147  The 
‘exception to the rule of consensus (consensus minus one, …) was 
introduced for the case of a serious violation’ in the CSCE Council of 
Ministers meeting in Prague in 1992 with the background of the conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia. The CSCE unilaterally suspended the Yugoslavia’s 
status as a Participating State and banned the country to join in the Helsinki 
Follow-up Meeting in the same year.148 The action recalls a rule of Axelrod’s 
cooperation theory that recommends an immediate punishment against the 
                                            
146 OSCE. (8th June 2004). OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures. p.2. 
147 Alberta Public Interest Research Group (APIRG), The. (No date, month 
or year is specified). Consensus Decision Making Process. Online. Available 
at: http://www.apirg.org/downloads/formsold/consensus.pdf (accessed on 
21st October 2009). 
148 OSCE. (2007). OSCE Handbook. Vienna: OSCE Press and Public 
Information Section. p.7, also see “box” in p.14 
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defecting partner in the game through stopping cooperation to teach a lesson 
and keep the sphere of cooperation with the other cooperative partners intact.  
 The practice of the mechanisms and the “consensus minus one” 
decision-making system, however, may have limited effects, regarding the 
history of the engagement of the mechanisms. It can be said that it was 
possible for the CSCE/OSCE to introduce and use the mechanisms only in 
the political environment in the 1990s when the Western values and opinions 
were taken as an instructor’s voice in the absence of counter-values and 
opinions in the international community. Nevertheless, the OSCE is a 
process more than an organisation, and has given a certain degree of 
autonomy in its activities. In a process, once a rule, system or mechanism is 
introduced, in particular through consensus, the abolition or amendment of it 
is difficult and requires considerable energy and a bona fide logic for 
producing an agreement by all concerned actors in the process. It may be 
possible to leave it or forget it. Yet, that does not mean that the rule, system 
or mechanism will never be recalled in future. The process has a feedback 
effect, and the organisation has institutional memories. Thus, the OSCE’s 
mechanisms have a lasting effect and ‘considerable symbolic value’.149  
 
 
 
 
                                            
149 Bloed, Arie. (1993). Meetings of the CSCE (Council of) Foreign Ministers. 
In :Bloed, Arie., ed. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 
Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993. Dordrecht, Boston, London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers (in co-operation with the Europa Institute, 
Faculty of Law, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands), 1993. p.108. 
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3.2.7. The OSCE’s Political Nature 
 
Having produced a number of documents and mechanisms, the OSCE may 
give a rigid organisation at a glance. However, one of the OSCE’s features is 
its political nature. It does not have a founding and legally binding agreement 
or treaty (except the system the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration which is 
a treaty-based agreement), like the UN Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty 
of NATO. The OSCE is a process in which a number of documents are 
accumulated year by year and shape the general nature, character or 
direction of the organisation. These documents are usually not legally 
binding and, thus, belong to the territory of “soft law”. In theory, ‘‘political 
agreements’ still offer less security than legally binding documents (treaties). 
This explains why almost all the major forms of cooperation within Europe 
are based on legal agreements…’ and ‘the main frameworks for international 
cooperation in Europe meet the … criteria of an ‘international organization’.’ 
Nevertheless, the OSCE may be ‘the most important exception’. Whether a 
legally binding or politically binding, ‘[b]oth forms [of international relations] 
contribute to the regulation of cooperation between states and one cannot 
say in general that one is more effective than the other. […] Here again, the 
OSCE offers an example of commitments that are not legally binding, linked 
to an extensive system of compliance control.’150   
 However, it is true, to some extent, that the OSCE associating with 
such a political nature may be felt as weak with a less physical leverage to 
                                            
150 Wessel, Ramses A. (1996). Towards a United Europe: A Legal 
Perspective on European Institutionalization and Integration. In: De Wilde, 
Jaap., and Håkan Wiberg, eds. Organized Anarchy in Europe: The role of 
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strike a deal or force to comply. It looks as if the organisation would have to 
rely and actually relies on a sort of “naming” and “shaming” manners as often 
seen in human rights NGOs’ practices. Is the political nature really a 
weakness? With the method, named and shamed states, which are often the 
“usual suspects” in violation of human rights, rarely change their attitudes. 
How about state actors? Reports from powerful states, such as the US, 
casually name troublesome states over the issues of nuclear proliferation, 
terrorism or human rights. The voices rarely alter the situations. How about 
the UN as the universal peace and security organisation? The troublesome 
states may be named by the UN, which, in a sense, convicts them in the light 
of international law. However, justice is little delivered by that. Thus, the 
politically binding nature of the OSCE does not necessarily determine its 
inferiority to other international actors with the legally-binding nature.   
 The OSCE has been insisting that the political nature of the 
organisation is a part of its strength. Many realists may disregard such a 
statement as a cliché without contents. Nevertheless, if what is most 
important is normalisation of the OSCE’s standards over the three 
dimensions, and as long as the dimensions require a sheer cooperation, 
rather than bargaining, with the participating states, what should be 
understood is that forceful compliance and/or transaction between 
cooperation and benefits cannot produce genuine normalisation. 
Normalisation means that, when there is no direct and physical incentive, 
norms are still maintained. If the existence of direct and physical incentives 
alone sustains norms, they are not norms, since, when the incentives have 
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gone, they are no longer exercised. Norms belong to soft power. Therefore, 
the OSCE has to rely on suasion rather than coercion, and its political nature 
suits it. In the light of the capabilities that the OSCE is granted, coercion is 
unlikely to work due to a lack of resources for it.  
 Another peculiarity of the OSCE in the political nature can be seen in its 
preference for a low-profile diplomacy. Represented by the original style of 
the HCNM’s manner, quiet diplomacy, the OSCE makes a contrast to, for 
example, the UN’s Good-Will Ambassador campaign in which celebrities are 
appointed as ambassadors of the UN, counting on their influence to draw 
attention to and raise finance for the organisation. The OSCE, in this sense, 
is more conservative than the UN. The OSCE uses the naming and shaming 
strategy as the last resort. It tends to incline to persuasion hoping that things 
will be improved before the wider international community starts looking at 
the issues and the reputation of the state in question is damaged. When the 
target state responds positively, such a discreet approach may be 
appropriate. However, it is obvious that there is no guarantee of getting such 
a positive response. It is not so clear if such a low-profile diplomacy is always 
a wise way to solve issues.  
 Yet, under the rising confrontation of the “East of Vienna” and the “West 
of Vienna”, the OSCE’s political nature may be tested in the coming years. 
The political nature allowed a number of the communist states to 
immediately enter the CSCE/OSCE without any screening procedure and 
was effective for keeping peace over Europe just after the demise of the 
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, even equipping an exclusion procedure, the 
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OSCE may not activate the procedure against free-riders of the OSCE’s 
regional order and system due to the political nature. There are a number of 
evidences about the violation of the principles, norms and values of the 
organisation by the countries from the “East of Vienna”. This has not 
activated the procedure yet. It is still a wait-and-see issue to decide whether 
the political nature is positive or negative.  
 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
The CSCE/OSCE has been a process to invite the state actors in the pre-
modern and modern worlds to the post-modern world. From the suspicious 
diplomatic talks of the Soviet idea of the pan-European security framework in 
the 1950s, it "accidentally" developed into a human security-centred soft 
peace and security organisation. It kept engagement in the Soviet Union and, 
no matter how much the official Soviet authorities were indifferent about the 
follow-up meetings, the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 inspired the peoples in the 
East. While the East has made its comeback in the 21st century to defend 
the traditional Westphalian state sovereignty and confront the post-modern 
Western values, the East does not have an alternative set of values and, at 
the bottom line, not deny human rights and democracy. As it will be 
discussed in the following chapters, the East, in particular Russia, has 
attachment to human rights or democracy, at least at the level of slogan. If 
the OSCE is seen as a process, the raison d'être of the organisation is to 
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lure the East through the long-term commitment and engagement and to 
urge "softly" the change of authoritarian regimes.  
 While the countries the "East of Vienna" tend to strategically behave 
with a short term view on interests to protect their non-democratic regimes, 
the behaviour does not produce a lasting stability of the internal society and 
the international community. The meticulous system of democracy is 
described in the Figure 3.2. The democracy is an answer for the stability, 
despite that it sacrifices the elites' right of impunity in their society.  
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The OSCE has contributed to the development of means to breach state 
sovereignty in a legal way. It has played a leading role to promote the post-
modern or the R2P state sovereignty and equipped with a number of formal 
mechanisms to carry out intervention as a part of peace operations. On 
paper, the OSCE is quite innovative and ambitious.  
 However, facing the resistance of the East, it has stopped being 
innovative and entered the state of stasis. The organisational coherency is at 
risk. At the same time, it is same for the East which cannot easily replace the 
post-modern Western values with something new and universal by 
themselves. The "East of Vienna" is also in struggling to mark the positive 
meaning of their existence in the international community.  
 The following chapters will see the interaction and dynamics of the 
relation between the OSCE (post-modern world) and the "East of Vienna" 
(the pre-modern and modern worlds) and consider the potentiality and 
limitation of the institutional approaches towards international/regional peace 
and security. 
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4: Russia and The OSCE’s 
Values 
 
The relations between the OSCE and Russia may be an intriguing topic. 
There is no OSCE field mission, centre or office to commit to a specific 
problem in the country after the termination of the OSCE Assistance Group 
to Chechnya in March 2003.151 The fact, however, does not mean that 
Russia has no issue or problem in which the OSCE should engage. Russia is 
an issue. It is probably one of the severest and most fundamental problems 
for the OSCE, though it is not explicitly propagated. It is of discord between 
the OSCE and Russia in value systems. The case of Russia suggests that a 
thing does not necessarily emerge with the same quality of the thing in the 
places where the foundational values to engage in the thing are different.  
 Russia has its own civilisation and history that mark a stark difference 
from the European ones and cast a shadow over the norms, practices and 
values of the current ruling elites who are often called siloviki. The term 
implies that they likely have the intelligent and/or military service background 
and were educated by the Soviet system. Thinking of the fact that Russia 
has a dense history of secret police/intelligence service to control society 
almost throughout the imperial and Soviet history, the rule of siloviki is really 
something, no matter how much the European counterparts of the OSCE 
Participating States are unaware of the significance. Just this Russian 
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peculiarity has already set an unfavourable condition for the OSCE’s peace 
and security concept as well as its value system.  
 The large part of the ruling elites, who may be regarded as “statists” by 
Vladimir Kolossov and Gerard Toal, are the group of ‘political realists who 
view international relations as characterized by self-seeking power-
[accumulation] by state actors whose interests require constant balancing. 
The interests of the Russian state are served by it remaining an independent 
civilization capable of resisting the [hegemonic] ambitions of other states and 
their allies.’152  
 As the major successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia with the ruling 
elites must inherit a sense of being a great power in Europe, if not a 
superpower, and the Cold War-time interpretation of the world that 
instinctively attempts to locate itself in an important position in global politics. 
The sense and interpretation, therefore, supply a certain degree of 
confidence that helps Russia think that it is able to (or should) play a greater 
role than the most of other countries to "counter" the Western world. The 
sense of rivalry against the West in particular the US is still working 
somewhere in the elites' minds. The psychology takes the form of a tacit 
refusal to the Western style of liberal democracy that occupies a large part of 
the OSCE’s values. In fact, the federation is ominously taking a path towards 
a non-liberal and non-democratic state, if not returning to the Soviet 
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totalitarian state. With this negative psychology, Russia formulates the 
foreign policy which sometimes appears aggressive, seen, for example, in 
the Georgian War in 2008 over South Ossetia. The aggresive Russia shakes 
pan-European peace and secuirty as well as Eurasian ones.  
 Since it is a great regional power within the OSCE, Russia in 21st 
century has turned out to be a huge challenge for the OSCE, which is 
fundamentally a value-orienting, -disseminating and -unifying regime for 
regional peace and security. Russia is implicitly or explicitly resisting the 
adoption and exercise of the OSCE’s principles, norms and values with the 
Russian twisted psychology. Furthermore, since Russia alone can pose a 
threat through such behavioural resistance, if not a military one, due to its 
presence in the organisation, it may influence the other Participating States 
from the “East of Vienna”, in particular ones from the CIS region. 
 This chapter examines the Russian issues in the OSCE largely in the 
light of Russian psychology and value system, Russian possibility and 
capability to cooperate with the OSCE and the international community and 
the prospect for the future. For Russia, the OSCE has “cons” and “pros” as 
the Soviet Union did. Instead of accepting and exercising the OSCE’s norms, 
rules and values, the country “plays” with the organisation, thinking of the 
merits and demerits. Russia belongs to somewhere between the pre-modern 
and modern worlds in the Cooper’s map, and is quietly declining to adopt 
and adapt itself to the norms, practices and values of the post-modern world 
with holding the Cold War mode of thinking to some extent. 
 Nevertheless, the OSCE is still meaningful for Russia in some aspects 
to "check" its supposed rival – the West – in the European theatre. After all, 
  203 
the OSCE is the only regional peace and security organisation in Europe in 
which Russia has formal membership that allows the country to engage in 
the decision-making system. Under the condition that the EU and NATO 
memberships for Russia have not been realised, Russia as a realist thinker 
needs to maximise the usefulness of the OSCE for projecting its presence 
into Europe that is the core region in the organisation and where Russia sits. 
 
 
4.1: Russian Values as a Structural Anti-OSCE 
Actor 
 
The Russian civilisation often causes collision against the post-modern 
European civilisation. The European part of the OSCE region largely falls 
into the civilisation that provides the ground of the OSCE’s values. Supplied 
from the civilisation are the practices of accountability, transparency and the 
rule of law or regulations in the organisational operations and procedures as 
well as the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the 
organisational purposes.  
 The Russian civilisation, history and current state lack these elements 
of the post-modernity. Russia’s continuous dictatorial regimes to the end of 
the Cold War anchor the civilisation, land and people to the non-democratic 
norms, practices and values, and do not easily let the country get out of the 
inclination of non-democracy. This is a structural factor or actor that affects 
both the internal and external behaviour of Russia and should not be 
underestimated. 
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 In relation to the current Russian politics, the inclination can be seen, 
for example, in the rule of siloviki. Russia has the dense history of the use of 
secret police or intelligent service to control society starting from the 
Oprichniki of Ivan’s Terrible in the 16th century. The Soviet rule enhanced 
this tradition. The KGB was the elite group of the Soviet society only 
subordinating to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). After the 
confusion of the 1990s, this privileged group of people successfully sneaked 
into the top of Russian politics headed by Vladimir Putin who became 
president in 2000. The ex-KGB or military persons, who were highly proud of 
their Soviet-time elite class status, took the high places of the governmental 
organs and private companies that have a strong connection to Kremlin, and 
formed the current ruling class. 
 After a number of re-organisation, the Russian intelligent service sector 
has made a comeback to the position of impunity. It is now only 
subordinating to the president under the Russian law and protecting the 
regime. The sector inevitably reminds of a imperial Russian practice, more 
than the Soviet one, that a number of the Tsars "personally" used the secret 
police as his/her tool.  
 There is, thus, one difference between the Soviet era and the current 
Russia. The CPSU as a collective of the Party members did not give a free 
hand to the KGB. The CPSU acted independently from the KGB and 
extended its control over the intelligent service organ. It put a keen eye on 
the KGB activities and manipulated personnel’s promotion or degradation. 
The KGB was the so-called “advance regiment” and just a part of the 
CPSU’s regime. In the current Russia, the intelligent service sector itself is 
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the ruling regime of Russia headed by the president of the state. In other 
words, the sector is the unofficial highest authority and exerts a free hand 
over the whole Russian society without being checked by any other external 
power or influence. In fact, it cannot be seen any effort to put a system of 
check and balance over the intelligence service sector in order to make the 
sector accountable and transparent to the Russian parliaments and public. 
Andrei Soldatov, therefore, outlines about the Federal Service Bureau (FSB), 
the largest organ of the KGB successors, in this way: 
 
‘… the FSB is a remarkably independent entity, free 
of party control and parliamentary oversight. If the 
FSB has an [ideology], it is the goal of stability and 
order. FSB officers now regard themselves as heirs 
not only to the KGB but also to the secret [police] 
that the Tsars deployed to battle political 
terrorism.’153 
 
 
The Russian power structure poses a non-democratic or semi-authoritarian 
feature on Russia that collides against the post-modern Western and 
OSCE’s norms, practices and values. Having the police force of impunity in 
the society, Russia should not be named a democracy. The governing 
system is semi-authoritarianism, if not the Soviet authoritarianism and 
totalitarianism.  
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 This post-Soviet Russian semi-authoritarianism has several implications. 
First, the Russian regime is less able to provide common and public goods 
not only to the Russian society but also to the OSCE region and the 
international community as a whole, since the regime consisting of a small 
number of Russian elites understandably and primarily works for their 
internal common goods which are focusing on the continuation of the current 
state as longer as they can no matter how much it damages the human, civil 
and economic rights of the ordinary Russian people. The elite’s interests are 
inevitably narrowly defined to satisfy their narrow common goods, but not the 
whole Russian or OSCE’s regional goods. Russian internal and foreign 
policies, therefore, are forged from the narrowly defined common goods and 
the understanding of the world by the small number of the elites. Accordingly, 
Russia cannot produce general and greater common and public goods for 
the international community, at least, right now.  
 Rather, Russia may produce something absolutely self-help to protect 
their way even violating other state’s sovereignty. For example, in July 2006, 
the Russian parliament approved a bill that legalised extrajudicial activities, 
such as assassination or abduction, in the foreign countries by the Russian 
intelligence service agencies or spetsnaz (special forces) under the 
presidential order.154 This law seems to be for counter-terrorism in Russian 
national security. The legislation suggests, in an aspect, that the Russian 
president and parliamentarians do not care about the international law, 
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principles and standards on state sovereignty if the particular sovereignty to 
be violated belongs to other states, and did not seriously notice a problem in 
the contents of the bill in the time of the War on Terror. Russia, as the head 
of the countries of the "East of Vienna", is an enthusiastic supporter of the 
traditional Westphalian state sovereignty that stresses non-intervention of 
internal affairs. Yet, the state’s behaviour suggests that respect towards the 
international normative law seems to be available only over Russian 
sovereignty. Therefore, it can be assumed that Russia has a very low-degree 
of consciousness on reciprocity, mutual respect and obligation towards other 
states. The famous assassination of Alexander Litvienko in London on 
November in that year came after the legislation in Russia.  
 It is utterly conspicuous and audacious, if the legalisation has been 
done with the clear recognition of the breach of an international law. It can be 
more problematic if it is done without the recognition, since it implies that 
Russia does not share the international common sense. Of course, in the 
light of international law, the Russian unilateral legalisation of extrajudicial 
activities in the foreign countries cannot be legal and no state sovereignty of 
any country can be diminished by the Russian law. Yet, in some CIS 
countries, the Russian intelligence service still behaves as the KGB used to 
do with impunity guaranteed by a tacit agreement with the CIS states which 
mind about the disparity of military and economic power against Russia. 
Where the distribution or projection of power allows it to behave in the Soviet 
mode, Russia just keeps doing.  
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 Second, Russia’s traditional aspiration to have a benevolent absolute 
ruler or Tsar155 also helps Russia keep away from a genuine democracy and 
invite authoritarianism. When the people find a hopeful, they tend to expect 
too much to one person’s personality and allow him/her to enjoy the power 
beyond the limitation of law or norms of society even though the hopeful 
period does not last. Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin were initially looked so 
messianic by the people. A prolonged period of the lack of the rule of law has 
developed the inclination towards the rule of the strong person who is 
extrajudicial and can solve problems immediately by his/her authority without 
the proper political or legal process. Even in a recent research by the Levada 
Centre in Russia , ‘[t]he majority (60%) … said it would be better for Russia if 
the president controlled both the courts and the parliament ….’156  This 
Russian mentality rather separates the Russian civilisation from the post-
modern world where the rule of law and democracy (or the rule by the 
people) are the essential parts of the governing system. The tendency rather 
confines Russia to the pre-modern or modern world.  
 The siloviki exploited this weak spot of the Russian mind in the process 
to grasp power, putting Russian major media companies under the 
governmental control and manipulating the image of Putin. Russia had had 
some active media companies during the 1990s which were critical about the 
Russian government and president, even though the critical position was 
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taken by some independently and politically ambitious Russian media 
tycoons. The Putin team successfully put them under control and the most of 
the tycoons ended up at political exile to foreign countries or subordination to 
the government.  
 Third, Russia’s pretence of democracy is associated with a peculiar 
explanation that indicates a further peculiar aspect of Russian psychology. 
The Russian elites have been calling the Russian political system the 
sovereign democracy, and avoiding to admit that the country has non-
democratic features that remind of the Soviet time. According to Vladislav 
Surkov who was described as ‘one of the most influential Kremlin aides’ in an 
article by Masha Lipman, the tricky words seem to mean that Russia’s 
democracy is ‘not much different from democratic practices of the Western 
countries.’ However, Lipman notes that ‘“[s]overeign democracy” is a Kremlin 
coinage that conveys two messages: first, that Russia’s regime is democratic 
and, second, that this claim must be accepted, period. Any attempt at 
verification will be regarded as unfriendly and as meddling in Russia’s 
domestic affairs.’157 The point that the Russian elites want to stress is that 
Russia is special (and, therefore, deserves the right of impunity).  
 The idea of “Russia is special” is embedded in the Russian minds and 
hearts and seen in a variety of the Russian society. Probably, one of the 
major sources of the sense of specialness is the fact that the Russian empire 
is often regarded as the successor of the Byzantine empire and the Eastern 
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Christianity and, therefore, the “third” empire of the Roman civilisation which 
“should not fall.” This mystical idea roots in the ancient Christianity in which 
the number “three” is the symbol of the Trinity. The same idea was also 
observed in the propaganda of Nazis Germany. The Russian aspiration for 
being special in some way should not be overlooked in understanding Russia. 
 Turning back to the issue of democracy, in the Russian minds, her 
democracy should be also somehow original and special separating from the 
Western version over which some Russians are sceptical. Although there are 
differences from the Western democracy, it should be and must be regarded 
as a version of democracy for the Russian elites' mind. The Economist 
summarises the Putin’s rule that ‘[i]n nearly eight years in the Kremlin he has 
crushed opposition, stripped regional governments of their autonomy, 
reasserted state control of Russia’s energy resources and eliminated most 
independent media’, and concludes that ‘[n]owhere in these manoeuvrings is 
there a trace of democracy as understood and practiced in the West: it is far 
more reminiscent of the old Soviet Union.’158 Still, for the Russian elites, 
Russia must be called a democracy. No question to be asked. Period. For 
the Westerner’s mind, this sounds like evasion. Then, in fact, Russian 
sovereign democracy is short for the respect of human rights, civil rights and 
economic rights. However, the Russian authorities do not allow to question 
their mistakes and failures other than continuing the claim of and the 
window-dressing of a democracy. 
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 The post-Soviet Russian semi-authoritarianism, therefore, has been 
very deceptive and provides a real example why the practice of elections 
does not automatically confirm democracy. Rather, as Marina Ottaway’s idea 
suggests, the current Russian semi-authoritarian regime is absolutely 
capable of dodging the conventional definition and criticism of 
authoritarianism, dictatorship or totalitarianism. 
 
‘Semi-authoritarian regimes are not failed 
democracies or democracies in transition; rather, 
they are carefully constructed and maintained 
alternative systems. If semi-authoritarian 
governments had their way, the system would never 
change. One of the countries included in this study, 
Egypt, has developed a particularly resilient, almost 
institutionalized, semi-authoritarianism that has 
already lasted more than twenty years and even 
survived the transition from presidency of Anwar 
Sadat to that of Hosni Mubarak. While the Egyptian 
system is highly unlikely to last forever, there is little 
explanatory value in defining a system that maintains 
its stability over a long period as transitional.’159  
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 Russia at least look like satisfying the Schumpeterian definition of 
democracy at a glance, which weights on elections. In a close-up, however, 
Russian elections at any level are dubious and it is easy to point a number of 
irregularities. Of course, as a relative beginner of democracy, the problem is 
not what immediately denies the possibility, existence and practices of 
Russian democracy. Some, like Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei 
Ryabov, take the post- Soviet Russian political development in that way that 
‘Russia meets [Stephan Hanson’s] definition of [the] consolidation [of a 
political system], even if the regime type is not a liberal democracy.’ They  
consider that, although non-democracies tend to be ‘more fragile than a 
liberal democracy’ and ‘[Russia] has not made progress in strengthening 
liberal democratic institutions’, and that ‘the [Russian] regime has shown 
[remarkable] stability since 1993.’ 160  Nevertheless, the stable political 
system has not developed into democracy. If Russia is counted as a member 
of the project of democratic peace by the OSCE and the international 
community, the current Russian political condition cannot be overlooked by 
the external eyes.  
 Democracy is largely the product of the Western civilisation. As a result, 
Russia is somehow sceptical, if not negative. Russians do not understand 
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democracy as the Westerners, but regard it in a different way. The Russians 
are fundamentally less positive, if not negative, on the Western style of 
democracy. In the research of the Levada Centre, ’57% of those questioned 
considered that Russia needed democracy – the lowest number since 2006.’ 
It also reported that ‘26% believed that democratic governing was not 
suitable for Russia.’161 In addition, the experience of the 1990s may have 
consolidated scepticism on the Western democracy. As the post-Soviet 
Russia’s political system ‘was superficially democratic under Yeltsin, the 
general population perceived its failures as failures of the Western political 
model.’162 Thus, when the OSCE sells the post-modern Western ideas as 
the organisational philosophy, the Russian minds do not react as the 
Westerners predict. It is not easy to restore faith in the Western style of 
democracy, unlike in the post-communist East European states which see 
the exercise of the Western style of democracy as a part of their identities. 
 However, the Russian civilisation does not possess a model of 
governance that can compete against the Western model or earn some 
acclamation from the international community. In other words, Russia does 
not have a counter-idea to the Western made democracy model. The fact 
makes Russia defensive in psychology. The Russian psychology affects the 
behaviour of Russia even as a state and emerges in a variety of occasions in 
diplomacy and foreign policy. In accumulation of these psychological factors, 
                                            
161 BBC News. (16th October 2009). Democracy ‘not needed’ in Russia. 
Online. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8311189.stm 
(accessed on 16th October 2009). 
162 Hunter, Shireen T. (2004). Islam in Russia – The Politics of Identity and 
Security (The Center for Strategic and International Studies, with Jeffrey L. 
Thomas and Alexander Melikishvile). Armonk, New York., London, England.: 
M.E.Sharpe. pp.127-204, in particular p.135, pp. 162-173, p.169. 
  214 
Russia tends to be competitive and still looks like staying at the Cold War 
thinking that the ex-KGB personnel get use to have.  
 One of raison d’être that the OSCE engages in is to tame this Russian 
psychology and alter the value system through the Helsinki/CSCE/OSCE 
process which has been continuing since the end of WWII. In fact, the 
Helsinki Final Act worked for the promulgation of human rights over the 
communist states including Russia. The human rights and democratic values 
were transferred and, in a long process, invited the fall of communism.  
 Infiltration of the Western values 30 years ago may be one of the 
reasons why Russia hesitates to directly bash the democratic values and 
somehow likes to keep the nominal name of “democracy” on its own 
governing system. In a hidden place, Russian minds admit the significance of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Nevertheless, they also like to 
protect its own pride and face without kneeling down to the Western values 
to which Russia does not have alternatives to compete. Bringing the name of 
“sovereign democracy” is a means to protect the Russian pride, no matter 
how bizarre it is.  
 Russia's aspiration for being regarded a democracy may have a 
historical root and connection to the inclination to the benevolent Tsar. The 
beginning of the Romanov dynasty was a sort of democratic selection of 
Mikhail Romanov as the tsar of Russia by the aristocrats in the early 17th 
century. This may be a source why Russian legitimacy vigorously requires 
popularity. Whichever the Tsar or leader, the top of the state should and 
must be selected, if not elected, by a popular voting in some way. 
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In the contemporary time, democracy is associated with positive images in 
the international community.  While Russians may be sceptical on the 
Western version of democracy, it also likes to have prestige, reputation and 
respect from the community, and being regarded as a democracy.  
  Accordingly, Russia has a wish to be taken positively and righteously. 
That is one of the reasons why Russia does not directly challenge against 
human rights at the philosophical level, though it quite often violates in 
individual cases. This aspect of psychology is important, since this can be an 
inception to alter oneself and develop sociality. It is true that the ruling elites 
still prefer arbitrary and extrajudicial use of their authorities, while they also 
desire to be regarded as a democracy. If circumstances allow them to lead 
into the direction of the post-modern (Western) values and practices without 
hurting their pride and face value, Russia may quietly come to the terms of 
the values and practices. In fact, at the level of the Russian civil society, the 
ordinary Russians have started showing their complains on the lack of 
human rights and the weak democratic institutions in Russia through the 
demonstrations against, for example, the result of the parliamentary election 
in 2011 and the presidential election in 2012. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a former 
richest man in Russia, is now a martyr status man. He is a victim of the 
supposed Putin’s wrath and gathering many supporters outside his prison.  
 When facing the West as a civilisational rival, the Russians may be 
defensive and sceptical on the Western-made ideas. In individual cases in 
their everyday life, however, the Russians definitely notice that the lack or 
weak of human rights and democratic institutions including the rule of law 
  216 
cause their misery even though the level of economic life has significantly 
improved in the last decade.  
 As of the ruling elites, it is true that the interaction of the inter-
governmental level is the direct window to the ruling elites of the semi-
authoritarian regime and may be more effective to change the mind and 
attitudes of the elites. Where democracy is weak, what is necessary to 
reform is the values of the top change. A question is how long it takes that 
the Russia’s ruling elites and governing system absorb the universal ideas 
and project into their norms, procedures and practices. They belong to the 
Soviet generation and their mentality had been already framed in the Soviet 
way. The slight difference between younger Medvedev (more liberal) and 
older Putin (more statist) indicates the generation gap. Putin's generation 
more associates with the lack of accountability and transparency and has 
made Russia a kleptocracy. Corruption sustains the regime, and the regime 
calls for corruption. The vicious cycle has already turning in the Russian 
politics.  
 If there can be seen a sign of resist against the current Putin-led siloviki 
regime, one potentially and relatively significant key person may be Alexei 
Kudrin, a former minister of finance who used to be regarded as one of the 
most trusted persons by Putin and resigned on September 2011 with a 
supposed quarrel with then President Drimitr Medvedev. What has been 
surprising Russian watchers is that Kudrin has not taken any alternative job 
in the government which must have been offered by Putin as his usual 
manner. Rather, since his resignation, Kudrin has been critical about the 
government’s policy on the national budget and related corruption. Although 
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Kudrin is not adhering to a claim of democratisation of Russia, his liberal 
stance and logical thinking on economy inevitably hits the problems of the 
Russian Kleptocracy by the siloviki elites. Kudrin may be the most visible 
example of the Russia elites who may have been adopted the Western ideas 
through the high level of interaction in or exposure to the Western-led 
international community.  
 Nevertheless, it is hard to say that there is a clear group or people in 
the siloviki who willingly risk his/her safety and invest himself/herself for a 
more liberal Russia in future. Ominously, in his second presidency, Putin has 
been enhanced the thigh grip of his rein, at least, at the level of law 
enforcement. The application of Article 212 of the Criminal Code on the mass 
demonstration on the rally on 6th May 2012 looking at the inauguration of 
Putin’s second term is effectively criminalised the demonstrators who 
exercised the constitutional right stipulated in Article 31 (the right to 
assemble) and have led them face the possible prison terms up to ten 
years.163 In the beginning of June, the Russian parliament passed a bill to 
increase fines over the violation of laws over public demonstrations and the 
law enforcement officers seem to understand now that hiding the protester’s 
faces is a subject of arrest.164 Restriction on internet has been increased 
along with that.165 
                                            
163 See: Ryzhkov, Vladimir. (2012). Criminalizing the Right to Assembly. The 
St. Petersburg Times. June 27th, 2012. Online: 
http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=35864. 
164 See: BBC. 6th June, 2012. ‘Russian parliament backs huge protest fines’: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18336097. 
165 Ekaterina Vinokurova, edited by Karina Ayvazova. 3rd July, 2012. 
‘Deputies prepare new rules to tighten control over Internet’. gazeta.ru 
english: http://en.gazeta.ru/news/2012/07/03/a_4661557.shtml. 
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 This situation raises a concern relating to the approach of the human 
dimension and democratic peace of the OSCE and the international 
community which are currently employing these post-modern ideas, 
philosophy or schemes for international peace and security. Can Russia be 
cooperative for the ideals of the OSCE, the international community and the 
post-modern world?  
 
4.2: Russia's Capability to Cooperate 
 
The OSCE and Russia are engaging in a game to make or not make 
cooperation. What means cooperation in this context is that, since the OSCE 
is a regional organisation in which the Participating States voluntarily join, 
Russia theoretically accepts and exercise the OSCE’s set of norms, rules, 
practices and values that are rather post-modern Western. The reality is not. 
While it does not need to obey every advice and warning from the OSCE to 
be regarded as cooperative, Russia at least needs to improve, for example, 
its "dodgy" legal system, the practice of impunity by the powerful, and the 
transparency and fair practices of elections. It should accept external 
verification of these issues and listen to criticism, if it names itself a 
democracy.  
 What are at stake in the case of Russia? Russia is the leading force of 
the "East of Vienna", in particular of the CIS region, due to its relative 
strength in military ability, a larger economic scale and political clout over the 
region. Although the influence is much less than the Soviet Union, Russia is 
the regional great power and can be a model for the CIS states which are 
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equally struggling or resisting to adopt the norms and practices of democracy. 
Like Russia, the CIS states had not experienced democracy until the Soviet 
Union collapsed, and still have not achieved a moderate condition of 
democracy. Therefore, the course of the development of Russia’s political 
system will affect how the OSCE and the international community treat the 
CIS states. Accordingly, a question to be asked first is whether Russia is 
capable of making cooperation along with the scheme of democratic peace, 
running subtlety and details of the post-modern democracy that goes beyond 
the Schumpeterian definition and requires more. 
 The current project of democratic peace has a flaw. In the theory, 
“democracies” in the theory of democratic peace unconsciously point “mature 
democracies”, due to the timing when the theory started being discussed 
among the prominent politicians in the world before the end of the Cold War. 
It was the time when the distance between democracies and non-
democracies was so huge. Democracies were largely limited to mature 
democracies. Thus, the timing made the theory largely lack the consideration 
over the cases of “transitional democracies” or “immature democracies” 
which a number of the former communist states fell into in the 1990s and 
have failed to escape from. Some of them have returned to the authoritarian 
or totalitarian states. With the reality, it is true that the international 
community has reached an understanding that democratisation takes a long 
time and states under democratisation would be quite unstable. Nevertheless, 
there has not been an alternative idea that replaces the democratic peace 
strategy by international/regional peace and security institutions and 
organisations and the Western states’ foreign policy. 
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 Therefore, it is a significant key factor whether a state is capable of 
promoting and being a capable, if not mature, democracy to join the project 
of democratic peace as a foundation of international cooperation.  
 
4.2.1. The State of Russia 
 
It is hard to believe that the Russian government is actively working for 
becoming a capable democracy with adjusting itself to the Western model of 
democracy. Furthermore, it is not difficult to find some negative evaluations 
on Russia’s state of democracy/non-democracy. The degree of democracy 
measured by the Freedom House is often used for showing the general 
conditions of democracy/non-democracy in a state. Russia has been 
negatively evaluated by the Freedom House indicator, in particular after 2000 
or since Vladimir Putin took the presidency (See Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Russia’s State of Democracy between 1991 - 2008 
Year 
 
Politica
l 
Rights 
Score 
Civil 
Libertie
s 
Scores 
Status Year 
Politica
l 
Rights 
Score 
Civil 
Libertie
s 
Scores 
Status 
1991 3 3 
Partial 
Free 
2000 5 5 
Partial 
Free 
1992 3 4 
Partial 
Free 
2001 5 5 
Partial 
Free 
1993 3 4 
Partial 
Free 
2002 5 5 
Partial 
Free 
1994 3 4 
Partial 
Free 
2003 5 5 
Partial 
Free 
1995 3 4 
Partial 
Free 
2004 6 5 
Not 
Free 
1996 3 4 
Partial 
Free 
2005 6 5 
Not 
Free 
1997 3 4 
Partial 
Free 
2006 6 5 
Not 
Free 
1998 4 4 
Partial 
Free 
2007 6 5 
Not 
Free 
1999 4 5 
Partial 
Free 
2008 6 5 
Not 
Free 
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Comparative and 
Historical Data.  “Year” is the year covered (not the year of the 
editions).  See: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439. (accessed on 
July 2010). 
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Brian Whitmore and Robert Coalson’s Kremlin watching online-blog, The 
Power Vertical, concisely sorts out the state of Russia’s democracy in the 
entry dated 16th December 2009:  
 
• Freedom in the World index by Freedom House: Not Free 
• Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders: 153rd in 
175 countries 
• Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International: 
146th in 180 countries 
• Happy Planet Index by New Economics Foundation: 108th of 
143 countries 
• Legatum Prosperity Index by Legatum Institute: 69th of 104 
countries 
• Index of Economic Freedom 2009 by WSJ/Heritage: 146th of 
179 countries166 
 
None of these indicators causes an illusion that Russia is a democracy. The 
following section examines the details of Russia’s democracy/non-
democracy through some markers for a democracy. 
                                            
166 See: Coalson, Robert. (16th December 2009). The Year In Review (in 
series The Power Vertical). RFE/RL. Online. Available at: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/blog/1905325.html (accessed on 29th December 
2009). For a reference,  
•Happy Planet Index: ecological efficiency with well-being (long and 
happy lives), 
•Legatum Prosperity Index: an assessment of wealth and well-being 
associated with life satisfaction or development,  
•Index of Economic Freedom: a measurement of the degree of 
freedom from state control over economic activities. 
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 There are a number of reasons for this Russian reality. 
 
4.2.2. Russian Political Willingness 
 
Russia’s political willingness to cooperate is dubious. Russia is a kleptocracy 
and semi-authoritarian. It does have a number of weaknesses in the 
international standards of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The 
Russian ruling elites are always attempting to evade the criticism on the 
weaknesses upholding the traditional Westphalian state sovereignty, since 
they know that their kleptocracy and position of impunity in Russia are 
sustained by the state-sponsored infringement of these principles, even 
though the level of systematic features are far less than that in the Soviet 
regime. The Russian authorities are still less sensitive on the principles. Yet, 
the Russian elites not only hate to be criticised by the external force but also 
like to earn prestige. As a result, Russia has become less open to the 
international community to hide inconvenient facts. It has become aggressive 
against foreign journalists, business corporations and investors in Russia. In 
the international community, it has set itself as a vanguard of the traditional 
Westphalian state sovereignty to rule out external influence, interference and 
intervention at any reason.  
 It is a tradition in the Russian regimes that the authorities hate and are 
afraid of a fair and accountable check and balance system. However, that is 
the exactly what the Helsinki/CSCE/OSCE process has been demanding the 
Soviet Union and the current Russia. After the Helsinki Final Act was signed, 
the Soviet Union resisted the implementation of the follow-up procedures 
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over Basket III or what would be the current humanitarian dimension. The 
resistance made the Helsinki/CSCE process stand still.  
 In the Putin’s first presidency term, with the economic growth under the 
rise of the price of natural resources in the international market, the natural 
resource rich country shifted the foreign policy stance from a cooperative 
mode to a non-cooperative one, becoming the leader of the states of the 
"East of Vienna". In 2008, after a number of provocative moves, Russia 
helped Georgia engage in a counter-terrorist operation in South Ossetia that 
led the Georgian War. Over the area and Abkhazia in Georgia, Russia has 
been accumulating efforts to turn them into a sphere of Russia’s influence, 
using the Russian peacekeeping operation in the areas, economic aids, 
distributing Russian passports (which have made the South Ossetians and 
Abkhazians the Russian citizens on paper) and the support for anti-
governmental forces (or terrorists) against the Georgian government.  
 Russia does not have a political will to have a peace with the rule of law 
prescribed by the OSCE and the international community. However, Russia 
does have a political will to have a peace in which it can dictate the fate and 
course of the countries and peoples under the peace. Russia historically has 
an inclination to zero-sum thinking or taking-all idea rather than to sharing 
interests with others in foreign policy. Russia has partly acquired this norm 
through the European balance of power inter-state relations in past. While 
the EU European states enter the post-modern and cooperative relations 
under the rule of law abiding relations, Russia still remains the distribution or 
projection of power thinking in inter-state relations. As a state, Russia’s 
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capability and political will for international cooperation, therefore, are still in 
the Cold War mode and has to be said that it is low. 
 
4.2.3. Russian Civil Society 
 
If a focus turns to the civil society level and the greater number of the 
ordinary Russians, potentiality for democracy is not totally lost. However, it is 
also true that there are a number of obstacles imposed by the rule of the 
siloviki and it is very hard to change the current Russian political reality in the 
foreseeable future.  
 The people are tired of the rule of the siloviki or Putin’s rule that has 
been continuing since 2000. They are frustrated by the fact that the people 
cannot change the regime through democratic procedures. The series of 
mass demonstrations after the parliamentary election on December 2011, 
the presidential election on March 2012 and the presidential inauguration on 
May in the year show how much the urban middle class holds dissatisfaction 
sensing the violations and irregularities of the Russian elections. The class is 
regarded as the children of Putin, since the growth is coincided with the 
Russian economic growth under the first Putin presidency and has been 
considered to be royal to the Putin’s rule until recently. It is currently 
supposed that the middle class population occupies the 25% of the whole 
population and the 40% of the workforce in Russia.167 Many of them are 
accustomed to using internet that has been generating some anti-
governmental activists, like Alexey Navalny. The urban middle class consists 
                                            
167 Economist, The. (2nd March), 2012. ‘Daily Chart - Richer Russian’. 
Online: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/03/daily-chart-
0/print. 
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of the relatively young generation who do not have the clear memory on the 
Soviet rule, so that their fear against the authoritarian rule is lower than the 
older generations. They are also the generation who go to foreign countries 
relatively freely and can compare Russia with the Western countries. While 
they may be not so easily praise the Western democracy without hesitation, 
they are the generation who see the Western liberal life protected by the rule 
of law more comfortable for individuals. Therefore, when an issue comes to 
their individual political, civil and human rights, the urban middle class is 
easier to be kindled. The urban middle class is currently testing the stomach 
of the Putin's second presidency through the mass demonstrations and 
supports for the dissidents who are arrested under a variety of charges, such 
as Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the members of Pussy Riot. Looking at the 
recent events in Russia, some may be tempted to lead a conclusion that 
Russian civil society is positively evolving and the democracy is growing.  
 Nevertheless, this is a false impression if one turns the focus to the 
aspect of legislation. The Russian government is increasing regulations and 
restrictions over the public demonstrations and internet since May 2012 with 
the start of the Putin’s second presidency. Of course, the tightening of civil 
movements has been continuously setting up since his first presidency. For 
example, NGOs have been targeted not to get out of the governmental 
control. This is probably a habit inherited from the Soviet totalitarian practices 
in which NGOs (at a glance) were produced according to the government’s 
plan for controlling society during the Soviet era. On paper, the state of 
NGOs is a marker to measure the degree of democracy, since they relate to 
the civil rights to assemble and to demonstrate in public that may become a 
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force to move society. Obviously, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes tend 
to decline them. 
 Russia’s civil society temporarily flourished during the 1990s, which 
was a reaction to the Soviet controlled society. Since the collapse of the 
communism, ‘more than 200,000 nongovernmental [organizations] (NGOs) 
have formed.’ NGOs ‘ “[had] grown dramatically from only 30 to 40 registered 
organizations in 1987 to about 238,000 by the end of 1998.’168 However, 
Russian civil society had not been backed by support from the middle class 
which was so “thin” at that time and by fair legislative and judicial treatments 
to protect the activities of the oppositions towards the central and local 
governments. The seeds of the pluralistic civil society were, therefore, easily 
eradicated by the emergence of the Putin presidency in 2000. Since then, 
negative development has been observed. Michael McFaul and Elina 
Treyger note: 
 
‘Under Putin, Russia has seen increased harassment 
of NGOs and other independent entities by the police, 
the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the tax 
collecting authorities, which have now been 
subordinated to the FSB; denial of mandatory 
registrations to legitimate NGOs; arrests of and legal 
                                            
168 McFaul, Michael., and Elina Treyger. (2004). Civil Society. In: McFaul, 
Michael., Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov with Mikhail Krasnov, Vladimir 
Petukhov, Victor Sheinis, and Elina Treyger, eds. Between Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform. Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. p.153. 
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suits initiated against prominent activists; and 
assaults on media sources unfriendly to the Kremlin.’ 
 
‘The most common tactic for curbing civic activities is 
for the Ministry of Justice to turn down registration 
and re-registration applications. [According] to the 
new law on public associations, those NGOs that 
were not [registered] by June 30, 1999, can be shut 
down by a court order at any time. The Glasnost 
Public Foundation, a human rights watchdog, asserts 
that “nearly half of non-governmental organizations” 
were “eradicated” before this [deadline], citing official 
Ministry of Justice statistics that as of the deadline, 
only 58 percent of the previously registered number, 
had registered at the federal level.’169  
 
 Putin has added a new law concerning NGOs ‘that handed bureaucrats 
wide discretion in registering NGOs and placed extensive reporting 
requirements on the groups.’ Freedom House reported the case of the 
Russian-Chechen Friendship Society in 2007, which can be interpreted as a 
negative result of the law. While the organisation ‘monitored human rights in 
Chechnya,’ it was forcefully closed ‘on the grounds that an NGO cannot be 
                                            
169 McFaul, Michael., and Elina Treyger. (2004). Civil Society. In: McFaul, 
Michael., Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov with Mikhail Krasnov, Vladimir 
Petukhov, Victor Sheinis, and Elina Treyger, eds. Between Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform. Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. pp.160-161. 
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headed by a person convicted of extremist activities. In February, the 
organization’s leader, Stanislav Dmitrievsky, had been found guilty of 
publishing articles by Chechen separatist leaders, an offense labelled an act 
of “extremism.”’170 These legal methods are almost a copy of the Soviet 
conducts. While the NGOs which take pro-government policy positions may 
benefit from governmental support, the NGOs which attempt to oppose the 
government can be the target of these methods.  
 From the beginning of the current Russian Federation, Russia inherited 
the negative legacy of the Soviet system to restrict the civil society. The 
Soviet communism stood at the position that ‘Marxist theory predicted an end 
to all political and social conflict after the proletarian revolution, pluralism and 
organization for the sake of any particularistic interest had no place in a 
communist society.’ When the theory was translated into a set of policies, it 
‘became the virtual destruction of the space between the individual and the 
state, the space that the building blocks of civil society would occupy: social 
[networks], private businesses, public associations, clubs, religious groups, 
labour unions, and so on.’171  
 The destruction was repeated by the Putin’s first presidency and prime 
ministership. One of the effects of the destruction is a thin relation to the 
foreign civil, private and economic societies in the West. Usually, these parts 
                                            
170 Freedom House. (2007). Freedom House Country Report: Russia (2007). 
Online. Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7
258  (accessed on January 2008). 
171 McFaul, Michael., and Elina Treyger. (2004). Civil Society. In: McFaul, 
Michael., Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov with Mikhail Krasnov, Vladimir 
Petukhov, Victor Sheinis, and Elina Treyger, eds. Between Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform. Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. p.142. 
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of relations thicken and strengthen relations to the international community 
that compensate to some extent for a negative relation to other states at the 
diplomatic level. However, the Russian government makes the parts of 
relations thin on purpose and actively isolates its statehood from the 
international community. Therefore, information from/to Russia becomes less 
and the country becomes somewhat enigmatic. In terms of business, 
Russian policy on its civil, private and economic societies reduces accurate 
information to know about the Russian market and business opportunities. In 
terms of civil society, it invites ignoring Russia.  
 Xenophobia is in the Russian psych. This, of course, roots in the history 
of the country which has had the long open borders to other countries. Yet, 
this psych may be stronger in the ex-KGB people than in the ordinary 
Russians, since the KGB educated their personnel to be suspicious on the 
foreign states, in particular the Western countries and values. In parallel, 
they were supposed to control the Soviets’ ideology, thinking and values. 
The core generation of the siloviki are the collection of individuals who are 
more adversary against the Western values than the generation of 
Medvedev or younger than him. The core would like to see the Russian 
people following the scripts that the siloviki regime writes like the Soviet time.  
 
4.2.4. Media Freedom 
 
For the ex-KGBs who were accustomed to ideology control in the Soviet 
period, it is quite natural to repeat the norm in the post-Soviet Russia. Even 
Yeltsin, who was regarded as the hope of democracy, depended on the 
image control for his popularity. Russian media under the Putin regime have 
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been working for the promotion of his image. The Russian government 
currently fully controls the Russian major media companies, in particular TV 
broadcasting stations that are the most influential medium in Russia, through 
stock holding by the elites. Therefore, the Russian media are unable to work 
as the observers and critics on the government’s activities. Internet has been 
relatively a blind spot of the Russian government until recently, probably 
because the core siloviki generation (or Putin’s generation) are less familiar 
with the use of the technology. However, as the growth of internet clearly 
shows the increase of influence over the Russian society, the government is 
moving towards tightening the regulations. Thus, Russia is losing a space of 
freedom of speech and media. 
 Many probably have to admit that there is not so much freedom for 
media activities in Russia. In fact, the rating of the Freedom House in 2009 
(thus, the evaluation of 2008) stays at “Not Free”. The Freedom House’s 
evaluation of Russia in that year notes that ‘[j]ournalists remained unable to 
cover the news freely, particularly with regard to contentious topics like 
human rights abuses in the North Caucasus, government corruption, 
organized crime, and police torture.’172 Journalists are not safe in Russia. 
The danger is symbolised by the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya, a 
fierce anti-Kremlin critic of the Chechen Wars, in 2006. It is a mystery 
whether such attacks on journalists are carried out by the semi-authoritarian 
regime or any other parties. Nevertheless, anti-governmental journalists have 
been the majority of the victims. The FoM of the OSCE actually strongly 
                                            
172 Freedom House. (2009). Freedom House’s evaluation on Freedom of the 
Press. Online. Avaiable at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/, choose “Freedom 
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raised the issue, for example, on October 2009 under the leadership of 
Miklos Harasztis. The Russian reaction, however, was not so positive.173 
Nowadays, it is quite rare that journalists in Russia take a clear anti-
governmental stance.  
 Externally, the lack of media freedom increases the scarceness of 
information on the true Russia, which increases anxiety, misinformation and 
scepticism on Russia. The situation does not help the project of democratic 
peace by the OSCE and the international community. 
 
4.2.5. The Rule of Law 
 
As stated, the rule of law is one of the post-modern features and an 
important element of mature democracy and, therefore, the project of 
democratic peace. What makes Russia semi-authoritarian most is its legal 
system, the lack of the rule of law or the existence of the rule of the powerful. 
Application of law is selective, the judiciary system is full of irregularities and 
corruption is rampant. The case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who used to be an 
oligarch in Russia and a CEO of Yukos, is a symbolic case to reveal all of 
these Russian aspects. His arrest in 2003 is widely speculated as a Putin’s 
                                            
of the Press”, then follow the navigation to choose year and state, in this 
case “2009” and “Russia”. (accessed on July 2010). 
173 For example, Miklos Harasztis, then representative of the Freedom of the 
Media, ‘offers Russian authorities co-operation on media freedom’ on 
October 2009, calling for ‘urgent measures to tackle violence against 
journalists; steps needed to restore pluralism of views in national television 
channels, including licensing of independent broadcasters and the creation 
of a public service channel; and the reviewing of legislation that reduces 
media or Internet freedom, such as anti-extremism and defamation laws, or 
administrative rules”.’ Moscow, however, has not clearly answered the offer.  
See: OSCE. (12th October 2009). OSCE press freedom official offers 
Russian authorities co-operation on media freedom. OSCE Press Release. 
Online. Available at: http://www.osce.org/fom/item_1_40690.html. 
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revenge against Khodorkovsky’s anti-Putin stance. The case turned a new 
page in 2010 when he was re-tried due to a new allegation. It is widely 
thought that the allegation was brought in order to extend Khodorkovsky’s 
detention.174  
 Another prominent case, which is now causing a tension with the US, is 
the case of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer who died in 2009 in prison after 
ignorance by the authorities over his health and unreasonable detention. 
Magnitsky found a $230 million corruption case in dealing with the troubles of 
Hermitage Capital, an investment bank run by William Browder. However, 
the finding led Magnitsky’s arrest and detention over a year. While then 
President Medvedev ordered an investigation after Magnitsky’s death, no 
one has been clearly identified as the responsible about the corruption case 
and Medvedev’s effort ended with firing about twenty prison officers including 
Alexander Piskunov, deputy head of the Federal Penitentiary Service, and 
issuing a decree that prohibits the detention of the suspected of tax crimes, 
as happened to Magnitsky.175 Browder with the support by an American 
Senator, Benjamin L. Cardin campaigned to move the US government. The 
effort has resulted in the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law and Accountability 
                                            
174 See: Feifer, Gregory. (15th December 2010). Russia’s Khodorkovsky On 
Ice Ahead of Verdict In Second Trial. RFE/RL. Online. Available at: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_khodorkovsky_sentence/2248415.html 
(accessed on 2nd February 2011). 
175 See: Wikipedia. Seigei Magnitsky. Online. Available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Magnitsky (accessed on 2nd February 
2011). 
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Act in December 2012 that includes the so-called Magnitsky’s List which 
bans the corrupt Russian politicians from entering the US.176 
 The most fundamental problem in the Russian legal system is that laws 
do not have significance. ‘[I]t simply does not matter what values are 
enshrined in the laws.’ Robert Coalson notes that ‘[a]ny values enshrined in 
laws that are ignored or are selectively applied are overshadowed by the 
values enshrined in ignoring or selectively applying them.’177   
 However, the rising dissatisfaction over the reality of the Russian 
society begins to hit the limitation that the mass demonstrations are more 
visible and frequent. The Russian society is angry. The participants who 
have grown up in the post-Soviet Russia and do not know the Soviet regime 
are currently challenging the Russian semi-authoritarianism. The siloviki 
regime seems to be reaching a point that it needs to decide whether the 
regime goes to the Soviet mode or the liberal (or the Western) one for 
earning the stability of the Russian society.  
 In relations to the international community, the lack of the rule of law 
associated with corruption in Russia has been fending off the business 
investment and the advancement of INGOs. This hinders both Russia, the 
OSCE community and the international community from sharing interests 
and values and forming a regime of democratic peace at the economic and 
social level. 
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4.2.6. Institutional Settings of Politics 
 
The distortion and selective application of law are one of the Russian norms 
granted by the rule of the powerful. This rule is also a product of the 
institutional settings of the Russian constitution that has been enhanced by 
some changes under the Putin-Medvedev presidencies.  
 It is often said that the Russian Constitution bears presidentialism. The 
constitution may be categorised as a semi-presidential one, but not an 
authoritarian or dictatorial one, according to M. Steven Fish, just ‘by virtue of 
a single provision: the right of the Duma, the lower house of parliament, to 
reject the president’s choice for prime minister.’ However, the rejection 
requires the Duma’s veto three times ‘at which point the president, without 
having to place him/herself up for reelection, automatically dissolves the 
legislature and calls new elections. The provision explains why the Duma 
has never rejected a prime minister…’178   
 Fish may have read the Russian Constitution too narrowly, since, in fact, 
the Duma theoretically ‘does have certain control functions’ over not only 
‘approving the president’s nominee for prime minister’ but also ‘approving the 
federal budget, and monitoring the use of expenditure funds through the 
Auditing Chamber.’ In addition, ‘dissolution of the State Duma is limited by a 
strict time frame and a number of conditions.’ Yet, ‘[t]he real weakness of the 
parliament’, according to Victor Sheinis, who unsuccessfully worked for 
drafting the 1993 Russian Constitution, ‘is its lack of oversight authority.’ In 
his observation of the behaviour of many governmental officials who ignored 
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the Duma’s requests to testify at hearings, Sheinis concludes that ‘the Duma 
has no power to call on government officials to show up at parliamentary 
[hearings] or to secure the documents from executive officials needed to 
make independent inquiries into the executive branch’s activities.’179 The 
Russian practice shows the lack of accountability by the Russian government 
to the Duma and the people.  
 The State Duma’s weakness in check-and-balance towards the 
government may have been increased by the dominance of the party in 
power, Unity, that has been in a tight cooperation with Putin. After Putin 
“bequeathed” his presidency to Dmitri Medvedev and became the prime 
minister in 2008, Putin also took the position of the head of the party. Then, 
after the presidential election on March 2012, Putin, who was elected to be 
president, traded the seat of the leadership of Unity with Medvedev who was 
promised to be prime minister. Then, Unity in the Duma backed some new 
legislation that would restrict anti-governmental movements, for example 
over internet and mass protests, as the Putin administration planned. The 
fact provokes an idea that Unity seems to be currently playing the role of the 
CPSU during the Soviet era, which is to simply “rubber-stamp” the 
government’s decisions in the Duma. Then, it works for making oppressive 
and extrajudicial methods legal.  
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 Russia’s parliamentary and presidential elections are a great farce. The 
elections in the 1990s under Yeltsin’s rule were neither perfect nor 
sufficiently fair. Nevertheless, they were still conducted in a relatively 
reasonable way. Opposition politicians and political parties to the regime 
could run for the elections. Then, the results of the elections were relatively 
unpredictable. Therefore, from a viewpoint of democratisation, it was 
certainly expected that it should ‘serve as an interim step between 
dictatorship and democracy.’ Therefore, Schumpeter’s conditions over 
democracy, which are ‘open communication and the universal right to 
compete for elective office’ as ‘diagnostic features of democracy180’, were 
somehow observable.  
 Not anymore. ‘[T]he trend [had] been in the opposite direction’ in the 
2000s. ‘[E]lections [had] become less free and fair today than they were a 
decade ago.’181  The victory of Unity and Putin (or whoever the siloviki 
regime recommends) is scheduled. The potential strong parties and 
candidates who are rival to Unity and Putin, such as Yabloko (a liberal party 
of Russia) and Grigory Yablinsky, like to be eliminated through preliminary 
requirements to be a political party and run for the elections, the allegation of 
political scandals or crimes, and the authorities’ wrongdoings in the elections. 
For the siloviki regime, these elections are important to pretend Russia’s 
democracy. The pretence is expected to persuade not only the ordinary 
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Russians but also the external audience with decorative legitimacy and 
popularity of the siloviki-Putin regime, though the effectiveness is being lost 
as this has become a Russian norm. 
 In addition to the State Duma, there has been another twist in the 
Federal Assembly, the upper parliament of the Russian Federation. The 
power of the government has been strengthened throughout the last two 
decades through not only setting the pro-presidential Constitution but also 
implementing the policy of centralisation. The most outstanding event in the 
trend was the modification of the selection method of the regional 
representatives for the Federal Assembly without changing the Constitution 
under the Putin presidency. Since there is no specific provision for how to 
select the members in the Constitution, the Putin administration decided to 
deliberately read it in its favour, but not for the development of or, at least, 
consideration of democracy. The representation system has been altered to 
allow the tighter governmental control.  
 The representation system was through direct election at the local level 
in 1993. This became ‘the heads of the regions’ executive and legislature 
branches’ in 1995. Then, ‘in May 2000, under strong pressure from newly 
elected President Putin,’ it has been changed into ‘the current structure, 
which consists of two representatives from each region, one appointed by 
the governor or the president and the other by the regional legislature.’ 
According to Nikolai Petrov, the newly introduced system under Putin works 
for the expansion of the Kremlin’s leverage in the regional politics, even 
though many of the members selected by the system ‘are Moscovites who 
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had never been to “their” regions prior to being appointed.’182 It is politically 
understandable why Russia’s federal government wanted to strengthen its 
sway over the regions. Some of the regional representatives had been 
rebellious against the federal government during Yeltsin’s reign. Thus, the 
system change certainly aimed at fossilising the political participation of the 
representatives through manipulation of the system of representation.   
 What was more significant was Putin’s method for achieving the change. 
The method – re-reading the Constitution rather than bringing an argument 
to the wider society for consultation – may have set a negative precedent for 
the future of Russia’s democracy. It has proved a possibility that the 
president can change the fundamental political system prescribed by the 
Constitution without formally changing it or consulting with other political 
institutions, parliamentarians or, ultimately, the people.  
 A potential problem in relation to the project of democratic peace in 
such internal non-democratic issues is that the regime may resort to a 
diversifying policy that non-democracies tend to use in the time when they 
have problems in controlling the mass in their countries. Foreign countries 
are an easy target to blame, no matter how unhelpful this is. Russia may be 
not been heavily imposed such control as much as the Soviet Union did or 
the current China does. Nevertheless, since the government controls the 
major media, the regime has been using the method of labelling a negative 
image to inconvenient subjects, like the West, and glorifying the leader of the 
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regime. A Russian value tends to help the regime’s “persuasion” since it 
askes a special place of Russia and the Russians among other ethnic 
peoples and nations and encourage suspicion over others. The siloviki 
regime knows the weakness of the people and is quite capable of exploiting 
the Russian psychology, since this was exactly one of the Soviet and KGB 
methods. At the same time, the KGB personnel were used to be trained to 
think with the chauvinistic and xenophobic values. Therefore, a Putin’s cliché 
of “the conspiracy of the West” is not only a propaganda but also what he 
was trained to think.  
 
4.2.7. Russian Foreign Policy 
 
It is quite interesting to see how much the Russian foreign policy of the 
Putin’s second presidency will shift from that of his first presidency and prime 
ministership, since, during the Medvedev’s presidency, the external 
circumstances drastically changed and deprived Russia of some key 
premises for the assertive foreign policy. The change, with the recent 
development of the internal situations, may thaw the Russian assertiveness 
in the recent years and present a better opportunity to the OSCE and the 
international community to invite Russia into the post-modern world. 
 Russia’s assertiveness in foreign policy, including the leadership of the 
"East of Vienna" in the OSCE, in part started with an economic fortune in the 
early 2000s. The rise of the prices of natural resources at the international 
market provided a fantastic opportunity for Russia to be one of the biggest 
providers of the energy resources in the world. While the rise continued until 
the Lehman Shock in 2008, the Putin regime successfully gained the control 
  241 
of the major Russian energy companies through stock holdings by either the 
state or the powerful elites of the Putin’s circles. The situation made the 
Russia’s national budget depend on the companies’ earnings and become 
the bait for the siloviki. The economic fortune was so huge that the Putin 
regime could buy the people’s royalty through increasing wages, state-
sponsored development projects, and the people’s wealth. The current urban 
middle class is the product of this fortune. The economic condition also 
stabilised the Russian society in general that Putin’s first presidency 
promised.  
 There was another series of events at the international level that 
strengthened the Putin regime’s confidence. The US’ engagement in the War 
on Terror under the Bush administration reacting to the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
reduced international criticism on the Russian counter-terrorism activities in 
the North Caucasus area. Putin took an advantage to equalise the Chechen 
separatist movement with the Islamic terrorism connected to Al-Qaeda. Then, 
the Russian government engaged in the counter-terrorist activities in 
Chechnya and established control over the republic where some of key 
pipeline routes and refinery facilities were located. The coincidence of the 
international market on natural resources and the War on Terror gave the 
Putin regime to consolidate the economic viability of the state.  
 Furthermore, Europe had increased dependency of Russian oil and gas 
supply during the period. Originally, the East European countries had almost 
totally depended on Russia due to the Soviet legacy. Then, during the Putin’s 
first presidency, the Central European countries increased the supply from 
Russia. Russia also worked hard to develop the project of the Nord Stream, 
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an undersea pipeline running through the Baltic Sea to connect Russia to 
Central Europe bypassing any other former Soviet Union states that were 
conflicting against Russia over the payment of the energy supply. Russia 
sometimes stopped oil and gas to the states, and caused the supply troubles 
to the South and Central European states. Therefore, the development of the 
bypassing route was understandable. However, at the same time, the project 
was suspected whether some German politicians and related companies 
were corrupted by the Russian government. The conspiracy theory implied 
that Russia’s purpose of the project was to make Central and Western 
Europe vulnerable without Russian oil and gas and, in the end, to control the 
whole Europe.  
 Usually, this theory was accompanied with the so-called Putin’s 
doctoral thesis supposedly submitted in 1997 titled “The Strategic Planning 
of Regional Resources Under the Formation of Market Relations” in which 
Putin seemed to hold the idea of creating a powerful state based on his 
energy resource strategy. 183  In fact, the Central European countries 
increased dependency on Russian oil and gas during the negotiation and 
construction of the Nord Stream. For example, Germany’s dependency 
reached about 36% of the domestic consumption in 2006.184 Then, the 
increase also met the rise of Russian hard line foreign policy. The 
culmination of this came to the 2008 Georgian War.  
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 Accordingly, Russian assertive foreign policy, therefore, grew with 
some external events that benefitted the Putin regime along with the growing 
internal stability given by the economic fortune coming from the international 
market. Instead of becoming a liberal market economy, Russia under Putin 
became a sovereign market economy in which the state would use economic 
resources in the private sector for the state policies, including foreign policy, 
regardless of rationality in management of private companies and economic 
appropriateness.  
 However, after the Lehman Shock in 2008, the economic fortune 
completely reversed. First, the international investment to the Russian 
financial market was rapidly withdrawn immediately after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. Although the Putin regime seemed to like to regard this 
event as a conspiracy by the West, this was rather that the foreign banks fell 
into the shortage of money due to the Shock and needed to withdraw money 
from the low-rating countries including Russia. The withdrawal of the foreign 
investment immediately caused the problems of liquidity in the Russian 
“ostensibly private but actually state-run” companies, including Rosneft and 
Gazprom, the Russian energy giants.  
 Second, the financial catastrophe was coincided with the fall of the oil 
and gas prices in the international market that Russia heavily depended on 
its national budget. The fall was also a part of the consequences of the 
Lehman Shock. In the case of West Texas Intermediate oil market, the oil 
price hit nearly $140 per barrel around August 2008 and fell below $50 in the 
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beginning of 2009.185 Natural gas in Henry Hub spot shows that the gas 
price declines below $4 per million Btu in the recent years from about $10 
around 2005.186  The price change has negatively affected the Russia’s 
national budget. 
 Third, behind these events, the so-called Shale Revolution was 
proceeding. This revolution has now set the US to overtake Saudi Arabia to 
become the biggest oil producer until 2020187 and shifted the energy supply 
map. The Middle Eastern oil and gas producing countries are currently 
increasing their sales in Europe as an alternative market where the EU 
states are attempting to diversify the sources of energy for energy security 
reasons in which Russia occupies a large part of the concerns. Thus, Russia 
is losing some portion of the market. It is rumoured that Poland holds a huge 
amount of shale gas and oil and the Baltic states will be independent from 
Russia in energy if the shale gas and oil resources in the Baltic Sea are 
exploited in future.  
 Russia is trying to acquire and expand a new market in China and 
Japan while it is also attempting to diversify the economic structure which is 
currently heavily depending on the natural resource export. Nevertheless, it 
is still unclear whether these efforts will bring the economic viability of Russia. 
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Furthermore, even if the Russian effort is successful, it is not guaranteed that 
the princes of oil and gas will stay above what Russia requires until the effort 
completes. So far, the introduction of the Shale gas into the international 
market collapsed the gas price in 2009, which turned out to be 45% cheaper 
than Russia’s gas at some point of time in the year.188 Russia may be still 
economically viable if austerity measures are implemented under such a 
reduction of the prices. Nevertheless, it may not be able to sustain the 
Kleptocracy system. At the same time, the Shale Revolution reveals the lack 
of the advanced drilling technology of the Russian energy giants. Rosneft 
and Gazprom have not used the technology and are rather campaigning the 
abolition of it, claiming the risk over natural environment, in particular in the 
Eastern European states.  
 About energy resources within Russia, the Russian government with 
the energy giant companies has been negotiating with the Western energy 
companies, like BP or Shell, in the last couple of years to collaborate the 
development of the resources. This move is the 180 degree turn of the 
internal energy policy in Russia that used to be attempting to expel any 
foreign companies from the sector. The fact implies that Russia generally 
lacks advanced technology in the energy sector to compete in the 
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international market and needs cooperation with the Western companies to 
learn it.  
 In total, these events after the Lehman Shock have largely bankrupted 
the Russian foreign policy foundation, in particular towards the Western 
countries. Rather, the Russia’s assertiveness until 2008 is now being 
revenged by difficulties of the Russian economy which has not been 
successful in diversifying the economic means to grow. The EU states have 
become cautious after the 2008 Georgian War and seriously started 
considering energy security with resisting the expansion of Russian portion 
of energy supply. As a result, Russia has largely lost the means to produce 
the national budget and business opportunities. Since Russia is a sovereign 
market economy and the foreign policy has depended on it, the loss of the 
money for the national budget directly depletes the Russia’s assets for 
diplomacy.  
 
4.2.8. Russia and the Project of Democratic Peace 
 
From the observation on internal affairs, it is clear that Russia is neither a 
democracy nor a fully-fledged authoritarian or totalitarian state like the Soviet 
Union. At the same time, it is obvious that Russia has been implementing the 
decade-long de-democratisation through increasing restrictions on the NGOs, 
civil movement and party systems. If this period is taken as a temporary 
waning of democratisation, Russia might be regarded as a transitional 
democracy. Yet, the temporary period has been more than a decade now 
and will likely continue for the foreseeable feature. Probably, therefore, it is 
safe to understand that Russia is a semi-authoritarian state with a 
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democratic pretence and not worth of putting so much trust on it at  the 
current time for the project of democratic peace and the OSCE’s 
comprehensive peace and security.  
 However, Russia is currently showing the shift of the distribution of 
power within the siloviki elites, curiously because of the democratic pretence. 
What has sustained Putin’s power over the other siloviki elites in the state is 
the overwhelming Putin’s popularity. In the state where the rule of law has 
not worked and the regime still hesitates to use of violence against the 
people, the source of legitimacy of the rule is popularity. That is the reason 
why the Russian democratic pretence may be important in a long term to 
shift the state into, at least, more democratic a mode. The authorities’ might 
may be able to grab the political power to rule. However, the power cannot 
have an objective legitimacy and, therefore, is unstable.  
 As Yeltsin was so, Putin successfully put himself into the weak spot of 
the Russian minds that naturally seek for a benevolent Tsar. It is rumoured 
that there were a number of fabrications to cause anxiety among the ordinary 
Russians, like some, if not all, of terrorist attacks in some Russian cities 
when Putin worked under President Yeltsin in the end of the 1990s. Putin 
was presented as a man who could solve the problem and won the 
presidency in 2000. Although the process of the presidential election was 
dubious, Putin’s popularity was enough true and high, and that has been 
Putin’s power base in legitimacy no matter what he was doing. Putin was 
lucky, because Russia as a natural resource exporting country enjoyed the 
high price of the resources in the international market. The economic 
justification was another Putin’s power base. It is said that the half of the 
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Russian national budget comes from the profit of the natural resource trade. 
Then, Putin Kleptocracy regime could distribute the wealth to the state 
authorities, projects and key persons.  
 Currently the two conditions cannot be seen. In terms of popularity, 
continuous irregularities and selective application of law to benefit the siloviki 
elites have exhausted the ordinary Russians, in particular the Russian urban 
middle class. The Russian narrow civil rights space is also one of their 
complains.  Although the economy had been relatively in good condition, 
the growth did not improved the social welfare, education and health systems 
as expected. This is hitting the working class, in particular the Russian rural 
areas. While the Russian media have been cooperative for creating Putin’s 
strong-man image, the ordinary Russians seem to be fed up with that with 
looking at Putin ageing. This decline of Putin’s benevolent Tsar-like 
popularity is now joined by economic difficulties rising with a total shift of 
energy business.  
 In terms of external relations, Russia is suffering the deficit of the 
assertive foreign policy until 2008. The after-effect of arrogance in diplomacy 
under the sovereign market economy paradigm seriously remains and may 
not be curable. The perspective of the international oil and gas markets is 
negative for Russia, if the Shale Revolution goes on. Although the oil price is 
currently rising, the rise is not enough to let the Russian kleptocracy regime 
to continue to buy stability through the distribution of money among the 
power elites and state bureaucrats. 
 The situation means that Putin has lost his legitimacy enough to have 
anti-Putin demonstrations by the ordinary Russians and be challenged by 
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some Russian opposition celebrities and politicians and even colleagues and 
friends to some extent. Journalists, who have been docile to the regime, 
seem to be slightly tempted to test the nerve of the regime after the May 
demonstration in 2012.  
 Here comes an important point of a Russian aspiration that urges itself 
to be regarded as respectable and democratic in some way, no matter how 
much that is true or false. If the Russian elites do not care about the 
aspiration or the democratic pretence, it is easy for the Putin regime to use 
violence and immediately return to the Soviet system on which his 
generation is much more accustomed. Yet, the Putin regime is rather taking 
an option that is to legitimise irregularities and problematic regulations 
through the legislative or the Duma in which Unity, the party in power, does 
the rubber-stamping job for the presidency. Although the method is 
problematic in the light of democracy, the regime is trying to counter against 
the oppositions in an invisible way from the external world. Russia is still 
minding about the democratic pretence. 
 Russia is making an effort not to lose a face value with earning a 
reputation of the fully-fledged authoritarian state if it is impossible to earn a 
reputation of a democracy. The regime seeks for a way in which the 
Russians can find a benevolent Tsar and do not raise a question to him. The 
combination of the Russian aspirations can be leverage to turn the Russian 
semi-authoritarian regime into less authoritarian one. Thus, the OSCE and 
the international community should and can exploit them in order to make 
Russia more democratic, if not a satisfactory democracy.  
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 Currently, the application of the violence and intelligence methods are 
selective and the number of the victims are relatively small in comparison to 
the Soviet period. Nevertheless, if the regime determines to curb anti-
governmental movements dropping the stance of the democratic pretence, 
there is no guarantee that Russia does not go back to the Soviet mode. It is 
speculated that the FSB, a Russia’s intelligent service holds about 200,000 
personnel189, which is ten times more than the CIA. With the reality of 
dubious law enforcement system, the potentiality to go back to the Soviet 
system should not be underestimated.  
 While Russia is currently not a trustful partner of the project of 
democratic peace, the possibility in future is mixed. The political and 
economic environments are pushing Russia to a way in which Russia has to 
open itself to the external world, in a realistic sense, to acquire advanced 
technology to keep Russia’s natural resource industries competitive in the 
international market and reserve the market to sell Russian oil and gas. This 
economic necessity has started showing an impact to persuade the Putin 
regime and siloviki elites to shift Russian assertive foreign policy to more 
cooperative foreign policy with the international community.  
 Internally, while the Putin regime prefers a total control to a partial one, 
the ordinary Russians are now actively desiring more space for open society, 
civil, political and human rights, the rule of law and the opportunity to choose 
their regime in a true sense that the Russian government does not supply. In 
other words, the Russian government does not supply the common and 
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public goods of the Russian society, while the ordinary Russians are looking 
for them. It is very difficult for INGOs to penetrate the Russia’s anti-foreign 
NGO regulations that virtually make it impossible for foreign donors to fund 
Russian NGOs or civil activities from oversea. Therefore, some Russians are 
seeking an authority which is greater than their government and may provide 
the common and public goods for the Russians. For example, the Russians 
who like to complain against their government dare to go to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), since Russia is a member of the Council of 
Europe (CoE). One-third of the backlog of complains of the ECHR are 
against Russia and many of them are done by the Russians.190 Therefore, at 
the individual case level, although the current human rights regime may be 
understood as written by the Western values and the siloviki elites may have 
some reservations, the ordinary Russians at the bottom of the society aspire 
human rights and the rule of law.   
 Yet, the ordinary Russians are unable to crack the siloviki regime so far, 
and, no matter how many the mass demonstrations occur, the regime soon 
legalises the use of means that are against human rights and actually 
employ them as currently seen in Russia after the series of the large scale 
demonstrations after the parliamentary election on December 2011. Before 
the regime completely abandons the aspiration for the democratic pretence 
to protect the current power system and starts engaging in more violent and 
systematic means to control the Russian society like the Soviet system, 
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something should be done to stop Russia moving to the completely 
authoritarian direction.  
 When the elite’s monetary interests are tied up with the international 
economic environment that is now working against Russia, the OSCE and 
the international community have a better opportunity than before and should 
engage in Russia to move the state into a democratic direction for the project 
of democratic peace.  
 
4.3:Russia and the OSCE 
 
Since the pre-Helsinki Final Act period, the regional great power in the East 
has been a challenge and agenda of the Helsinki/CSCE/OSCE process. For 
the Soviet/Russia, the Helsinki/CSCE/OSCE process should not be an 
external interference to the Soviet/Russian internal affairs. Basket III or the 
human dimension should be a diplomatic farce to satisfy the moral aspiration 
of the general public but nothing more than that. 
 Historically, the Soviet Union used the Helsinki/CSCE process for the 
enhancement of the Westphalian state sovereignty of the countries in 
Eastern Europe that were under the Soviet influence. The Soviet focus was 
on concerns on hard security related to arms control, confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBMs) and state sovereignty. That suggests 
that Basket I or the politico-military dimension was the centre of the Soviet 
interests.191  
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 Basket I in the Helsinki Final Act is carefully connected to the Helsinki 
Decalogue that regulates the rules of inter-state relations within the 
Participating States in the Helsinki process.192 The Decalogue covers state 
sovereignty in the traditional sense, and, therefore, territorial integrity. In the 
Soviet sense, if the state borders of the communist states in Eastern Europe 
were legally protected by Basket I, the Soviet Union would firmly hold the 
whole communist state territories as its own territory where the Soviet 
influence, including military one, could move freely with fabricating the 
consent of these communist states. The concept was called the Brezhinev 
doctrine that implied a set of the communist state territories shared 
theoretically by all communist states but actually occupied by the Soviet 
regime. The pan-European security framework proposed by the Soviets was 
imaged in this way and actually realised at the Helsinki Final Act at the legal 
level. 
 A similar territorial interest can be found in the post-Soviet Russia’s 
support for the CSCE/OSCE in the post-Cold War era. The post-Soviet 
Russia immediately faced the problems of the borders which had been the 
internal administrative divisions or the internal republican borders during the 
Soviet era. Russia also inherited several international border issues. The 
authority of Moscow as the central government was in question, and some of 
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the internal republics and autonomous regions/areas were rebellious. 
Therefore, the territorial confirmation was quite important for the transitional 
state which was in the process of the fragmentation of the communist empire. 
In the confusion, it was impossible to militarily protect either the Soviet 
territory or the Russian territory from an external threat through a coherent 
chain of command. Although the West did not have any intention of militarily 
mobilising to take some territory from the post-Soviet Russia, the newly 
emerged state required confirmation of its own territory for both foreign and 
internal policies.  
 The Russian territorial issues may not be completely solved even in the 
21st century, in particular internally. Due to its history, Russia holds a 
number of problematic internal regions and has to think of the possible 
fragmentation of them. An Islamic tie lingers in the instability of the North 
Caucasus region including Chechnya and the Middle Volga region that 
contains Tatarstan and Bashkortostan which ‘have a measure of autonomy 
but want much more.’193 Russian elites, in particular nationalists, also keep 
in mind the Turkish cultural and civilisational influence over the Turkish 
population areas, which partly overlap with Russia’s Islamic regions. There is 
an observable fact that non-Muslim Turkish Russian peoples ‘who go to 
Turkey or study in Turkish schools set up in the Russian Federation often 
convert to Islam and adopt Islamic names.’ The fact has induced the 
Russians to ‘see the variant of Islam sponsored by the secular Turkish 
government as more dangerous than extremist or stricter versions because it 
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pretends to be progressive.’ Furthermore, the change of letters from Cyrillic 
to Latin script in Tatarstan mobilised the Russian government to investigate, 
through the parliamentary committees, ‘the potential threat’ to Russia’s 
security. The joint report points out not only the concern about the 
fragmentation of the Russian state but also the possible ‘renewed incentive 
to cultural expansion of Turkey in the subject of the Russian Federation, 
which, in turn, will contribute to the realization of the long-term geo-political 
aspirations of Ankara.”’194 With a number of concerns about the internal rule 
and territories, the territorial confirmation by any external authority must have 
been welcomed by the Russian federal government. Facing these realities, 
Russia repeatedly needs the territorial confirmation from the external 
authoritative entities. The CSCE/OSCE has been satisfying such a Russian 
prerequisite as an independent state.  
 The CSCE/OSCE was also useful for preserving the post-Soviet Russia 
as a great power, if not a superpower anymore, at the start of the Federation, 
since Russia had to fix its ambiguous status in a variety of places in the 
international community in a short time. The CSCE almost immediately 
granted the newly emerged Russian seat in a Conference, since there was 
no detailed procedure for the affiliation process, like the UN, other than the 
consents of the Participating States. This helped the establishment of the 
legitimacy of Russia as a state. The ideologically triumphant West did not 
raise a question of the Russian succession even about the veto in the UN 
Security Council. The West was much more care about the total loss of 
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control over the nuclear weapons spreading the Soviet territory and would 
like to preserve Russian influence on the weapons. The West's support for 
Yeltsin was aimed at this, supposing that he would proceed a pro-Western 
foreign policy.  
 The Helsinki/CSCE/OSCE process also has an aspect of a means to 
counter against NATO for Russia. The Russian rivalry against NATO was 
originated from a fact that the Helsinki/CSCE/OSCE process was partly an 
idea to set up a regional security framework to nullify NATO and the US 
presence in the European theatre. While the Soviet vision withered away 
towards the Helsinki Final Act when NATO was firmly developing, the idea 
was resuscitated when the post-Soviet Russia needed a quiet international 
environment in the 1990s. David J. Galbreath sees this as ‘a substantial 
misperception of the Yeltsin government and spectacular failure of a key 
foreign policy objective.’195  
 In the early 1990s, however, the perception might not have looked so 
off target, since NATO was in search for a new identity after finishing its role 
as the deterrent against the Warsaw Pact, sensing the crisis of its 
institutional validity to continue. Even in the late 1990s when NATO 
enlargement to the East started lurking and the role of the alliance began to 
be explicitly renewed through the activities in the former Yugoslavia, Russian 
internal instability, with the fragile democracy and economic difficulties, 
limited Russia’s foreign policy options. Whatever it was a misperception or 
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spectacular failure, in the light of the reality that Russia did not have enough 
internal stability and resources for foreign policy, Russia’s promotion of the 
CSCE/OSCE as a means to check, if not to stop, NATO enlargement could 
not be dropped as a diplomatic game, even though it might have ended up 
as a simple attempt. Accordingly, the 1990s was a comfortable period for the 
CSCE/OSCE in dealing with Russia. Since it is a state of which the basic 
preference in making relations to others follows the distribution or projection 
of power based on physical or threatening capabilities, Russia at that period 
simply curbed its enthusiasm to overplay its presence beyond its limitation 
imposed by the internal instability and weak economy. This attitude was 
enough to make the international community, in particular the EU states, 
misunderstand that Russia was going to be a normal liberal market economy, 
even though democratisation might encounter some difficulties.  
 This expectation was betrayed. The economic fortune in the 2000s 
helped Russia think that their power was recovering and, according to the 
Russian preference of distribution or projection of power, it naturally began to 
press its unilateral demands.  
 One of the significant issues affected by the revival of the Russian anti-
Western/NATO foreign policy came in the area of the Confident and 
Seucirty-Building Measures (CSBMs) that made the OSCE ‘one of the 
central arrangements in Europe in the field of security’.196 Although the level 
of implementation may be in question, the OSCE’s CSBMs are partly 
                                            
196 Wessel, Ramses A. (1996). Towards a United Europe: A Legal 
Perspective on European Institutionalization and Integration. In: De Wilde, 
Jaap., and Håkan Wiberg, eds. Organized Anarchy in Europe: The role of 
states and intergovernmental organizations. London and New York: Tauris 
Academic Studies / I.G. Tauris Publishers, 1996. p.49. 
  258 
pursued through the Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the 
Open Sky Treaty. The CFE Treaty, which was originally signed by the Soviet 
Union in 1990 and later inherited by the Russian Federation, was a product 
of the negotiation between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Pact countries. 
However, since the CSCE/OSCE has been taking responsibility for the 
politico-military dimension in the CSCE/OSCE region that wraps up all the 
signatory countries, the OSCE is currently working as the repository of the 
CFE Treaty. The treaty, however, has been controversial in a variety of terms, 
such as the issue of the flank zone that covers the Caucasus region, the US 
plan to create bases in some of the former communist states, and the issue 
of the withdrawal of Russian troops from some FSU republics.  
 Here again, a sort of the Cold War rhetoric and mentality can be seen in 
the Russian interpretation of the situation that magnifies any US movement 
in the former sphere of influence under the Soviet Union, while the US rather 
looks at the direction of Iran or Afghanistan. At the same time, the Russian 
stand against NATO and/or the US also aims at the internal audience whom 
Vladimir Putin attempts to imbue with the image of the continual existence of 
the external threat as the reason for the unity of the Federation. Under the 
presidency of Putin, Russia declared its suspension of the CFE Treaty in 
2007 and has interpreted that the country has been released from the treaty 
obligations. The formulated verification and inspection in the treaty, therefore, 
has been suspended. It means that the OSCE’s CSBMs have been 
damaged to some extent by the impediment of the CFE Treaty. 
 The Russian defection or free riding from the OSCE is also seen in the 
issue of the "East of Vienna". As stated, it is a claim about discrimination 
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over the treatment of the post-communist states that are, on statistics, the 
exclusively selected targets of the OSCE’s activities. ‘[T]he OSCE has 
overwhelmingly remained oriented towards the East. Only recently has the 
OSCE began to observe elections in [Participating] [S]tates in the West.’197 
Of course, thinking of the OSCE’s agendas including arms control, 
democratisation and human rights, it is quite natural that the organisation has 
to target the former communist states that had not been familiar with norms, 
practices and values in democracies. Nevertheless, This fact provides 
Russia with the means to make a series of arguments in the OSCE. ‘In June 
2000, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgenii Gusarev complained that 
unnamed Western countries were trying to narrow the OSCE’s focus to 
human rights issues in the former East Bloc. He said such efforts “would 
reduce the OSCE to nothing,” and warned that Russia “will do everything to 
prevent this.”’ 198  In Vienna, on 8th July 2004, the nine FSU republics 
together issued a statement criticising the OSCE, which is supposed to be ‘at 
Moscow’s instigation’. It ‘charged that the OSCE “does not respect such 
fundamental … principles…as noninterference in internal affairs and respect 
for national sovereignty,” and that it is guilty of double standards by focusing 
“selective attention on certain states while ignoring problems in other states.” 
It claimed that the OSCE’s humanitarian activities are restricted to 
“monitoring the human rights situation in the countries of the CIS and former 
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Yugoslavia,” and that this almost exclusive focus on the human rights 
dimension “significantly restricts” its ability to counter new challenges and 
threats.’ 199  ‘The statement further targeted the OSCE’s Warsaw-based 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), noting that its 
primary activity of election monitoring is frequently “politicized and fails to 
take into account the specifics of individual countries.” Over the past decade, 
ODIHR monitoring missions have criticized as failing to meet European 
standards most of the ballots, both parliamentary and presidential, in all the 
nine states that signed the condemnation.’200  
 The theory of the "East of Vienna" phenomena, however, is a part of 
the efforts by the Russian-led "East of Vienna" countries to deny the current 
on-going construction of the R2P state sovereignty and resuscitate the 
traditional Westphalian state sovereignty. To some extent, Russian 
adherence on the Westphalian state sovereignty is its traditional mistrust on 
the West and Western influence over Russia. If the R2P state sovereignty is 
completely legitimated and external interference become an international 
norm, Russia, which traditionally has a despicable record of human rights 
throughout its history, must be put into a very uncomfortable position within 
the OSCE and the international community. In particular, the governing 
regime in Russia tends to seek impunity or non-accountability that is an idea 
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on power in the Russian sense fostered by the history which has almost no 
democratic period. The preference is so strong that the siloviki regime has 
re-established after the confusion of the 1990s and Russia has lost an 
opportunity to be democratic. 
 On the contrary, the return to the Westphalian state sovereignty may 
cause the diminishment of the human dimension of the OSCE, human 
security in the international community, and human rights in Russia and the 
non-democratic CIS states. Russia’s criticism against the OSCE’s approach 
to the “East of Vienna” is a Russian method for pushing the agenda for 
recovering the Westphalian state sovereignty at the international level. 
 One of the most visible resistance by Russia against the OSCE in 
relation to the questions of state sovereignty is probably the OSCE’s election 
monitor mission for the 2008 Russian presidential election. The Russian 
government ostensibly delayed to issue the entry visa for the mission, even 
though it had been cleared just before the election when it was too late for 
the OSCE. The "delay" effectively shut out the OSCE's mission.  
 One of the negative effects in the process over the issue of the "East of 
Vienna" or the Russian resistance against the R2P state sovereignty is that 
Russia has set an example to demote an international/regional organisation 
and actually provides a model how to resist against external interference. It 
shows an example that a free-riding state can remain the organisation that 
institutionalised and legalised the interference adopting the R2P state 
sovereignty, while it denounces the idea and practice of the state sovereignty. 
This model is very attractive for the CIS states that participate in the OSCE 
and are still lagging behind the progress of democratisation and human 
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rights. Since Russia had been very carefully disguising as a democracy with 
dodging questioning, it also presents a model of how to pretend to be a 
democracy without really becoming a democracy with remaining within 
international/regional organisations that urge democratisation.  
 While these CIS states may be a minor problem due to the scale of the 
states in the political and economic aspects in comparison to Russia, the 
OSCE has to be careful, since, as Kazakhstan took the Chairmanship in 
2010 and Ukraine takes it in 2013, the organisation is now stepping into a 
phase where such minor states start taking some important positions of 
leadership in the organisation. In the 1990s, the positions were carefully 
taken by the Western states which were mature democracies with stable 
economies. Due to its “ostensible” rotation system, the positions have been 
gradually opened for the former communist states in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the 2000s. Nevertheless, they were pro-Western and more or less 
positive about liberal democracy, having lured by the carrot of EU 
membership and its benefits. The CIS states have not had such an incentive 
for becoming or ability to become liberal democracies and following Western 
precedence. Now, such non-democracies have begun taking representative 
and managerial positions in the OSCE. Is the process going to cause a 
qualitative change of the OSCE and reduce its commitment to the common 
and comprehensive security?  
 The Chairman-in-Office (CiO) is ‘the most prominent representative of 
the OSCE’, in particular in the function of agenda-setting. ‘The CiO … 
dictates an agenda for the OSCE while that [P]articipating [S]tate holds the 
CiO position.’ Although there are other forces setting the organisational 
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agendas, ‘[t]he CiO is the key agenda-setter within the OSCE.’201 At a time 
when a non-democratic state takes the Chairmanship, like Kazakhstan which 
has never held ‘an election [judged] free and fair [by the OSCE]’,202 does 
such a state not reverse the progress that has been made during the last two 
decades? There is a certain expectation that Kazakhstan, which possesses a 
poor record on human rights, may be encouraged by the vested 
responsibility of Chairmanship as a sign of the organisational recognition for 
the state, and make progress in that field during its Chairmanship and Troika. 
At the same time, there is a certain doubt about how much the honour of the 
Chairmanship can change a non-democratic state’s behaviour just because 
of the honour. Kazakhstan is one of the nine states which joined the criticism 
of the OSCE’s bias on the “East of Vienna” along with Russia in 2004, as 
stated above, which implied Kazakh discontent about the OSCE’s “intrusive” 
activities as a breach of (the Westphalian) state sovereignty. Under the 
Chairmanship of such a non-democratic state, can the quality of the OSCE’s 
common and comprehensive peace and security be preserved? It is 
reasonable to raise a concern about how much the non-democratic states of 
the CIS region have the will to follow the paradigm of the post-modern state 
sovereignty, rather than the Westphalian state sovereignty, and tackle the 
human dimension. In his video address in January 2010, President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan (as the OSCE Chairmanship state) seems to be 
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more comfortable for talking about commitment to the politico-military 
dimension, in particular, in the Asian area of the OSCE as the issue of inter-
state relations. He does not forget to refer to the issue of the “East of Vienna” 
and criticise the ‘[stereotyping] of the “former Soviet republics” [that 
continues] to dominate the minds of some of [the] OSCE partners’, saying 
that Kazakhstan has ‘almost 20 years of experience of integration into the 
global democratic community.’203 Is the negative stereotyping a Western 
imagination or the reality of the CIS states?  
 Despite such a concern, it is impossible to continue to pass the 
Chairmanship within the limited number of the mature liberal democratic 
states in the organisation in order to preserve a certain degree of unity. The 
2010s will be a test for the OSCE if it continues to be innovative and intrusive 
in the human dimension and the post-modern state sovereignty regime. 
Moreover, there may be another concern about how Russia may use its 
influence on the CIS states in organisational politics, when one of the states 
takes the Chairmanship or Troika, in order to press its national interests. 
 Russia is, after all, a regional great power, and the geography counts in 
Eurasia, the OSCE and the international community. The influence matters. 
While Europe is generally in the post-modern world, the pre-modern or 
modern Russia lying the edge of the Eastern Europe permanently imposes 
the Russian version of peace and security paradigm in which Russia 
occupies a special position and dictates the other states’ course of action. 
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Therefore, it is an important task to tame the Russian values which may be 
adversary against the Western and the current international standards of 
values that are working as the foundation of the rule of law in the 
international community.  
 It is not easy to change the preferences of a state which emerge from 
the history and culture and roughly set the behavioural patterns. In the case 
of Russia, its xenophobia, nationalism and rivalry to the West are a reflection 
of the loose borders, the sense of the chosen one inheriting the Eastern 
Christianity from the Byzantine Empire and the schism between the Eastern 
Orthodox and the Western Latin Church in Christianity that is still ongoing, 
starting from about a millennium ago.204 The accumulation of these factors 
makes the hard shell of a Russian preference which demands impunity from 
external forces. Nevertheless, as long as it is impossible to change the 
geopolitical reality, taming Russia is a key for the regional security of the 
greater Europe and Eurasia. 
 
4.3.1. Prospect  
 
Can the OSCE tame the Russian enthusiasm to (over)play the role of a great 
power in the world, and make the state, at least, more democratic, human 
rights abiding and a rule of law follower? It is never easy to reason and 
persuade the ruling elites of a state which is run by the distribution or project 
of power, realist thinking and the rivalry mind set to the West to adopt the 
nearly opposite norms, practices and values. Ideally, if the adoption will be 
done, the reasoning and persuasion should not be associated with a sense 
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of loss of their side but a simple choice. Therefore, keeping the contact with 
the elites at the diplomatic level is a means to continue to inspiring them. Yet, 
the elites are a collection of individuals who must be getting more benefits 
than others from the current power structure of the state and quite hard to 
agree to the change of any part of it.  
 The Russia's siloviki ruling elites, in particular the FSB personnel, may 
be a huge headache for the OSCE's human security scheme and the project 
of democratic peace. The FSB personnel seem to have a kind of the mind 
set which sustains the current Russia — a sense of obligation or the chosen 
one to keep the stability of society. Nikolai Patrushev, then the director of the 
FSB, once described the mind set as a “New Nobility.”205 For those who 
have the mentality, the current order — some may call the power vertical — 
is the one to protect but not the Western style of democracy. To carry out the 
obligation, extrajudicial methods are, in their sense, allowed.  
 Some parts of the Russian business community have also benefitted 
from the exclusion policy of foreign companies’ activities in Russia. The 
energy sector is the source of the Russia's national budget and a vanguard 
of the Russian sovereign economy, even occasionally accepting some 
losses for the direction of Russian foreign policy. The losses are a payment 
for occupying a position of patriots. Thus, the Russian government can stop 
the gas and oil supply to the East European countries when it likes to harass 
these countries for some reasons. These groups in the elites share interests 
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and a sense of honour in the continuation of the current regime and system. 
Therefore, some Russian watchers recently start using a term, a “Deep 
State",206 which is originally made for explaining the Turkish politics.  
 Thus, something extra is necessary to cause impetus of the regime 
change. Is there the something?  As suggested so far, what made Russian 
foreign policy aggressive and unilateral during the 2000s is evaporating or 
weakening in the 2010s. 
 First, it is its economy. Russia is not and will not be as rich as it was 
due to a 180 degree turn of the international energy market due to the Shale 
Revolution. Although Russia will remain as an energy big power, the 
powerfulness will never be the same again. While there are some concerns 
over environmental problems by the technology, the Shale technology has 
started changing the map of energy resources and the energy prices in 
particular natural gas that are falling or keep staying without a clear prospect 
of the raise. While Putin promised to increase the state expenditure in the 
presidential election 2012, this promise requires $130 per barrel of the oil 
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price.207 The price is currently almost $93. Then, the price may significantly 
fall, like the one seen just after the Georgian War and the Lehman Shock. 
The governmental spending is already the 40% of the Russian GDP.208 
Without a clear prospect of the state income, Russia is in difficulty to 
continue spending the governmental money to buy the people’s royalty and 
push the aggressive and unilateral foreign policy towards the neighbouring 
countries. Russia under the Medvedev planed to increase the military 
spending. It is rumoured that this is a reason why Alexei Kudrin resigned 
from the financial minister thinking of the budgetary viability. The siloviki 
regime has made Russia a kleptocracy. Without reducing the volume of 
corruption and stolen money from the national budget, Russia cannot avoid 
the budgetary crisis.  
 Second, the biggest asset among the political assets to rule Russia is 
popularity. Since Putin’s benevolent Tsar-like popularity has lost and the 
mass demonstrations and complains towards the government are becoming 
more visible, the phenomena may have started triggering the sift of the 
political power distribution among the siloviki. Among the siloviki, Putin has 
been playing the head of the class, since his popularity was so high, even 
though there were some speculations that his popularity was carefully 
constructed with the coordinated efforts of propaganda, fabrication of 
information and the dramatisation of social instability like the Russian 
apartment bombings in 1999 by the Russian intelligent service. His popularity 
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has been allowing him to behave like an absolute Tsar. This popularity 
cannot be seen anymore. Therefore, Putin now has to  play a balance of 
power politics, taking care of his oppositions among the political elites. While 
the grass-root oppositions can be silenced by the state authorities without 
risk, that is not the case against the other siloviki elites. With the weakening 
Putin in the last couple of years, Russian politics seems to have entered into 
a new phase.  
 Russian aggressive and unilateral foreign policy is a product of Putin’s 
leadership. The weakening of his political power, with the economic difficulty, 
means that it is likely that Russian foreign policy shifts to more moderate a 
mode. Russian foreign policy tends to be run by the mixture of realism and 
the aspiration of Russian specialness and greatness. When the assets to 
push the aspiration is under a low-supply, realism comes on top.  
 This is a good prospect for the OSCE and the international community. 
It opens an opportunity to bring Russia to the long term process to reason 
and persuade. Looking at the realistically diplomatic and organisational 
assets, the OSCE itself does not have much leverage to forcefully open 
Russia no matter how many human rights abuses are observable or how 
much Russia’s democratic institutions are suffering from the lack of 
accountability and transparency. Therefore, in the current opportunity that 
the changes of the environment surrounding the Putin regime, the OSCE 
should invest more energy and focus to the Russian problem.  
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 Russia is not an official problem of the OSCE. However, as a politically-
binding and consent-based organisation, containing a state of which the 
value system is so contrasting is slowly consuming the organisational 
coherency. While the OSCE is supposed to work for the CFE Treaty, 
democratisation or human rights, Russian behavioural resistance not only 
shuts out the OSCE's commitment to Russia but also separates the CIS 
states from the OSCE values. It hinders the OSCE from performing the 
planned functions.  
 The Russian problem is not limited to the OSCE. It also can be seen in 
the current Syrian Crisis and the related discussions in the UN where Russia 
predictably sticks with the theory of the Westphalian state sovereignty and is 
resisting any meaningful UN Security Council resolutions to intervene the 
civil war. The UN under its Charter is prescribed the organisational functions 
to work for not only inter-state relations but also human rights. Nevertheless, 
Russia, as well as China, in the UN Security Council almost always stands in 
the side of the protection of the Westphalian state sovereignty rather than 
human rights. The development of the R2P state sovereignty has been 
blocked by the two regional great powers and the veto members of the UN. 
The resistance disengages the UN from what is expected. In the light of the 
legal theory of the implied power,209 the protection and promotion of human 
rights stand above the state sovereignty. The UN’s immobility over the 
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possible peace operations caused by the two regional great powers let the 
organisation fail to work for the raison d’être  of the organisation and tarnish 
the prospect of peace.  
 At the same time, however, in the 21st century when human rights have 
become an international standard, the Russian behaviour in the UN Security 
Council may simply construct a negative reputation. Other than opposing the 
Western Security Council veto members, Russia does not propose any 
viable plan to lead peace in conflicts. In the case of the Syrian Crisis, it 
inevitably leads a speculation that Russia stands on the side of the 
government of Syria since it is a good customer of the Russian weapons for 
a long time. Any excuse that Russia presents is judged with the undeniable 
fact and reduces the Russia’s ethical position in the international 
community.210 Since the time is not the period of the Cold War, the space 
that ethic and moral in argumentation can work in the international 
community is larger than before, seen in the development of humanitarian 
intervention and the R2P state sovereignty. Russia is losing this ground 
when the economic environment is in difficulty and its military power cannot 
be equivalent to the Soviet one.  
 The ethical and moral argument to check, if not accuse, Russia in any 
international organisations is a means to reason and persuade Russia. In 
particular, the OSCE which is primarily working for human rights and 
democracy is one of the biggest focuses of the international elites. In such a 
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stage, a Russian preference of aspiration to be regarded as a great or 
special in some sense is a quite useful leverage for the OSCE which does 
not possess physical assets, rather than ethnical and moral ones, for 
diplomacy. Russia may not have an identical value system to the West. 
Nevertheless, it at least has an understanding of human rights. That makes a 
contrast to China where the most of the people, except the intellectuals, do 
not have an idea and are unaware of it. The OSCE can gently urge Russia 
that respect comes from following the rule of law, agreements and the 
founding ideas and principles of the organisation rather than breaking them, 
as long as it affiliates to the organisation. The OSCE’s norms, practices, and 
values are the public goods of the international community that Russia is 
unable to provide even for the Russians in Russia. Russia is not capable of 
producing an alternative. That is a limitation of the state run by the rule of the 
small number of the powerful. It may produce a set of common goods for the 
small elites, but not for the greater number of the Russians. The OSCE and 
other European regional organisations can offer these things for the ordinary 
Russians, if the government allows to engage in Russian internal affairs.  
 A problem is that the OSCE’s leadership does not engage in this 
Russian problem. The OSCE’s leadership, the position of the Chairman in 
Office (CIO), is rotated yearly and handed over one by one among the 
Participating States. Usually, the CIO is led by the foreign minister of the CIO 
state of the year and sets the agendas. This frequently changing leadership 
may be understandable in the light of equality among the Participating States. 
Nevertheless, it may not be ideal to deal with prolonged and lasting issues. 
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While the agendas of institutionally set projects and missions are distributed 
to the OSCE’s appropriate sections to make them commit permanently, the 
Russian problem, which is unofficial yet important, just slips out of the 
organisational focus, in particular the years when the CIS states are taking 
the role of the CIO.  
 This suggests that the Russian problem in the OSCE is not 
systematically engaged and attempted to solve. Among the diplomats, the 
issue may be talked and that may create a certain pressure against the free-
rider of the organisational framework. Nevertheless, at the level or 
organisation, there can be seen no so much means to, for example, punish 
or expel the regional great power, while the theory of cooperation suggests 
that the immediate punishment against a defector is the best strategy to 
extract cooperation. At the operational level and in dealing with the clear 
cases of human rights violation, the OSCE has procedures in the names of 
“mechanisms” to shut out the state in question to participate the 
organisational decisions for the actions. However, like the Russian problem, 
when a problem somehow falls into a black hall of politics in international 
organisations, it seems to be quite difficult to problematise the problem.  
 One of the common black hall issues of international organisations is 
the expulsion of a members when the organisations find a defecting state 
from the principles of them. It is a grey area. Suspension of membership, 
whatever forcefully or voluntarily, may be observable, like the former 
Yugoslavia case of the OSCE in the 1990s. Yet, among the OSCE, the EU 
and the UN, there is no articles or documents actually referring to the 
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procedures and principles in particular when a member of these international 
organisations clearly disagree to or violate the organisational principles, 
norms, and values of the organisations. Like the UN's budgetary problem of 
non-payment, when a problem is quite operational and practical, it seems 
that the organisations are able to regulate. When a problem is a matter of 
principles, norms and values, it seems to be very difficult to set and impose a 
set of standards to punish a defector.  
 This is a huge flaw of international institutions and organisations, since 
this means that international organisations currently do not possess the 
ultimate disciplinary measure to punish the participants. Overlooking a 
number of defectors may end up the breaking up of international institutional 
arrangements, like the European Monetary System (EMS) that is under a 
huge pressure right now due to the violation of the regulations of the system 
which has produced a great amount of debts of the South European states 
and the institutional failure of punishing the violators on time.  
 As a politically-binding organisation, the OSCE may not be enough 
solid and united to counter against the defectors of the organisational 
principles, norms and values. Nevertheless, observing other 
international/regional institutions and organisations in working in the field of 
international peace and security, the elites of international politics (therefore, 
mainly the Western elites) in history have not dared to take a look over the 
necessity of punishment regulation. Probably, this is a reminiscent of the 
past great power politics where delicate issues were always dealt with 
negotiation among the powers and international/regional institutions and 
organisations were more purely a reflection of the distribution or projection of 
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their power. The issues dealt with such the old regime were largely inter-
state issues and picked up by political convenience. 
 The current elites working in international institutions and organisations 
do not seem to be aware of that their normalised practices are allowing the 
continuation of great power politics inside the institutions and organisations 
over some delicate issues. However, the contemporary international 
institutions and organisation in this field has adopted more systematic and 
regular approaches to not only inter-state issues but also internal affairs 
related to human rights and democracy. The more systematic and regular 
approaches have increased the necessity of the institutional/organisational 
autonomy instead the great power politics. Questioning and punishing the 
free-riding or defection of the great powers in the institutions/organisations 
will be a further expansion of the autonomy.  
 Then, in the case of Russia in the OSCE, what is the core of the issue 
is not that Russia is free-riding or defecting, but that the OSCE does not 
have a rule on this point. As the post-modern regional organisation, the 
OSCE rather has the rule of law in managing the organisation and its 
activities. Yet, questioning and punishing the organisational value violators 
are in the hand of politics within the organisation. One of the enemies of the 
rule of law is a lack of punishment. There may be recognition of the Russian 
problem and the Russian guilty. Yet, there is no way of punishing in the light 
of the organisational rules. Therefore, reasoning and persuading Russia to fit 
to the OSCE’s norms, practices and values need external circumstances with 
which the OSCE can play politics towards Russia. This is not ideal. However, 
the expansion of the organisational autonomy does not come by immediately.  
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 And this time, the OSCE should utilise the current given opportunity, 
though the organisational political will to do that is in doubt. If Russia accepts 
and starts emulating the OSCE’s values in a genuine sense, rewards may be 
great. It is not only that the OSCE gains the coherency of the organisational 
norms, practices and values, but also that European peace and security is 
enhanced, the CIS states follow more actively the Western model of 
governing and improvement of human rights can be expected in the OSCE 
region.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
Russia is a case. The course of the value war between the OSCE with the 
post-modern values and Russia with the pre-modern/modern values has 
been a long way and will be a long way. Denis Sandole notes, ‘the Russian 
Federation is a partner of Europe, but also a rival of Europe.’ Nevertheless, 
the geographical and geopolitical circumstances do not allow the post-
modern Europe to detach from or drop Russia in the scheme of 
international/regional peace and security. ‘Russia is too big, too powerful to 
be digested in a European arrangement. Perhaps we need a new “Congress 
of Vienna” to sort this out.’211  
 If one carefully assesses the current circumstances surrounding Russia, 
however, some factors that had made Russia complacency have gone, and 
Russian starts being forced to pay the deficit of the complacency in the 
                                            
211 Sandole, Dennis J.D. (2007) Peace and Security in the Postmodern 
World: The OSCE and Conflict Resolution. London and New York: Routledge. 
p.165. 
  277 
2000s. Its energy resources are not enough expensive to sustain the 
Russian national budget, while the behaviours towards the near abroad and 
European states during the 2000s have firmly seeded suspicion, mistrust and 
caution in the international community. Russia the realist knows that its 
military might cannot be recovered to the Soviet level overnight and Russian 
value system or logic of appropriateness cannot be universal or the 
common/public goods of the international community as the Western value 
system has partially become so.  
 The OSCE, therefore, can find out a great opportunity to invite Russia 
and persuade the civilisation to adopt and adjust the international and 
universal values with following the OSCE’s principles, norms, practice and 
values. The OSCE is now facing such a rare opportunity to hold the new 
“Congress of Vienna” for the 21st century. Lamentably, the OSCE is the one 
which does not realise and is indifferent to the opportunity. The organisation 
is just letting the opportunity go. Unlike its innovative and proactive measures 
on real conflicts for regional peace and security, it is so responsive towards 
the political manoeuvre inside the organisation by the Participating States. If 
the OSCE’s leadership is enough tactical and strategical for the political 
game, it would reduce a number of obstacles and burdens for forging 
cooperation for the OSCE’s regional peace and security. While it is probably 
impossible to change the annal rotation system of the Chairmanship, the 
organisation needs an institutional mechanise to concentrate on the Russian 
problem with a middle/long term commitment, before the organisation 
completely lose the organisational coherency towards the raison d’être of the 
organisation.  
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5: The Caucasian Frozen 
Conflicts and the OSCE 
 
The OSCE has been engaging in and unable to make a clear breakthrough 
over some “originally violent but currently dormant conflicts” in the covering 
region, which are often called the frozen conflicts. They are namely the 
conflicts of Transdniester in Moldova, the Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, 
and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. The incipiency of these conflicts 
drags the legacy of the Soviet Union, and the die-hard imperialistic mind of 
Russia has made these conflicts difficult to resolve. Except Transdniester, 
the conflicts are located in the Caucasus region. The Russia’s North 
Caucasus region is also infamous as a hot spot of violent conflicts, 
represented by Chechnya. In effect, all these trouble spots are involved with 
geopolitics – a new great game – concerned with energy security and 
strategy of a number of states. 
 In the chapter about Russia, it is suggested that the current Russia is 
defecting and influencing the CIS states in the way that it collapses the 
coherency of the OSCE’s principles, norms, practices and values. That 
negativity also reaches to the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities. 
The frozen conflicts in the Caucasus present a set of the examples. 
 In the 1990s, the CSCE/OSCE played a greater role in the post-conflict 
stage and earned some reputation over the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia. 
Behind the scene, on the contrary, all conflicts in the post-Soviet Union had 
remained unsolved or “frozen” without reaching the post-conflict stages. 
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Although there are sometimes news about the meetings related to mediation 
within the OSCE’s framework, the peace talks are basically in deadlock and 
struggle to find out a way out. About the paralysis, Karel de Gucht, the 2006 
Chiarman-in-Office (CiO) from Belgian said that that ‘[t]his situation [was] 
detrimental to the overall credibility of our Organization.’212 While the peace 
talks are stack, like Stephen Blank or Brian Whitmore, there are some who 
warn that ‘the … frozen conflicts along the peripheries of the former Soviet 
Union are now unfreezing and could incite further ethno-political conflicts 
there, if not elsewhere.’213 An illustration can be seen in the Georgian War in 
2008 between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia. 
 The Caucasus region is a backyard of Russia. It is a territory of the pre-
modern world and outside of the reach of the EU and the frontline of NATO. 
It is also a region that geopolitics counts more than any other OSCE areas. 
Geopolitics is probably a game that the OSCE is not good at playing since it 
is a regional organisation, while Russia is more capable of doing since it is 
the regional superpower power in the Caucasus and a regional great power 
in the greater Caucasus and European regions. Traditionally, in geopolitics, 
physical assets of international relations, such as military power, are 
regarded as a large source of leverage to control situation. The OSCE does 
not have military power at its will, while other state actors in the conflicts 
have. Russia has a larger one. Yet, the US may exert its power through 
NATO. 
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 Although it may depend on the future course of the Shale Revolution, 
energy security has been lurking in the region, so that some external state 
and commercial actors are lured by potential interests in the Caucasus. The 
Caucasus is also concerned with stability/instability of the Middle East, in 
particular Turkey, Syria and Iran. This is a pivotal part of international peace 
and security. Thus, the frozen conflicts need to be more actively understood 
and dealt with. 
 Who takes care of them? In fact, this is a big problem in the frozen 
conflicts, since the state actors in or surrounding the conflicts do not have a 
real plan for peace or are not always interested in resolving the conflicts. 
Rather, the continuation of the frozen condition may present bigger interests 
for some actors in the aspect of geopolitics. At the same time, the real and 
lasting resolution of the conflicts may require the resolution of all conflicts to 
simultaneously occur, rather than a “one by one” approach, since there are 
some conditions interacting each other. 
 Following the frozen conflicts, this chapter examines why the OSCE 
keeps failing to make either a breakthrough or progress on conflict resolution, 
how much the pre-modern and modern features of international relations 
stabilises the structure of the conflicts, and why, even so, the organisation 
has an importance in mediation as a potential provider of a public, if not 
common, good. Although Transdniester is not completely discarded, this 
chapter in general focuses on the Caucasus. The complexity of the 
Caucasus conflicts has been multiplied by the 21st century’s geopolitics in 
the last decade. While they look disconnected at a glance, they are more or 
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less connected under the regional system. And, inconveniently, the 
resolution of one of the conflicts seems to require the resolutions of all 
conflicts in the region. That is a daunting task. 
 
5.1: The Frozen Conflicts 
 
The Caucasus region consists of two areas, the South and North. Russia 
occupies the North Caucasus, and other five countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Turkey and Iran) are in the South. The Russian North Caucasus, 
which is also a large source of Russian instability, contains Chechnya, 
Dagestan, Ingushetia, Adyghea, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, 
Karasnodar krai and Stavnopol krai. In the South, Georgia holds two 
separatist regions: Abkazia and South Ossetia to which Russia grants the 
recognition of the independent state status, and Azerbaijan contains 
Nagorno-Karabakh on which Armenia lingers. In the OSCE, what are called 
the frozen conflicts are the conflicts in the two Georgian separatist regions 
that are Abkhazia and South Ossetia which are currently the self-claimed 
independent states sponsored by Russia and Nagorno-Karabakh which is 
technically belonging to Azerbaijan but strongly connected to Armenia at the 
level of ethnicity, religion and politics. All of them used to be parts of the 
Soviet Union. 
 There may be some who like to include the conflict in Chechnya in the 
list of the frozen conflicts. This is probably proper to do for understanding 
closely the whole picture of the frozen conflicts which are indirectly, invisibly 
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and partially interacting. However, if the proposition comes to a negotiation 
table, Russia, as a Participating State of the consensus-based regional 
organisation of the OSCE and a strong supporter of the Westphalian state 
sovereignty, uses the veto to oppose the OSCE’s commitment to its own 
internal issues. This happened to the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya 
that ended in the end of 2002. The organisational politics bars the inclusion 
Russia’s problems into the OSCE. Therefore, Chechnya and other North 
Caucasian republics in Russia are in a grey zone from the international eyes. 
Yet, there are rumours that, while Chechnya has been “cosmetically” 
restored from the devastated conflict landscape, a neighbouring Daghestan 
has a series of terrorism of which the level of instability could be worse than 
the warring areas of Syrian which is currently in a civil war.214 
 The backgrounds of the frozen conflicts developed over decades. They 
are quite extensive and complicated. That is a part of the reasons why the 
conflicts are so difficult to find a lasting resolution other than freezing them. 
The very prolonged history on the growth of the would-be conflicts has set up 
some sets of sub-structures that together work for spoiling the efforts for the 
peace processes.  
 There are, at least, two major sets of the sub-structures that have made 
the conflicts so complicated in the Soviet history; the Bolshevik territorial 
policy and the Soviet nationality questions. Fundamentally, the Soviet 
authorities gave a birth of the modern Caucasian states and the seeds of the 
current conflicts. 
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 The frozen conflicts began with perestroika and glasnosti in which 
Gorbachev encouraged the mood of freedom of speech in the late 1980s. 
With the mood, the Soviet peoples started talking about the contradictions of 
the Soviet system including the “voluntary but coerced” federal system. In the 
end, the criticism on the Soviet system and Moscow’s authorities turned into 
explosions of violence in many Soviet Republics. The current frozen conflicts 
were some of them. This means that, although the contemporary violence 
began since the later period of perestroika, the seeds had already been 
planted much before the problems emerged. The Soviet iron rule, however, 
had been capable of dodging the questions of the distorted Soviet system for 
a long time. Perestroika, whatever Gorbachev’s intention and belief of the 
Soviet communism were, transformed the questions into conflicts between 
the Soviet authorities and the locals in the Soviet republics. The Soviet 
federal system began with the Bolshevik territorial policy after the Russian 
Revolution. 
 
5.1.1. The Bolshevik Territorial Policy 
 
All Former Soviet Union (FSU) republics containing the frozen conflicts have 
the history of independence before they were incorporated into the Soviet 
Union. The areas were quelled and distributed the land demarcations by the 
Bolsheviks in the 1920s, including the now frozen conflict zones – Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. It is generally understood that the 
Bolshevik’s policy intended to seed instability in the peripheral regions in 
order to prevent them from uniting and challenging Moscow’s rule. In the light 
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of the current situations over these conflict zones, it can be judged that the 
Bolshevik’s policy appropriately served for its purpose. 
 After the Russian Revolution and the victory of the Bolsheviks over 
Georgia, which had enjoyed a short-lived independence with the Mensheviks 
resisting against the communists, Abkhazia became a full Union republic in 
March 1921. Then, it ‘was attached to Georgia by contract as a treaty 
republic’, and ‘further demoted to that of an Autonomous Republic within 
Georgia, which at that time was still a part of the [Transcaucasian] Soviet 
Federal Socialist Republic.’215 Like the imperial Russia, the Bolsheviks also 
manipulated the regional demography for the control of the area. The 
settlement of Mingrelians in Abkhazia ‘dramatically [decreased] the Abkhaz 
share of the population’ in the 1920s and 1930s. In addition, the ‘Soviet 
Georgianization policy, especially in the 1930s under Lavrentii Beria, 
enforced the spread of Georgian language and culture.’216 These historical 
backgrounds imply an Abkhaz caution on both Russia and Georgia. It may 
welcome Russian support when it faces Tbilisi’s rule, while it is not so clear 
how much Abkhazes are willing to embrace Russia. Abkhazia has been 
insisting its recognition for independence rather than incorporation into 
Russia since the end of the Soviet Union.  
 On the contrary, South Ossetia – the other Georgian breakaway region 
– has expressed its willingness to integrate into Russia by uniting with its 
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neighbouring brother in Russia, North Ossetia. ‘Ossetians were the only 
Christians, and … consistently an ally of Moscow’s during the entire 19th 
century. It is not [a] coincidence that the colonization of Georgia in the early 
1800s took place via the Ossetian corridor in the central Caucasus.’217 Thus, 
a historical cause of antagonism between Georgians and Ossetians had 
already taken root in the 19th century. After taking control of the region, the 
Bolsheviks divided the Osseitan land into two, and South Ossetia became an 
Autonomous oblast in April 1922 after a Federal Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics of Transcaucasis was formed in March, while North Ossetia 
remained in the Soviet Russia. Many interpret the Bolshevik policy as a tactic 
to plant instability in Georgia.  
 As the process of the collapse of the Soviet Union speeded up, South 
Ossetia started stressing the will of independence from Georgia. Georgian 
forces fought a war against South Ossetia region in the end of 1991, over 
which the current South Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity, ‘wants an 
admission of “genocide” from the Georgian leader’.218 Further, Kokoity has 
been clear about his hope ‘to annex some parts of Georgia’, saying that the 
‘“native Ossetian land … for unclear reasons in the Soviet period” [was] not 
included in the territory of the region.’219 Taking into account a close relation 
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between Kokoity and Moscow, and a short distance to the Georgian capital 
Tbilisi, South Ossetia can be seen as a convenient pawn for Russia 
whenever it aims to destabilise Georgia. 
 Some may regard Nagorno-Karabakh as the Caucasian version of 
Israel, since, in sometime in the regional history, Armenians were few, if not 
none, in the area. ‘[T]he Georgians and Azeris point to the configuration of 
their principalities and khanates at the beginning of the 19th century to 
demonstrate that Armenia has no place in the South Caucasus at all. The 
borders were carved out by bayonet.’220 Under the Russian imperial rule 
after Persia conceded the area to the Russian empire in 1923, the Muslims 
left for Persia, while Armenians in Persia were encouraged to come to 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, until the arrival of the Soviet rule, it is possible to 
interpret that the demography of the area had turned favourable for the 
Armenians, though there is no reliable data for that. This, however, does not 
change an Azeri “faith” on Nagorno-Karabakh. It is like Kosovo for Serbs. 
‘There is no question that Azerbaijan will [n]ever recognize the loss of 
Nagorno-Karabakh.’ Thus, ‘[i]t even seems unlikely that they will lift the 
blockade on Armenia’221 if a peace plan implies the possibility of the loss of 
the land in any form.  
 Like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh was also a 
subject to the territorial manipulation by the Bolsheviks. Armenia and 
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Azerbaijan enjoyed a brief period of independence after WWI, while they 
were in dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. The imposition of the Bolshevik rule 
came in 1920. It was followed by ‘[t]he subsequent territorial disposition by 
the Caucasian Bureau of the Bolshevik Party, which awarded both Nagorno-
Karabakh and Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan’.222 While Nagorno-Karabakh is 
currently the Azeri version of “Kosovo for Serbs,” this attachment can be 
seen as a product of the Soviet policy over the region. Azeri national 
consciousness was not so clear, if existed, in the beginning of the Soviet rule. 
The Soviet era fostered Azeri’s attachment over the Soviet-drawn territory. 
With ‘the decay of Communist ideology’ in the latter stage of the Soviet 
Union, the territorial unit ‘promoted a build-up of ethnic consciousness and 
nationalistic tendencies in Azerbaijan.’ Dmitry Furman and Carl Johan 
Åsenius note that ‘[h]ad Moscow [decided] to include Nagorno-Karabakh in 
Armenia in the period between World War I and World War II, Azeri 
resistance [to hold the territory] would have been weak.’223 On the contrary, 
Armenians inevitably interpreted the Soviet territorial policy as unfair. They 
also believed that the distribution of wealth by the Soviet authority was 
heavily in favour of Azerbaijan in particular over the investment of 
infrastructure (mainly for oil and gas extraction). The demographic shrinking 
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of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan convinced them of the 
“correctness” of the Armenian interpretation of the situation.  
 It is true that there are traditional differences between the two peoples, 
especially over the religion and ethnicity. Both peoples have each naturally 
fostered their each stereotype images. While Armenians take Azeri’s Muslim 
identity as a source of their violent character, Azeris tend to interpret 
Armenian nature as aggressive without extending their understanding of 
Armenian psychology.224  
 The conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh, nevertheless, cannot escape from 
the fact that the policy of the Soviet Union played a large part in creating this 
conflict. It has set up conceptually a mind set of all parties to the conflict that 
does not allow them to “compromise” on any tiny piece of the land in 
question. The Soviet background virtually narrows, if not closes, the 
negotiating space for peace brokers, whoever do the job, in providing a plan 
of the land demarcation for peace.  
 Traditionally, land is the foundation for economic activities, producing 
foods and profits through lending/renting it. In the pre-modern world, the 
attachment to land or territory as an economic means, if not as a subject of 
nationalism, is probably stronger than in the post-modern world. The rule of 
law is too weak to provide the guarantee of the property rights and external 
physical threats, like military invasion. Violence to take lands is quite realistic 
even today in the pre-modern world. Therefore, in any territorial conflicts, the 
factor of the attachment to the disputed land is a trouble in peace processes. 
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In the case of the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus, this factor had been 
already enhanced by the Soviet policy. Then, this means that the parties to 
the frozen conflicts had become already self-help and realist actors who just 
look at what they have or do not have like a zero-sum game over the land.  
 
5.1.2. Soviet Nationality Questions and Perestroika 
 
Another major seed of the current frozen conflicts planted during the Soviet 
period is the question on the Soviet identity. Communism theoretically 
ignores the difference of ethnicities. Therefore, the national identity needs to 
be replaced with other type of identities and the sense of unity of a 
communist county should be built up with it. A communist state should be a 
state but not a nation. Therefore, the communist theoretical demand 
necessitated the CPSU to produce the identity of the “Soviet Man” – an 
overarching identity ‘to transform all the conquered nations into one Soviet 
people speaking a meagre and distorted Russian language.’225 
 Nonetheless, it is hard to say that the artificial logic and policy of the 
“Soviet Man” had solved the Soviet nationality questions and the incoherency 
of the policy. The Bolshevik target in the 1920s was the problem of Russian 
chauvinism. The 12th Party Congress in 1923, therefore, set up a campaign 
to promote local nationalistic elements, if not nationalism, to counter Russian 
chauvinism. The policy of korenizatsiia or nativization, however, associated 
with a side-effect that ‘gave considerable lee-way for national elites 
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controlling titular republics to promote their national [cultures]. In an 
interpretation, korenizatsiia “provided opportunities for nationalities 
representing over 93% of the non-Russian population to create ethnically 
distinct stratification subsystems within Union or autonomous republics.”’226 
In general, the Soviet territorial and nationality policies were somewhat 
irreconcilable with each other and not well coordinated from the start. The 
disharmony, however, had been confined through the Soviet ruthless rule.  
 Gorbachev’s perestroika in the late 1980s signalled the loosening of the 
harsh rule through encouraging glasnosti or democratizatia. The more the 
atmosphere of freedom of speech prevailed in Soviet society, the more the 
stability of the federal system was lost, since the republican titular ethnic elite 
groups accumulated nationalism to increase the stake against Moscow for 
greater autonomous power, if not independence. Such a republican trend, 
however, was also inviting instability within their Soviet republics facing the 
autonomous republics and regions, which were emulating their host 
republican action against Moscow.  
 One of the prominent and potential triggers for the emergence of the 
conflicts might be the growing republic/titular nationalism that was projected 
into the republican policies. For example, there is a factor of language. In the 
Caucasus where ‘is a multiethnic though not a multiracial society’, ‘[t]he most 
important’ in making racial/ethnic/clan distinctions ‘are … the differences in 
language and religion.’ Then, ‘language remains perhaps the main marker of 
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ethnic and national identity. The most obvious characteristic of an ethnic 
group is its separate language.’227 With the background, the increasingly 
independent titular republic governments under perestroika replaced Russian 
with or enforced their titular languages as the lingua franca. For the ethnic 
minorities whose languages were different from the titular language, the 
change of policy was felt as an alarm that the republican titular central 
authorities attempted to marginalise them. The dissatisfaction, unlikely 
before perestroika, was given an opportunity to manifest that rapidly turned 
into separatist movements in many Soviet republics.  
 In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the atmosphere of perestroika had 
already called for a number of demands for the transfer of authority from 
Azerbaijan to Armenia. One of the region’s complains was the fact that 
Nagorno-Karabakh, in which 80 percent were Armenian, was in the lack of 
Armenian language TV broadcasting and under the virtual suppression of 
teaching Armenian history in schools.228 Along with the prolonged territorial 
disputes that had been dormant until perestroika, the conflict was agitated by 
the republican titular policy. The struggle culminated in the resolution of the 
Regional Soviet in Karabakh that voted for a request of the transfer of 
authority on 20th February 1988. The declarations of independence from 
Azerbaijan and the abolition of the Soviet constitution in the resolution were 
also a sign of the titular ethno-nationalism that hardened the separatist 
regions. 
                                            
227 Cornell, Svante E. (2002). Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and 
Separatism in the South Caucasus – Case in Georgia. Uppsala, Sweden: 
Uppsala University. p.111. 
228 Brown, Archie. (1996). The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. p.262. 
  292 
 In the cases of the two breakaway regions in Georgia, the Georgia’s 
Military Council decided the abolition of the Soviet era-constitution and the 
revival the 1921 constitution on 21st February 1992. This was interpreted by 
the two breakaway regions as questioning their autonomous rights in territory, 
language and culture. This Georgian move triggered the Abkhazia’s 
declaration of independence from Georgia on 23rd July in the same year. On 
August, the Abkhazian War started. South Ossetia, at that time, had been 
already stripped of its autonomous status by Gamsakhurdia’s government in 
December 1990. The violent conflict between the Georgian government and 
South Ossetia began in January in 1991.  
 The Soviet nationality questions were about the questions of identity. 
The languages and cultures of the titular peoples and ethnic minorities are 
respectively the matters of their identities. The Soviet policy of the nationality 
questions had set a structure that the titular identities are located in an 
adverse position to the identities of the ethnic minorities in the titular states. 
In other words, the Soviet policy had made their relations over the identities 
irreconcilable. Then, since identities are a part of the polity’s sovereignty 
whatever the unit is a state or an ethnic group, when the peace brokers 
attempt to negotiate a share balance of sovereignty between the titular (and 
state) authorities and the ethnic minorities’ or local regional authorities, like 
the issue of the official language of which the status is usually given to the 
titular languages, the ethnic minorities’ or local regional authorities (over)run 
for the defence of their identities in the negotiations. The polity’s identity and 
sovereignty are the delicate issues in peace processes in any conflict, and 
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that is a reason why peace brokers need to know about the history of the 
conflicting land, people and history.  
 While the Soviet legacies and structural settings triggered the conflicts, 
there are other structures to refrain the conflicts from being mediated. The 
structural settings are caused by the initial slow responses of the 
international community and have made what was already complicated more 
complicated. 
 
5.1.3. How Have the Caucasian Conflicts Frozen? 
 
There were a number of twists in the series of events that partly railed the 
way towards the frozen condition of the conflicts. First, the international 
community led by the Western countries hesitated to make a timely response 
to the conflicts in the Soviet Union/FSU republics in the 1990s, due to fear of 
reaction from the Soviet Union/Russia. The West’s concerns were about the 
Soviet-made nuclear weapons and the course of liberal democracy in the 
FSU republics, in particular in Russia, but not so much on the conflicts in the 
FSU that were intensifying at that time. Western diplomacy worked harder on 
saving the face value of Russia than on evaluating the conditions of the 
conflicts in the present FSU republics and the actions of the now Russian 
troops there. In the Western understanding, bribing Russia in that way would 
lead a positive relationship with Moscow and make it easy to deal with the 
issue of nuclear weapons.  
 There was also indifference to the conflicts in the FSU republics, mainly 
due to the fact that the prolonged CPSU’s iron rule had blocked most of the 
international accesses to the Soviet republics, and the international 
  294 
community was simply unable to grasp confusion and instability of the Soviet 
Union. In the Soviet realist thinking and norms, such a type of internal 
information was a matter of national security and needed to be confidential, 
while the international community could not overcome the Soviet secrecy. In 
fact, some of the first international commitments came after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, for example, suggested by the dates of the UN resolutions 
over the Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. The commitments, at 
last, started after 1993.229  
 Second, the delay of the international engagement allowed a deep 
penetration of the Soviet/Russian style engagement in the conflicts that was 
not strictly following the international standards institutionalised by the UN 
through its history of peace operations. While the engagement was not 
identified as “peacekeeping” or “peacemaking” at that time, the Soviet central 
authorities had sent their political advisors or military troops to sort out the 
instability of the Soviet peripheral republics before its collapse, of which the 
military operations were not constrained by any international regulations, 
observation and accountability. The Russian Federation inherited and, before 
the international community started engaging in the conflicts, began the 
Russian version of peace processes, negotiating ceasefire agreements with 
the warring parties as the broker. Russia achieved the Sochi Agreement in 
                                            
229 See Wikipedia. List of United Nations Security Council resolutions on the 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Online. Available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_Security_Council_resoluti
ons_on_the_Nagorno-Karabakh_conflict (accessed on 30th June 2010).  
And: Wikipedia. United Nations resolution on Abkhazia. Online. Available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_resolutions_on_Abkhazia 
(accessed on 30th June 2010). 
  295 
1992-1993 to bring ceasefires over Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.230  
In the case of South Osseita, while the OSCE formally took the role in the 
conflict under a UN-OSCE agreement that determined the division of labour 
in Georgia between the two security organisations, the OSCE’s commitment 
at last started being seen in the 1995, which was long after Russia set up a 
controversial quadrilateral Joint Control Commission (JCC) under the 
Agreement on Principles for the Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict 
between Georgia and Russia, which was a part of the Sochi Agreement. The 
mission was designed to be a peacekeeping operation and included not only 
Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia, but also North Ossetia, as the parties to 
the agreement and providers of the peacekeepers.  
 In the case of Abkhazia, the UN’s first Security Council resolution 
related to the conflict came on 9th July 1993,231  and was immediately 
followed by the Abkhazia’s part of the Sochi Agreement – the Agreement On 
a Ceasefire in Abkhazia and On a Mechanism to Ensure Its Observance. 
The role of UN was designed in the agreement, and the UN established the 
United Nations Observer Missions in Georgia (UNOMIG) with another 
Security Council resolution in August,232 which would be soon invalidated 
due to the ceasefire violation on 27th September by Abkhazia.  
 In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Soviet “peacekeepers” from the 
Soviet Interior Ministry Forces officially withdrew from the region, though 
                                            
230 The Sochi Agreement is also known as the Dagomistskoe Agreement 
(Russian: Дагомысские соглашения) and a set of two agreements. One is 
the South Ossetia Agreement signed on 24th June 1992 by Georgia, South 
Ossetia, and Russia. The other part is the Abkhazia Agreement signed on 
27th July 1993 by Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia. 
231 UN. (9th July, 1993). UN SC Res.849. 
232 UN. (24th August, 1993). UN SC Res.858. 
  296 
some of them actually stayed on there to fight. In addition, a large amount 
cache of weapons remained, waiting to be used in the war. As a result, just 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh 
intensified. The UN Secretary-General’s special envoy, Cyrus Vance, came 
in February 1992 to explore the possibility of peace and humanitarian aid 
with the UN’s engagement. The UN, however, decided to limit its 
engagement to humanitarian activities and handed over the political and 
diplomatic role to the CSCE in May.233 In parallel, the CSCE formed the so-
called Minsk Group to take care of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process 
known as the Minsk Process in March. However, another track of efforts for 
settlement had already existed before the UN and CSCE’s commitments. 
Yeltsin’s Russia under the Soviet Union attempted a series of negotiations, 
including an attempt with Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan in September 
1991, just before the declaration of independence by Nagorno-Karabakh, 
aiming to end the blockades or restart communication.234 When it became 
the post-Soviet Russia, Russia simultaneously drove on both the Russian 
and CSCE tracks for settlement. The Russian dual track approach was 
ostensibly integrated into one in December 1994 when the OSCE Budapest 
summit made Russia a co-chair of the Minsk Group with the decision of an 
OSCE peacekeeping force, after Russia succeeded in brokering a ceasefire 
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agreement on May.235 The decision is still “the” only peacekeeping operation 
of the OSCE that has not been materialised. 
 In other words, international engagements in these conflicts always 
came after Russia had established a certain degree of presence in the peace 
negotiations as a fait accompli. The contents of the peace or ceasefire 
agreements were arranged almost in the absence of the UN or 
CSCE/OSCE’s meaningful commitments. The pattern is not of the issue of 
the so-called track I (governmental/international-governmental organisations 
actors) and track II (local, national and international conflict resolution NGOs 
and other nongovernmental actors) efforts.236 It is of the “dual” track I efforts.  
There were the two track I processes that were in confusion, if not in 
competition, under the strong influence of Russia.   
 Third, the peace negotiations and processes have been occupied by a 
number of biased actors from the start. In the 1990s, the inclusion of the 
biased peace brokers was undoubtedly controversial. In particular, Russia 
was not only politically but also militarily biased with carrying out the role of 
peacekeeping in the FSU conflicts. The international community, however, 
was occupied by the conflicts that emerged in the post-Cold War, especially 
in the former Yugoslavian and Africa. The situation had caused a shortage of 
resources for peace operations by the UN. Due to such a physical limitation 
as well as the lack of a strong political will in the international community to 
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deal with the conflicts in the FSU, the UN could not afford to lose Russia, 
which had already provided  “muscular” power over the FSU conflicts and, 
more importantly, succeeded to the Soviet veto power in the UN Security 
Council. The UN even granted the OSCE the surrogated role of the centre of 
peace process over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, partly due to the scarcity 
of own resources. In addition, the UN and the OCSE have not been able to 
construct an effective mechanism of “check and balance” over the Russian-
led peacekeeping regimes. Therefore, as argued above, Russian 
peacekeeping operations have remained unaccountable. To protect this non-
accountability, Russia has been working hard, coming and going back 
between the “two track I” diplomatic efforts. While Russia always attempts to 
secure unaccountability in the UN or OSCE-brokered track I where the 
ultimate conflict resolutions should be sought for, it acts as a spoiler state 
using the frameworks arranged in the Russian brokered track I to push 
Russia’s national and geopolitical interests first. As a result, the peace 
processes have become incoherent.  
 Furthermore, other members of the peace processes may be also 
controversial. This can be said especially about the Minsk Group over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It was started with 11 interested states in 1992 
under the CSCE. It currently consists of three co-chairmanship states – 
Russia, France and the US – and eight states – Belarus, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan as the permanent 
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members. A Troika state may join when it is not a permanent member.237 All 
co-chairmanship states hold huge oil and gas companies interested in the 
development of oil and gas exploitation in the Caspian Sea region. Apart 
from Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are the direct actors in the conflict, 
Belarus, Germany, Italy and Turkey among the permanent members are all 
related to the issues of the pipeline routes. The missing link here is the 
representative of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Minsk Group is full of the 
interested and, therefore, biased actors. Can impartiality be expected in the 
peace process, by having them overlook their national interests?  
 Dennis J. D. Sandole suggests that, ‘for behavior to lead to sustainable, 
positive outcomes, it must be moral/ethical (where actors do the “right thing”) 
as well as rational (where actors do the “practical thing”). Regrettably, 
Realpolitik-based, zero-sum/win-lose actions are practical and rational only 
in the narrow sense of advancing one’s own interests (+10) at the expense of 
one’s opponent (-10). Such actions are at least amoral, if not totally immoral 
and unethical.’238 Unfortunately in the peace processes in the Caucasian 
conflicts, the Realpolitik-based thinking actors are dominating in the process, 
contradicting each other, and contributing to the stasis of the conflicts. This 
does not mean that no one wishes to move the processes towards the 
ultimate conflict resolutions. These biased actors actually want to have stable 
peace in the region for carrying out the exploitation and transportation of the 
natural resources. Giving priority to their respective national interests that are 
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incompatible in a framework of peace, however, they are unable to find any 
incentive to compromise under the current situation.  
 For example, it may be partially true that, after the conflicts were frozen 
by the Russian efforts, there was a shift in Russia’s foreign policy ‘away from 
interventionist actions aimed at securing short-term interests and towards 
cautious approaches more on the lines of [traditional] international 
peacekeeping’, and ‘[t]he focus is now more on political conflict resolution.’239 
Nevertheless, it is also observable that, since Russia’s attitude shows its 
eagerness for domination and total control over the region, other states with 
their industries have no space for compromising. These states and industries 
want to have a certain degree of freedom that is enough to allow their 
businesses to operate under the liberal economic mode rather than the 
Russian sovereign economic mode which may be currently somewhat similar 
to mercantilism. The peace processes, if progressed, need to change the 
zero-sum perception among the actors, in particular Russia, and discover a 
space for compromise. So far, the reality does not allow for such a shift.   
 Fourth, the UN- and OSCE-arranged peace processes in the “dual” 
track I contain some significant problems. One is that the local warring 
parties are unable to represent themselves at the negotiation tables due to 
their status at the international level. The local warring parties – Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh – are officially represented by their 
host states – Georgia and Azerbaijan. In the case of the Transdniester 
conflict, the OSCE has recently formed the so-called 5+2 Process in which 
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the authority of Transdniester represents itself along with the Moldovan 
counterpart. The 5+2 Process, in fact, is a sub-track process which focuses 
on ‘freedom of movement and systems of guarantees for the negotiating 
process’.240 Thus, although there is possibility that this framework may be 
employed in the negotiation over the conditions of peace settlement, the 
participation of the 5+2 Process does not guarantee the position of the 
Transdniester government in the formal peace process in the OSCE at the 
present time.  
 At the same time, these local warring parties are bounded with Russia’s 
influence due to the Russian-dominated peacekeeping operations and other 
Russian physical supports. The positions of the parties in the peace 
processes are often determined by Russia. The local warring parties are 
contacted by or unofficially communicate with the envoys or representatives 
from the UN and OSCE. The lack of official seats at the table of the peace 
talks, nevertheless, has sent a signal to the local warring parties that the 
international/regional organisations do not respect them. In addition, the local 
warring parties consider that these internationally prominent security 
organisations do not possess a physical power – in particular military power 
– to enforce any peace deals, if they are struck, which will ultimately 
guarantee the viability of the deal in their pre-modern world. The local 
warring parties are too sceptical to accept the authority of the 
international/regional organisations.   
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 Scepticism towards the international actors has been also fostered by 
the low degree of international attention and engagement over humanitarian 
activities. The authorities of the local warring parties or separatist regions 
have become much more independent from international support and more 
dependent on Russia, adapting to the situations. S. Neil MacFarlane notes 
that in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh: 
 
‘Here, regrettably, the record is on the whole 
negative, despite [important] efforts on the part of a 
small number of aid providers. There is strong 
reason to believe that the lack of assistance to 
Karabakh itself reduced the international 
community’s [credibility] and influence there, while 
Nagorno-Karabakh’s [perceived] self-reliance in 
dealing with military and humanitarian tasks 
enhanced its intransigence.’241 
 
 Furthermore, in the process of the 2000s, Abkhazia, which used to be 
regarded as a relatively independent minded separatist region from either 
Georgia or Russia, has been increasing its dependency on Russia. Russia is 
its huge trade partner, generating a large part of the tax revenue for the 
Abkhaz authority, pays ‘the pensions of some 30,000 people in Abkhazia 
(newly registered Russian citizens)’ and sends ‘Russian tourists [who] bring 
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an estimated 50 million US dollars to Abkhazia during the high season every 
year.’ Abkhaz and South Ossetian residents are provided with Russian 
passports. That also increases their dependency on Russia. The presence 
and sense of authority of the international actors are significantly eroding 
under such a context.  
 Finally, there is a fundamental issue in resolving the conflicts which 
presents a real difficulty. That is the problem of the final status of the conflict 
areas. The formal settlement inevitably requires the decision of the ultimate 
status of the separatist regions. The international/regional organisations 
cannot make an easy decision to grant a separatist region “in a state” the 
status of state, unless it is an unusual and extreme situation, as seen in the 
case of Kosovo that was associated with the crimes of the host state against 
an ethnic minority group who were the citizens of the state. Although there 
were some casualties in violence and battles at the initial stages of the FSU 
conflicts, since the conflicts were frozen in the mid-1990s, there has not been 
such a case that proportionally constitutes systematic and continuous ethnic 
cleansing by the host governments, which makes the case of Kosovo 
different and exceptional. In such a situation, the UN, EU, OSCE or most of 
states in the international community find it difficult to make another 
exception for the sake of stable international and regional relations.  
 On the other hand, Russia has been unilaterally and arbitrarily 
attempting to dictate the status of the separatist regions. Along with the 
issuing of the Russian passports to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
residents, Russia has recognised the state status of these two regions after 
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the Georgian War in 2008. The recognition, however, has not been followed 
by the international community including the member states of the CIS or the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) where Russia is supposed to 
have a strong influence.242 Russia has attempted to assert its influence over 
the Caucasus through a twisted theory, which is that, if Kosovo can be an 
independent state, Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be so too. Russia, in 
this regard, has taken a step away from the international standards as well 
as the international community. Most of the states in the CIS and the SCO 
share borders with Russia. It is understandable that these states cannot see 
any positive interest in supporting Russia’s position on the issue.  
 As for the separatist regions and their host states, it ostensibly looks as 
if there would be no space for compromise between these parties to the 
conflicts. For example, Mikhail Saakashvili planned to use the Adjara model 
that he was successful in 2004 in which the Georgian government allowed 
the region to enjoy a greater autonomy, after President Abashidze, who was 
an autocratic ruler and supposed to have close ties with Russia, was ousted 
by the pressure from the central government as well as the local residents of 
Adjara. However, there is the question of whether greater autonomy can 
really provide a breakthrough in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
For example, Lynch states:  
 
‘Internally, they have developed the minimal 
structures [necessary] for survival, driven above all 
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by their political vision of [independence] from 
Georgia. The authorities in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia are not seeking a better share of power in 
Tbilisi; they want to leave Georgia altogether. The 
economic duress in which they exist has not altered 
this basic drive. What is more, their isolation from 
Georgia has only made the separatist regions more 
[dependent] on Russia – for passports, pensions and 
energy supplies.’243 
 
The separatist regions are now more like an independent state in relation to 
the host and central government. Why would greater autonomy from the 
central government be attractive for the separatist regions? Then, the Adjara 
model has been inevitably ceased by the course of the Georgian War in 
2008, since Russia has made itself a virtual suzerain for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia after the war. In this regard, the problem of Georgia’s two breakaway 
regions is not an issue only between the Georgian central government and 
the separatist regions but also between these parties and Russia which has 
a “double-headed” mind in the near abroad foreign policy.  
 Furthermore, Russia may interpret Georgia as the keystone to maintain 
its influence over and keep Turkey off the greater Caucasus. Turkey is a 
traditional rival in civilisation and a current competitor in the pipeline routes of 
gas and oil. As long as Azerbaijan continues blockade Armenia, Armenia 
‘[has] to rely on transportation routes through Georgia’. That deters the 
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potential development of positive relations between these Caucasian 
republics and Turkey from which ‘Georgia [looks] like a natural point of 
access for [it] to the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia.’244 In this light, 
Russia is likely to continue to play the suzerain role for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia to keep Georgia in its hand.  
 In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, although it is also in deadlock, some 
point that the value change of the locals may open a door for resolution, if 
they can drop the perception of the zero-sum game. An article from Open 
Democracy refers to the examples of the past conflict resolutions in March 
1905 and September 1918, a fact that ‘[a]lmost all Armenian refugees over 
35 will say that they had Azeri friends’, and the strong economic growth of 
Azerbaijan in the recent years that may be a reasonable ground for changing 
their perception over the war. It implies that, if Armenians do not lose their 
face value and there are ‘the agreements on mutual restitutions, 
compensations, a solution to the problem of refugees and the (obligatory!) 
ceremonial act of reconciliation between the two peoples’, it is possible to 
extract some concession from Armenia that would settle Azerbaijan’s 
position and release three parties from the situation of the so-called mutually 
hurting stalemate. The article stresses that ‘[w]hat’s needed is a “bird’s eye 
view”’, because ‘we are too immersed in the detail to be able to see [a 
solution].’245 These suggestions may give some hope, but require for the 
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major actors to shift, if not change, their values on which the terms of the 
peace deal are determined. In reality, there is not much auspicious sign for 
the value change in not only the peace process but also the respective 
foreign policy thinking of the actor states whose mode of thinking works with 
the Realpolitik-based perception.  
 With the combination of these problems argued above, the official 
peace processes of the Caucasian frozen conflicts are all in deadlock and 
have not produced a meaningful progress or result. The search for the 
ultimate resolutions is still in stasis. Here, the international and regional 
organisations are simply playing a role to preserve the frameworks for 
negotiation for a future opportunity.  
 At the same time, however, that can be a value of the international and 
regional organisations that the international community should build. The 
processes for peace are not always straightforward and take many decades. 
Or they may not resolve neatly after a century passes. Yet, if peace is 
pursued, the preservation of institutional arrangements for peace talks leaves 
predictability of the courses of the conflict resolutions. When the situations 
change and the things start moving forward, the arrangements are likely the 
first to be utilised by the parties and external actors to the conflicts. In this 
light, state actors who are likely biased for their national interests are less 
reliable than international/regional institutions and organisations as a care-
taker of dormant peace processes, since state actors may unilaterally end 
their commitment to the role at their will without any consultation when they 
see national interests talks more in ending the role than in preserving the 
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framework of peace. In terms of impartiality and a long and stable 
commitment to the issues of conflict, international/regional institutions and 
organisations are probably more suitable actors to rely on than state actors, 
since they are public actors in the public international space while state 
actors are rather "private" ones to serve their individual national interests in 
the space.  
 Nevertheless, the public actors are joined by state "private" actors who 
may deter the public commitments to peace. In the case of Nagorno-
Karabakh, the OSCE is able to remain as a provider of the arrangement and 
actually doing so. In the case of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia, after 
Russia vetoed the OSCE’s commitment to Georgia as well as to Russia’s 
North Caucasus region, the prospect seems to be gloom. The OSCE's 
organisational autonomy from state "private" actors is still not sufficiently 
constructed.  
 
5.1.4. The Environments Surrounding the Frozen Conflicts 
 
There are two extra aspects to understand the frozen conflicts that should be 
added here. One is about the remoteness of the conflict zones from the 
international community. The distance limits the confidence of the OSCE and 
the UN to engage in the frozen conflicts. The other is about the closeness 
from international power politics. Both are hindering the conflicts from 
reaching the lasting resolution. During the Soviet era, the Caucasus was 
completely detached from the international community and developed into a 
connected regional unit. Currently, the region is divided into the four 
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independent states (Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) holding the 
dormant conflict zones of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Some of the Russia’s North Caucasus republics, like Chechnya and 
Daghestan, also contain a number of security concerns and instability.  
 Physically, this reality presents a problem if the frozen conflicts are 
seriously handled to resolve. There is necessity of peace operations that are 
likely include a certain level of military engagement, thinking of volatility of 
the conflicts, no matter how calm the current situations look like from the 
international community. The local realities are sometimes invisible from the 
point of view. If the international community, whichever the OSCE or the UN, 
genuinely engages in the frozen conflicts, the peace operations must satisfy 
the military requirement and be able to show it to the parties to the conflicts 
even at the level of the peace talks. Otherwise, any international 
engagement is regarded as just a show especially by the local warring 
parties which need "real things" if any peace deal is struck and carried out. 
Nevertheless, it may be a huge headache to continuously and physically 
send the peacekeepers and the resources for the operations to the conflict 
zones, due to the transportation system covering the entire region (See Map 
5.1). The local economy also owes the system. A stable economic condition 
to comfort the locals favours and is needed to increase the possibility of the 
success of the peace operations. However, the transportation system for 
development of trade is questionable in the Caucasus. 
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Map 5.1: Infrastructure of the Transcaucasus 
 
Source:  MacFarlane, S. Neil., and Larry Minear.(1997). Humanitarian 
Action and Politics - The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh. Thomas J. Watson Jr. 
Institute for International Studies. Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for 
International Studies Occasional Paper No.25. p.22-23. 
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 In fact, Neil S. MacFarlane and Larry Minear pointed this reality in the 
1990s. They noted that ‘[b]oth Armenia and Azerbaijan were critically 
dependent on infrastructural links through Georgia and the Northern 
Caucasus, which were themselves affected by conflict.’ 
 
‘… the railroad from Russia through Abkhazia to 
Georgia was one of two principal rail links between 
Russia and the two republics. Traffic along it was 
interrupted by conflict in Abkhazia and by the 
Russian blockade of that region. The conflict and 
blockade also partially severed [economic] links 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Russia, 
historically their principal market.’246 
 
The transportation system is still basically the Soviet-era system and has not 
been appropriately updated or newly developed to adapt to the post-Soviet 
regional inter-state system, though there is a news that ‘the construction of 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line will be completed by early 2013’.247 The 
terrain of the Caucasian mountains or the Great Caucasus provides 
difficulties to develop a new route to connect between the wider world and 
the Caucasian states. In addition, the Caucasus, in particular Russia’s North 
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Caucasus and Georgia, has not been so stable. The local insurgencies 
frequently happen, whatever terrorism or separatist movements, which are 
not internationally reported by the media, and Russia and Georgia engaged 
in a war in 2008. The condition presents a physical difficulty, when the 
outsiders, like the EU, the OSCE, the UN or any other individual states, 
would like to constantly reach these states and/or the region for the peace 
operations.  
 Accordingly, the question on why the conflicts have been so effectively 
frozen lies in the regional isolation from the wider world. In theory, the 
international community should engage in any security problems in the world. 
Reality is that, due to a number of physical limitations, like finance or the 
degree of interest in the international/regional institutions and organisations, 
engagement is lamentably selective. In the Caucasian conflicts, since a 
meaningful conflict resolution likely requires a certain scale of military 
operations, the lack of a proper, durable and reliable transportation system 
can reduce the confidence of the international/regional institutions and 
organisations to engage. 
 In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, other possible routes, such as via 
Iran or Turkey, are politically more difficult to use for the UN, the EU or the 
OSCE, taking into account the US’ policy towards Iran and an uneasy 
relation between Armenia and Turkey. The only remaining route is via 
Georgia and/or Russia’s North Caucasus region where there are a number of 
security concerns. When any peace deal is struck and an attempt to bring 
either peacekeepers or humanitarian assistance is proposed, the plan 
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inevitably encounters the logistical difficulty. From this point of view, conflict 
resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh technically requires the stability of Georgia, 
in particular its two breakaway regions, and Russia’s North Caucasus, if the 
peace operation is joined by some external third parties. As anyone can 
imagine in the light of the current conditions over the Caucasus, this 
conditionality is a daunting task. Even if any peace resolution successfully 
invites international engagement, the logistical problem still remains since 
Russia’s preference and policy which would block any meaningful 
engagement by the outsiders over the Caucasus to preserve its significance 
as the regional superpower in the FSU region.   
 The other aspect which is important to understand how complicate the 
frozen conflicts are is the contemporary geopolitics surrounding the 
Caucasus. The geopolitical concerns are especially connected to energy 
security. It is the 21st century version of the so-called Great Game. Originally, 
the term means the colonial competition between the British Empire and the 
Russian Empire over the sphere of influence during the 18th and 19th 
century in Central Asia. In the contemporary version, the motivation to play 
the game is rather in oil and gas in the Caspian Sea and the surrounding 
areas. The areas are supposed to be ‘the world’s biggest untapped fossil fuel 
resources … [estimated] range from 50 to 110 billion barrels of oil, and from 
170 to 463 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The U.S. Department of Energy 
comfortably [assumes] a 50 percent probability of a total of 243 billion barrels 
of oil reserves.’248 In other words, the region is the second largest oil and 
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gas resource in the world, only surpassed by Saudi Arabia. Although these 
estimations are often exaggerated to call for international attention and 
investments, the significance of the energy reserves remains in global 
politics, in particular over energy security thinking.  
 To understand the contemporary Great Game, what should be kept in 
mind is the implication of the Soviet-time-built pipelines and their routes that 
are extracting the resources from the Caspian Sea and the surrounding area 
(See Map 5.2). First, the pipeline networks were designed to provide a tool 
for Moscow to maximise its grip over the Soviet republics. The networks 
were originally installed in the way that all pipelines run through near the 
Moscow area, putting aside the efficiency and practicality in distribution over 
not only the Soviet Union but also the communist-bloc states in Eastern 
Europe. Therefore, Moscow could control the distribution of the natural 
resources over the entire Soviet communist bloc.   
 Second, the pipelines of gas and oil built during the Soviet era are still 
dominant in transporting natural resources over the FSU region, and have 
today extended to the Central and Western European networks. The 
development in the post-Soviet era has now set up a condition that the 
Russian Federation can use the energy resources as a source of power to 
influence international politics through controlling the supply of them. These 
natural resources had been out of reach for the Western states and their 
energy industries during the Soviet era. The collapse of the Soviet Union, 
therefore, opened a huge opportunity for them. Logically, however, the 
Western pursuit of the resources in the FSU region has made the West 
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vulnerable against Russia, which still holds a strong grip over a significant 
part of the pipeline routes.  
 Third, there has been and is a fierce competition between the Soviet-
built pipelines under the Russian control and the other alternative pipelines 
that have been built, are under construction, or are under planning to avoid 
any Russian territory. While ‘Russia [insists] that new pipelines follow the 
same routes [of the Soviet pipelines],249 the West is understandably aware 
of the importance of the development of alternative routes for the stable 
supply of the energy resources, minding either technical glitches or political 
implications. Therefore, the states surrounding the Caspian Sea and 
standing on the energy resource transit routes have joined the contemporary 
version of the Great Game with its traditional members. The contemporary 
Great Game is ‘far more complex than those of a century ago’. Lutz 
Kleveman notes:  
 
‘The United States has taken over the leading role 
from the British. Along with the ever-present 
Russians, new regional powers such as China, Iran 
Turkey, and Pakistan have entered the arena, and 
transitional corporations (whose budgets far exceed 
those of many Central Asian countries) are also 
pursuing their own interests and strategies.’250 
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These players are up against the holders of the resources such as 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and the holders of transit routes, 
such as Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. Afghanistan has also become a 
player for a possible route.  The 21st Great Game may let some think that 
the geographical position of Afghanistan invited the US military engagement 
in the country rather than the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. Then, a curious truth is 
that all zones of the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus, instability in Russia’s 
North Caucasus, and Transdniester in Moldova are located on or near the 
transit routes of the oil and gas. This means that all these states are 
interested in the course of the peace processes over the frozen conflicts as 
well as in the stability of the Russia’s North Caucasus, no matter whether 
they are officially the members of the peace talks or not.  
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 The most conspicuous example of the pipelines that do not pass the 
Russian territory is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which has been 
supported by the US. 251  The route passes near Nagorno-Karabakh in 
Azerbaijan and Tbilisi in Georgia (which is close to South Ossetia) to reach 
the port of Ceyhan in Turkey. The alternative route requires a stable Georgia 
and a calm relation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh. If the pipeline is further associated with friendly relations between 
Armenia and Turkey, which often turns sour due to the claim of the Armenian 
Genocide, it would be ideal. As seen in the Georgian War in August 2008 
over South Ossetia, the conditions are often under pressure.  
 Accordingly, the 21st version of the Great Game is currently very hot. 
However, there is an emerging phenomenon that can change the rule of the 
Game. The value of geopolitics over this specific region may be demoted by 
the Shale Revolution. The Revolution has potentiality to completely change 
the energy security map in the near future and Europe may not need so 
much oil and gas from Russia, the Caucasian and the Middle East states. 
The Russian state-controlled energy companies, which do not have the 
Shale technology, are eagerly working for blocking the introduction of the 
technology in the European region through raising concerns over 
environmental damages by the extraction of Shale resources. While the 
technology is being used in the US, it is not clear whether the technology 
comes to Europe. If the introduction happens, the value of the 21st version of 
the Great Game may shrink. 
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 Is the Shale Revolution helpful or unhelpful for the progress and 
ultimate resolution of the peace processes of the Caucasian frozen conflicts? 
This is also difficult to measure. At the present time, the course of the Shale 
Revolution is unknown. If it is introduced to Europe, the geopolitical value of 
the Caucasus may reduced in terms of energy security. This, however, does 
not suggests the degradation of the region in terms of other security issues 
such as international terrorism, the Iranian nuclear issue and the 
stability/instability of the Middle East. If the latter concerns are not forgot, the 
international engagement in the peace processes in some form may continue. 
Even in that case, it is still unclear about how strong/weak the engagement 
will be and whether it will have a sheer force to bring all parties to the 
conflicts to the ultimate resolutions.  
 
5.1.5.Eternal Actors in the Caucasian Conflicts and Geopolitics 
 
The frozen conflicts are surrounded by state and international corporative 
actors who are chasing an enormously huge economic and business 
opportunity. It is too huge to miss it and makes the actors take realist foreign 
policies. Before energy resources, any actors coming out of even the post-
modern world, who are usually more cooperative than the actors in the pre-
modern and modern worlds over international peace and security, turn into 
the self-help actors. There seems to exist a prejudice that energy resources 
will be completely exhausted in 10~20 years and they must be secured 
“now”. Remembering The Limits of Growth by the Club of Rome in 1972 
which predicted that oil would be exhausted in the next 15 years, the 
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prejudice has been wrong. And the Shale Revolution is going on at the 
current time. Nevertheless, in the state behaviours, the prejudice strongly 
works as a premise of foreign policy and limits state actors to being myopic, 
short-term and self-help thinkers.  
 It is normal if international corporative actors are absolute realists in 
business terms and just seek business opportunities and profits, since that is 
who and why they are. Of course, it is possible to use them for some 
purposes in peace plans. Nevertheless, they are ultimately not responsible 
for providing a positive, durable and lasting peace. That is what public actors 
are expected to do, since peace is a public good. 
 In the context of the frozen conflicts, the OSCE and the UN are 
relatively genuine public actors. They are public actors in the international 
community who are arranged to serve human rights, democracy and 
international peace and security. On the contrary, while the governments of 
states may be a public actor inside the states, they are quasi-private actors 
in the international community following their individually-national interests. 
They choose the attitude (foreign policy) from "cooperative" to "self-help" 
according to their necessity, interests, convenience and/or values. Energy 
resources tend to extract a self-help foreign policy from state actors since the 
enormously huge economic and business opportunity and the reality of 
energy security override a number of restrains that states usually do not 
violate. The frozen conflicts are no exception. The capability and willingness 
of state actors to cooperate for an international issue is severely reduced by 
the nature of the energy security issues. 
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Russia 
Russia is the biggest external state actor concerned with the Caucasian 
frozen conflicts. In the Georgian conflict, it became a direct warring party in 
the 2008 Georgian War. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is exerting the 
influence over the locals in Nagorno-Karabakh and often speculated a strong 
tie with Armenia on which Christianity in Armenia is usually given as a 
reason. Nevertheless, Armenian weak economy must be another reason. 
Azerbaijan is in a delicate position with Russia, since it is a competitor in the 
international energy resource market. While some of Azerbaijan's oil and gas 
are exported through the pipelines in the Russian territory, some are passing 
through the BTC pipeline. Azerbaijan, therefore, keeps a close relation to 
Georgia in particular in the economic aspect. 
 Cooper considers that Russia belongs to both the pre-modern and 
modern worlds. It is a strategically realist actor in international relations. 
Russia's foreign policy over the Caucasus is a mixture of the use of military 
means and economic means supported by the Russian sovereign economic 
system. On the one hand, it engages in the Russian version of peace 
operations in the conflicts, carefully coordinating the ostensible international 
legitimacy. On the other hand, Russia with the inheritance of the Soviet-built 
pipelines has been predictably using them to harass the oil and gas 
producing FSU states in particular Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. 
Russia, in this sense, has been showing the tendency that goes beyond the 
maximisation of the business opportunities in the international economic 
activities. Russia’s national interests are pursued using Russian 
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"supposedly" private commercial energy companies as the agents of the 
Russian government, ignoring the commercial reasonability. 
 Russian foreign policy is dangerously combined with Russian 
preference on territory driven by its psychological call. It inclines a total 
control or an authoritarian approach towards the current neighbouring 
countries. It directs an attempt to regain the Soviet degree of control or 
influence over the former Soviet territory including the Caucasus. This 
Russian preference has been casting a shadow over not only energy security 
but also the peace processes of the frozen conflicts, along with the stability 
of Russian North Caucasus. The West may be unaware of the significance of 
the Russian preference on territory in foreign policy. Nevertheless, this is 
probably one of the most important aspects of Russian values that 
determines what Russia does. On the Russian consciousness over territory, 
Dmitri Trenin notes:  
 
‘For centuries, Russia saw itself as a world onto itself, 
a new (“third”) Rome, a self-contained and largely 
self-sustainable universe — almost a minor planet 
sitting on planet Earth. Territorial politics, from 
geographical expansion to tight border [control], was 
key both to the vaunted Russian Idea (which was 
basically that of a universal empire), Russia’s 
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perceived mission in the world, and the political and 
economic [organization] of the Russian state.’252 
 
The end of the Soviet Union caused the loss of ‘about 50 percent of the 
Soviet population, 60 percent of its industrial capacity, and 70 percent of the 
land mass.’ According to Trenin, ‘the latter is of key importance. Generations 
of Russians have formed their conception of their country simply by looking 
at a map, which shows it to be the world’s biggest by far.’253 When Putin said 
that the loss of the Soviet Union was the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, 
the Westerners interpreted the words as the aggressiveness of the Putin 
administration in foreign policy. Nevertheless, this feeling towards territory is 
very Russian, and the Putin’s words simply represent a Russian consensus. 
 The Russian preference tends to take a style of power projection in its 
foreign policy. Russia under Yeltsin in the 1990s was economically and 
politically in a difficult time and had no space to manoeuvre an aggressive 
foreign policy. Even at that time, ‘Russia made clear in both declaratory 
statements and in its regional behavior that it was unwilling to write off its 
influence in the area and was in fact working to restore it.’254 Putin’s Russia 
since 2000 has been showing revival of confidence backed by the economic 
boom, which has made his foreign policy become more assertive against the 
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West and more aggressive against some of the FSU republics, seen in the 
gas supply dispute with Ukraine and the Baltic states several times in the 
2000s and the 2008 Georgian War.   
 The projection of Russian preference for territory has, at least partly, 
sneaked into Russia’s peacekeeping role in (de-)stabilising the “near abroad” 
region since the beginning of the Caucasian frozen conflicts. Peacekeeping 
has been a convenient excuse for Russia to exert the military influence. In 
1992, Andrei Kozyrev, then foreign minister of Russia, articulated the 
Russian view that ‘saw the former Soviet Union as an exclusive sphere of 
Russian interests.’ 
 
‘I think for the time being there is still be a chance for 
us, Russia, to play the mediating role, because 
whatever the situation, Russia’s authority is very 
great, and, of course, nobody has our understanding 
of the situation.’255 
 
To extend its influence over the exclusive sphere of its interests, Russia 
started employing peacekeeping, setting up some quasi-principles over its 
peacekeeping operations as the legal foundation, such as the Presidential 
Decree no.1300 or the Russian-United States Guide for Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures of Peacekeeping Forces during the Conduct of Exercises 
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(1994). The principles, at a glance, follow the principles established by the 
UN or the Western-led international/regional organisations in terms of the 
emphasis on multilateralism, the protection of civilians, or the limitation of 
use of force. However, when the peacekeeping operations fall into the FSU 
region, there is ambiguity if the principles are appropriately applied by the 
military personnel working at the local level.  
 On the one hand, Russian peacekeeping ‘has proven to be rather 
efficient by using a broader and deeper involvement in [the FSU] countries 
and a whole arsenal of expedients, among them military force’ through 
freezing the conflicts. On the other hand, however, it has also gained a 
certain reputation that ‘Russia has never had any constraints on its 
peacekeeping operations similar to those experienced by UN peacekeeping’ 
that are, for example, ‘[t]he problem of legitimacy, rules of engagement, 
collateral damage, or public scrutiny’. It is only limited, ‘according to two 
Russian military specialists’, by ‘the available means, the resolve of the 
command in Moscow, and political infighting or indecisiveness256 …’ Russia 
has been careful in creating a certain legitimacy for its peacekeeping 
operations through gaining international auspices of the UN or the OSCE in 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniester, while it has 
been using the CIS collective security framework to put its presence under 
the name of the joint border security forces in Tajikistan and Armenia where 
the type of arrangement suits due to each process and contingency. Once 
such “international authorisations” are given, however, there is limited 
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accountability or a check-and-balance mechanism over the Russian-
dominated peacekeeping troops. With such a robust style of peacekeeping, 
however, Russian or the Russian-dominated peacekeeping operations have 
not achieved a sustainable and lasting final settlement for the conflicts so far.  
 Partly, if not totally, such a Russian performance is a result of the 
Russian foreign policy preference that adheres with spoiler behaviour in 
order to gain some degree of control over the FSU region rather than to 
resolve the conflicts. In particular, since the emergence of Vladimir Putin’s 
Russia that more explicitly attempts to construct Russia’s exclusive sphere of 
influence over the FSU region, there has been a growing concern that 
Russia’s strategy to keep positioning its military factors under the name of 
peacekeeping or the joint security forces aims at or, at least, is producing the 
perpetuation of the conflicts. Some regard perpetuation as a Russian 
strategy in the FSU region. Bred Stephens, for example, recognises that 
Russia acts as a spoiler state in the region. The policy is run by the 
graduates of the KGB school whose mode of thinking is still dominated by 
the belief of the muscular Soviet power in writing Russian foreign policy. In 
his view, Russia wants to have continuous crises in the region to keep 
providing Russia the pretext to impose its influence through manipulating the 
transit system of energy resources.257  
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 Such a view may gain some support due to the Georgian War in 2008. 
In retrospect, despite the initial impression that the war was triggered by a 
Georgian counter-insurgency operation, there had been a number of signs to 
indicate a well-planned preparation by Moscow. Svante E. Cornell and S. 
Frederick Starr note that ‘[w]e now know part of the reason for this, namely, 
that the Russian government had flown some fifty Russian reporters to 
Tskhinvali days before the war began’, and ‘scarcely any Western news 
media managed to post a professional war [correspondent] to the scene.’258 
There is also an opinion that ‘Russian authorities had been making serious 
preparations for war over the span of nearly one decade’ including the 
installation of its favourite, Eduard Kokoity, as the leader of South Ossetia in 
2002 and providing heavy weapons to the regime, such as T-72 battle 
tanks.259 After the war, Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, though the recognition has not been internationally 
accepted, even by the CIS states. In exchange for the recognition of their 
independence, Russia has made some “bilateral agreements” with the 
breakaway regions of Georgia and is “officially” implementing “military 
cooperation” including the expansion of the (already-existed) Russian military 
bases there. The pattern of Russian behaviours — installing its favourite 
person as the leader of the region, supporting the regime including the 
military aspect to act as an agent of Moscow, and using the existence of 
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conflict as a pretext to intervene with a touch of “peacekeeping” or “joint 
military operation” — has become a signature of asserting Russia’s power. In 
addition, ‘the presence of the UN and the OSCE in conflict zones, in 
observer and humanitarian missions, has not constrained Russian policy. In 
fact, this presence can be seen as being complementary to Russian policy, 
de facto justifying Russian operations in parallel structure.’260 
 Russia's dual track I commitments in the peace processes of the frozen 
conflicts are carried out with the peacekeeping part of Russian foreign policy. 
The pattern of Russian behaviour, however, inevitably makes the other 
actors in the contemporary Great Game nervous. Russia shows its lack of 
values to share profits and benefits with others, or its aspiration to possess 
everything. The zero-sum thinking and the aspiration for domination over 
either territory or means of economy do not suit the post-modern security 
paradigm that the West, the international community, and regional 
organisations, like the EU and the OSCE, promote. 
 
The US and States in the Caucasus 
Although it is geographically far away from the region, the US as the global 
superpower has several levels of interests over the Caucasus. Therefore, the 
US' relations and concerns to the region is very complicated.  
 At the level of energy security, the US has powerful lobbying groups 
from the energy industry. The business-minded corporative actors deploy 
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their activities globally, so that it is nothing strange that the US oil and gas 
corporations see a great amount of interests in the Caspian Sea area, the 
issues of the pipelines and, consequently, the course of the frozen conflicts. 
One of the noticeable influences by the corporative actors can be seen in the 
War in Afghanistan. Although the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 was the direct 
excuse of the US engagement of the country, in a careful observation, some 
of the US oil companies had already committed to Afghanistan as a potential 
pipeline route from the Caucasus and Central Asian oil reserves. President 
Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan is a former adviser to Unocal, a California oil 
company which has currently incorporated into Chevron Corporation since 
2005. Thinking of the relation of President George Bush to Unocal, it is quite 
natural that a conspiracy theory, which suggests the connection between the 
War and the US energy industry, has been born.  
 The War on Afghanistan has promoted the importance of the Caucasus 
region, since the US troops need to use Georgia and Azerbaijan for transit 
routes to Afghanistan for logistics. Due to the reason, the US must be 
nervous about the Russian (supposedly) peacekeepers in the two separatist 
areas in Georgia. Poti, a naval base city facing the Black Sea and close to 
Abkhazia, was once taken by the Russian troops in the 2008 war. The US 
war engagement in Afghanistan is going to be closed soon, so that the US’s 
interests may be slightly shrunk. Yet, the US corporative actors are also 
connected to the pipeline business over the Caucasus region.  
 If there is another visible reason for the possible shrink of the US 
interests over the Caucasus in terms of energy security, it depends on the 
course of the ongoing Shale Revolution. The US holds the abundant Shale 
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oil and gas resources which have just started being exploited and are not 
totally revealed how much they exist in the US territory. As stated already, 
the Shale Revolution in the US has already deflated the price of natural gas 
significantly. If the supply are secured for future, one of the huge reasons of 
the US’s commitment over the Caucasus, as well as the Middle East, will be 
significantly lost. However, the technology still has some environmental 
problems, so that it is not clear whether the Revolution completely collapse 
the current supply map of natural gas and oil. The change may not be big, or 
a small change could be enough to shift the political and economic power 
balance of the world. This factor needs to be carefully followed. 
 At the level of international terrorism, after the death of Osama bin 
Laden in 2011, the US may not keep the same degree of interests and 
enthusiasm in investing so much resources to follow the Al-Qaeda type of 
terrorists in or via the Caucasus. The US needed Georgia and Azerbaijan to 
engage the War on Terror in Afghanistan and manage the problem called the 
“Caspian Bottleneck” — a logistic problem due to the necessity to bypass 
Iran and Russia.261 With the eminent close of the Afghan mission, the value 
of the Caucasus may be degraded. However, there is an interpretation on 
the US' move involving Azerbaijan, a Shia Islamic yet largely secular state, 
has a symbolic meaning for the US diplomacy towards the Islamic world to 
mitigate the anti-Americanism to some degree, even though the effect is 
unknown. The connection between the Caucasus and the Islamic world in 
terms of Islamist terrorism is rather a direct concern of Russia. The North 
Caucasus region and peoples interact with the region. 
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 At the level of international security, there are the permanent existence 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran that hates the US most. The latter 
is one of the US’ greatest security concerns which immediately links to 
terrorism, the nuclear missile development issues and the lasting Iranian 
hatred against the US and Israel. Iran can be the single biggest reason why 
the US keeps its influence over the Caucasus region, since the region can be 
used as an observation post.262 Then, in the other side of the same coin, 
Iran is also an external actor to the frozen conflicts thinking of the US 
influence and its influence directly facing Caucasus. There are issues of 
borders, refugees, ethnicities and religion. Iran is also playing a realist actor 
role rather than a cooperative one to the peace process. To deal with Iran, 
the US must hope that it can have positive relations with Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, both of which are at odds over Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 The US has a nagging problem that has largely disqualified itself as an 
honest peace broker in the conflict. The 1992 Freedom Support Act passed 
the US Congress. The intensive Armenian lobbying activities resulted in 
Section 907a of the Act that prohibits the US from aiding the Azerbaijan 
government. Since Azerbaijan is largely a state command economy, there 
are few ways to skip the Azeri authorities and pass the humanitarian aid to 
the Azeri private sector and civil society. While Azerbaijan along with 
Georgia is generally considered as a US’ ally in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan 
does not put so much trust on the US when the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh 
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is a matter to discuss due to the Act. The US administrations have attempted 
to abolish the Act and failed. ‘President Bush after September 11, 2002, 
waived Section 907a of the Freedom Support Act, but has not yet managed 
to the measure completely removed by Congress. As a result, America’s 
ability to provide assistance to Caspian security, for example, is hampered 
while a major irritant in US-Azerbaijani relations remains in place.’263  
 Despite the powerful lobbying body in the US, Armenia is not counted 
as an ally of the US. It is rather regarded as an ally of Russia. Armenia is a 
Moscow's pawn against Azerbaijan which has a relatively strong economy, 
due to its oil and gas reserves, that encourages Azeri independent mind from 
Moscow's control and calls for the US to counterbalance with Russia. Yet, 
the US also wants to have Armenia looking at the Middle East and Iran. The 
unofficial states of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan are rather allied with 
Armenia, so that their borders to Iran are longer than the border between 
Azerbaijan and Iran.  
 For the US, keeping Azerbaijan and Armenia under its influence has an 
implication to Turkey. The Turkish parliament refused ‘to permit US forces to 
open a second front in northern Iraq’ in the event of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
in 2003. This was ‘a stark reminder that the United States could not take 
basing rights in established allies for granted.’264 The US’ interests over the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran do not allow itself to lose the scaffold to 
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the Middle East. If Turkey contains such an uncertainty, the US needs a 
backup plan. Azerbaijan and Armenia are an insurance policy of the US.  
 In the extension of this strategic thinking, the conflict of Nagorno-
Karabakh is a relatively important issue for the US Middle Eastern policy. 
However, how much it can bring the issue forward is another matter. Since it 
has undermined its own potentiality of an honest peace broker, the US may 
resort to use international institutions/organisations to push the situation, like 
the use of NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative to grant large-scale 
development aid to Azerbaijan, which seems to be a reward to Azeri 
participation in the War on Afghanistan and a seed for future cooperation.265 
 
Iran 
For a better regional trading environment, it is better for Iran to see the peace 
processes successful. It actually worked as a peace broker between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1992 and helped the presidents of the both 
countries sign ‘an agreement on a cease-fire to take effect within a week as 
a basis for a subsequent agreement on the end to the economic blockade of 
Armenia, the acceptance of [international] observers into the area, an 
exchange of prisoners, and the return of refugees.’ However, ‘[a] day after 
the signing, the Karabakh Armenians took the offensive, attacking Shusha, 
and then moving toward the western border of Nagorno-Karabakh, driving 
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Azerbaijani forces and the local Azeri population ahead of them in disarray.  
This ended the Iranian initiative.’266 
 In terms of religion, Iran may be close to Azerbaijan. However, Iran's 
religiously hard liner position does not match to the relatively secular 
Azerbaijan. In terms of economy, Azerbaijan is a competitor against Iranian 
oil business and a collaborator to bring Iranian oil to the outside world with 
swapping the oil through the local pipelines to dodge the international 
sanction against Iran. In terms of regional relations, Iran is suspected that it 
supports a Azeri political party, the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (AIP), which is 
pro-Iranian and banned by the Azeri authority. Iran is unhappy for the relation 
between Azerbaijan and the US. Teheran helps Armenians in Nagorno-
Karabakh providing necessary goods and electricity as an agent of Yerevan 
to check Baku. Iran provides gas to Armenia.267 Accordingly, Iran is very 
strategically acting to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
 Yet, the most of Iranian foreign policy over the Caucasus including the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is largely a reflection of its rivalry against the US. 
What Iran is afraid of most is that an unstable Caucasus region may invite a 
large scale of the US and Western led intervention, like the 2003 Iraq War. In 
this term, Iran likes to have a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Yet, the 
peace has to come in the Iranian terms. The peace deal must be the one to 
keep off the US and Western presence and influence from the region, 
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undermine Azeri oil sector as a competitor, and expand its influence of 
Iranian brand of Islam in particular to Azerbaijan. Otherwise, Iran rather sees 
its interests in continuing the conflict to check Azerbaijan.  
 
Turkey 
Since it has some problems with Armenia, such as the dispute over the 
Armenian Genocide, Armenian-Turkish relations are generally antagonistic. 
In the context of the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey tends to stand for 
the Azeri claim and, when time is felt relatively good, it urges Armenia to 
drop the territorial claim or the hope for the independence of Nagorno-
Karabakh. There is a sense of the Turkish brotherhood between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan spinning out of the history of the region. The closeness in religion 
also makes Turkey align to Azerbaijan. Plus, Azeri strong economy in the 
region is also attractive for Ankara.  
 At the same time, Turkey wants to have the peaceful condition over 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan for the sake of the stable use of the BTC 
pipeline from which Turkey can bet a good deal of economic gains.268 This 
needs to bring Armenia. Therefore, Turkey has attempted several times 
rapprochement with Armenia, which has not been successful. Turkey has 
also initiated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform after the 2008 
Georgian War to deepen the dialogues between all South Caucasian states, 
Russia and Turkey. While the EU and the US were invited, their reaction was 
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not positive.269 It does not move as a spoiler state in the frozen conflicts, like 
Russia or Iran. Nevertheless, Turkey lacks creditability in Armenian minds 
and cannot be regarded as a candidate for the brokers of the peace process.  
 Towards the Georgian breakaway regions, the 2008 Georgian War 
gives a shadow to the Turkish minds. Georgia is too small to be a buffer for 
Turkey from Russian threats. The war increases the concerns over Turkish 
territorial defence that include the protection of the BTC pipeline.  
 
China 
As the Shale Revolution goes on, China may expand its influence over the oil 
producing Middle Eastern countries and Caucasian states to feed its twelve 
billion population and keep its economy grow. So far, China’s state-controlled 
energy companies do not possess the Shale technology, and their use of the 
old type of technology in undersea drilling is largely questionable, in 
particular in terms of environmental safety. China's energy demand is acute 
and needs an immediate answer. In the light of this acuteness, a realistic 
choice for China is natural resource in the land areas in Russia, Kazakhstan, 
the Caucasus and the Middle East. China may not be so visible a player in 
the 21st Great Game so far. Potentially, however, it is a big player.  
 Like Russia, China is also a sovereign economy and likes to play a 
great power role even in the private business field. The degree is stronger 
than Russia. Its style of inter-state relations in Africa is regarded as neo-
colonialism associated with the so-called Beijing Consensus, which ignores 
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moral and ethnical problems and grants a large scale of investments to buy 
the elites of the regime in the partner states and get the exclusive right to 
exploit the resources seen in Sudan before the country broke up into two. 
Over the Caucasian states, China is extending the style of commitments. 
While China has a history of arms sale to Armenia in 1999,270 the Chinese 
trend is on Azerbaijan thinking of the oil and gas resources. China’s official 
line over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is non-interference on the issue and, 
at the same time, supports the Azeri territorial integrity.271 This can be read 
as a typical Beijing’s tacit consent on the Azeri position over the conflict. 
China cooperates with Azerbaijan over a variety of fields including financial 
aids on Azeri infrastructure. The shift of Chinese foreign policy over the 
Caucasus shows how big for the Chinese minds the energy security is.  
 The Caucasians should remind of a fact that China is also a territorial 
expansionist even in the 21st century. Its territorial ambition has been time 
and again proven by the territorial conflicts in Kashmir region between India 
and Pakistan, the forceful incorporation of Tibet and the sea territorial issues 
in the South China Sea and the East China Sea with its distorting 
interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). The 
Chinese style of foreign policy features the combination of broad territorial 
claims; economic, political, and military strength; an uncompromising 
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diplomatic stance; and demonstrated aggressiveness in pursuing its 
objectives.’272  
 Considering these elements, although China may not be an immediate 
security threat to the Caucasus right now, it is potentially dangerous. Just 
outside the Caucasus, the China's degree as a security threat increases over 
Kazakhstan sharing a border with the country. China has become an 
important customer for Russia which is losing some portion of the European 
market as a result of its aggressive foreign policy over the FSU states. It also 
has "thick" relations with Iran not only in the field of energy business but also 
in military cooperation including nuclear weapons. That annoys the US and 
EU states.  
 
 
5.2: The Frozen Conflicts and the OSCE 
 
For the then CSCE, the Caucasian conflicts were the first violent conflicts to 
commit after the Cold War and in the process of transforming into the OSCE. 
The period was a peculiar timing. The CSCE was not expected to develop 
into a well-organised and coordinated security organisation during the Cold 
War. The reality of the Cold War and the Soviet resistance against the follow-
up process concerned with Basket III did not allow to seek possibility to 
extend the institutional framework to another stage. When the Cold War 
ended, It was not organisationally and structurally ready to play a collective 
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will of the Participating States, especially over the Soviet territory that had 
been virtually untouchable by any international humanitarian activities or 
peace operations.  
 While a sudden end of the Soviet Union was, in a sense, an opportunity 
to establish a new profile and presence in the international community, it was 
too sudden for the CSCE in 1992 to take such an operational role in peace 
operations some years after the Caucasian conflicts had escalated, if a real 
effectiveness was expected. As a result, the CSCE/OSCE brokered peace 
processes were hijacked by the interested states. Both the OSCE Mission to 
Georgia (1993 ~ 2008) and the Minsk Process (1992~) were, from the start, 
troubled by the Russia’s dual track peace processes and the actual presence 
of the Russian military forces under the frameworks of the CIS brokered or 
bilaterally negotiated peacekeeping operations. The circumstances in the 
early 1990s, as a result, force the OSCE to have some limits in playing a 
mediator or a place of gathering for the peace processes to work as a public 
function in the international/regional community in the frozen conflicts. There 
was simply no space where the OSCE could establish its presence in and 
take a lead of these processes from the start. The OSCE has been put into a 
position that it ritually presides the processes among the nationally 
(individually) motivated state actors. In the peace processes, therefore, the 
space where genuine, neutral, impartial external third-parties can work has 
become so limited and unable to generate influence.  
 The field missions which are organised by the OSCE or any other 
international/regional institutions and organisations may be counted as such 
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a space in a limited sense, since the day-by-day activities of the missions are 
theoretically in the hands of the mission-dispatching institutions and 
organisations of which the headquarters do not usually follow all details. If 
the missions are properly designed and run by the rule of law in the 
institutions and organisations, the field missions, therefore, become an 
autonomy to some extent and make a blind spot for the member states of 
these institutions and organisations at the diplomatic level. For the minds 
coming out of the pre-modern and modern worlds, such a third-parties' 
autonomy lying in their interests is annoying. The state actors in the frozen 
conflicts are largely filled with the countries coming out of the worlds and 
more understanding the language of the balance or projection of power and 
the rule of the powerful than the one of pluralistic community, institutional 
arrangements and the rule of law. In the minds of such state actors, the  
third-parties' autonomy is located in the place where they relatively struggle 
to influence. Therefore, it may be taken as an obstacle to remove for their 
foreign policy. 
 On the contrary, the talking points at the higher diplomatic level of 
international/regional institutions and organisations are much easier for the 
state actors to follow and exert their influence. Even if such talks happen 
under  the frameworks of international/regional institutions and 
organisations, the host institutions and organisations rather work as the 
facilitators of the talks who may prepare for peace plans but not so for 
political games with the states actors in the frameworks and geopolitics. The 
state actors who have ulterior and selfish purposes other than the peace 
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planning of conflicts, therefore, naturally work for demoting the field missions 
for peace operations and letting the whole issues being concentrated on the 
higher level of diplomatic talks. This phenomenon can be seen in the frozen 
conflicts. 
 The OSCE had  been carrying out the Mission to Chechnya in the 
North Caucasus in Russia. Gradually, however, Russia’s anti-OSCE stance 
started lurking around this period and vetoed the extension of the Mission to 
shut down at the end of 2002. In Georgia, following the agreement with the 
UN, the OSCE was largely taking a charge of South Ossetia, while the UN 
was committing to Abkhazia. Nevertheless, the OSCE’s Mission to Georgia 
was doomed by, again, Russia, in 2008 after the Georgian War. Even before 
that, the border observation mission under the framework of the Mission to 
Georgia had been closed in the end of 2004 due to the Russian pressure. 
The two Georgian breakaway regions are now the unofficial independent 
states sponsored by Russia which virtually holds the suzerainty over the 
separatist republics, though it is not so clear whether the locals are welcome 
the virtual Russian rule. 
 On the other hand, the OSCE’s Minsk Group over Nagorno-Karabakh 
has been working since 1992 and has not been successfully in bringing the 
parties to the conflict to a lasting peace resolution. In this issue, although 
there is the plan of a peace operation, there has not been a well-arranged 
long term mission by the OSCE or any other international institutions and 
organisations. Therefore, the national interests of and the power politics 
among the Participating States of the Minsk Group largely affect the course 
of the talk. 
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 The Minsk Process, however, has made some progress during the last 
two decades. It proposed a “step by step” approach which suggests that ‘first 
the liberation of the surrounding regions of Azerbaijan, a return of displaced 
Azerbaijani population to their former residences, and a resumption of 
economic and human contacts, and then an eventual decision on the status 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh’.273 Although it was initially rejected by Armenia, 
the approach is still working in planning the peace deal. Then, the so-called 
“package deal” came. This contained the issue of the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh and the withdrawal of Armenian military troops from the conflicting 
area. Azerbaijan rejected this, since it liked to decide the return of Azeri 
population to the area before the status was determined. The next was an 
idea of a “common state” which offered the co-sovereign states position to 
both Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azeris disagreed. Yet, 
these proposals became the foundation of the so-called “Basic Principles” or 
“Madrid Principles”. The “Principles” proposed to hold the discussion over the 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh and to proceed the other issues such as the 
return of the refugees, the development of infrastructure and the resumption 
of trade as the priority.274 
 In 2007, the “updated Madrid Principles” appeared with some minor 
amendments in the OSCE Summit of the year. In 2009, the Minsk Process 
was so close to an agreement. Mysteriously, however, Armenia melted away 
from the talk. In 2010, the OSCE’s Astana Summit urged the two countries to 
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do ‘more decisive efforts’,275 and, in 2011, the Kazan meeting with Russian 
President Dmitri Medvedev was held. Again, no agreement was made. In the 
last few years, it seems to be Armenia which declines to bring the final 
resolution, probably minding about the withdrawal of Armenian troops and 
possible loss of influence over the area. An attempt to restore the process 
was done with minor changes of the proposal. This time, Azerbaijan rejected 
the amended version.276 
 Despite the activities of the Minsk Group, it has been never fully 
transparent what are talked behind the closed door of the negotiation and 
between the states individually and how much the arbitrator states are 
liberated themselves from their national interests over the Caucasus. 
Especially after Russia made the new independent states inside Georgia as 
a part of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy over the near abroad, it is hard to 
increase confidence on Russia as an impartial and neutral mediator, though 
it had been questionable before the event. However, no matter how dubious 
Russia is in the Minsk Process, the OSCE or the other OSCE Participating 
States do not have a strong will to raise the Russian problem and question 
about Russia’s ethical qualification to be in the Minsk Group.  
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 On the contrary, the OSCE's weakness may be more visible than the 
Russian problem. Theoretically the OSCE is the pan-European security 
institution covering a vast geographical region from “Vancouver to 
Vladivostok” as the organisation claims, which makes itself the most 
legitimate mediator, probably only next to the UN, in the international level to 
engage in the conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asian FSU republics. 
The CIS does not have such a reputation, legitimacy or moral authority, due 
to the fact and/or impression of Russian domination in the organisation that 
causes a suspicion as if it would work as an agent of Russia’s foreign policy. 
The OSCE’s higher legitimacy, however, cannot compensate for its lack of 
military forces to “enforce” peace in particular in the eyes of the direct parties 
to the conflicts. It has also had no record of peacekeeping/making operations 
organising the multilateral forces, except planning for the case of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A vague image of impartiality of the organisation 
cannot compensate for the lack of experience. 
 Furthermore, with the consensus-based decision-making system, the 
OSCE inevitably presents itself to the parties to the conflicts as an 
international/regional organisation that cannot be independent from politics 
among the Participating States, including some of the interested parties on 
geopolitics, as suggested above. It simply does not have a sufficiently 
institutional capacity or means to fend off the vigorous degree of power 
projection by the Minsk Group states in particular Russia. In other words, as 
Victor-Yves Ghébali notes, ‘… as a cooperative security organisation, [the 
OSCE] lacks the structural capacity to provide inducements or to impose 
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sanctions – the indispensable tools of effective mediation. The Chechnya 
conflict and the so-called ‘frozen’ conflicts are illustrative of such inability.’277  
 In his opinion, there are three reasons over why the OSCE is incapable 
of navigating the course of the peace processes in the frozen conflicts. 
 
• Moscow’s dual role as mediator and party 
• Intransigence of the breakaway authorities 
• Western diplomatic complacency278  
 
 The first point is about Russian geopolitical ambition. Although then 
President Medvedev temporarily exhibited a Russian “soft” face in the 
development of the Minsk process, this can be interpreted as his political 
strategy to make a difference from the hard line foreign policy of Putin, 
looking at the scheduled presidential election in March 2012. Since Putin has 
been back to the presidency, it needs to wait to see about how much his 
stance towards the near abroad has shifted or not. After the Georgian war 
2008, however, it may be safe to articulate that Moscow’s action is ‘a neo-
Byzantine version of “piece keeping,” in Paul Goble’s words.’ As a result, 
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‘Georgia became the most striking manifestation of Russia’s new 
[interventionist] policy in the post-Soviet space.’279  
 The second point relates partly to the OSCE's lack of capacity to deliver 
a peace operation and partly to the isolation of the conflict zones from the 
international community which have become very independent from the 
outside world and more dependent on Russia. They simply do not see any 
reason to compromise in the peace processes brokered by the international 
actors. 
 The final point is largely about the Western countries which are also 
playing the major roles in the international/regional institutions and 
organisations and of which the civilisation has been providing the main set of 
values to them. They have not clearly determined their position and foreign 
policy towards the Caucasus region and conflicts, if not “complacency.” The 
indecisiveness is logically projected into politics in the international/regional 
organisations. The OSCE cannot escape from that. If the Western 
Participating States are clearly supporting the peace talks frameworks 
provided by the OSCE, the organisation may be able to counter political 
game inside the organisation and geopolitics over the Caucasian frozen 
conflicts. 
 For example, in his paper, Why Georgia matters, as a study for the EU, 
Dov Lynch stresses that the EU has a correct analysis over what the 
Caucasus stakes are for the EU, while it lacks the political will to 
                                            
5-68A4-C952-EB8C-A6E75E98065B&lng=en. (accessed on August 2008). 
pp.10-11. 
279 Gordadze, Thornike. (2009). Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s. 
In: Cornell, Svante E., and S. Frederick Starr, eds. The Guns of August 2008 
  347 
meaningfully engage in the region. On the one hand, it is possible to see the 
creation of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1999, the 
programmes of TACIS, and the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the 
South Caucasus as a positive sign of an active engagement by the EU and 
its member states which are also the participating states of the OSCE. After 
the Rose Revolution in 2004, the EU enhanced its role in the two breakaway 
regions in Georgia and supported the OSCE-led Needs Assessment Study in 
late 2005 to early 2006. After the end of the OSCE Border Monitoring 
Mission due to the Russian veto in 2004, the EU increased its assistance for 
the border control for Georgia along with a similar effort of the OSCE in the 
still-remained framework of Mission to Georgia at that time. All these positive 
signs, however, have not been able to alter the situations of the Georgian 
conflicts and push the peace process forward. Lynch sees the reasons for 
this in the lack of a clear setting of a coherent policy and the EU’s ad hoc 
actions without strategy, even though Georgia stakes in terms of the value of 
democracy, stability of a border of the EU sphere, energy security and 
traditional military security.280 It is, therefore, nothing strange if there has 
been the lack of a political will to make the CSCE/OSCE really workable, 
taking into account the fact that the EU member states are the nearly half of 
the participating states of the OSCE and the same hesitation within the EU 
has been projected into the policies and activities of the OSCE. Furthermore, 
the OSCE holds Russia as a biased and a great regional power actor. The 
organisation, in the treatment over the Caucasian frozen conflicts, is really 
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caught up in a dilemma caused by the indecisiveness of the West and the 
aggressiveness of Russia.  
 Furthermore, the EU seems to be diminishing the engagement in the 
Caucasus in the recent years. It abolished the position of the EURS for the 
South Caucasus in 2010 due to the organisational reform. According to 
Richard Giragosian and Liz Fuller, this change caused the loss of Peter 
Sumneby, a Swedish diplomat who had been an EURS and especially 
dealing with the South Caucasus issues.281 
 If the EU has abandoned the will to play a meaningful role in the 
Caucasian peace processes and is going to separate from the issues, this 
may be a great blow for the OSCE. The conflicts involving geopolitics over 
energy security do not have so many actors who sincerely pursue a positive 
peace regardless of strategic interests. As an international/regional institution, 
the EU has a better degree of “sincereness” than that of the state actors, 
diluting the respective strategic interests of the EU states. However, with the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework, it must forge a 
unanimous consent over the 27 countries. This makes the EU less timely 
and responsive to the peace processes than the state actors engaging in the 
Caucasian issues. 
 The Western countries’ indecisiveness on how to face Russia is, in fact, 
the most significant issue that, in the end, determines not only the future of 
the OSCE’s commitment to the Caucasus but also of the whole European 
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security. The unstable Yeltsin’s Russia gave an impression that Russia could 
be tamed in the 1990s and the West did not seriously connect to the 
Caucasus. The assertive Putin’s Russia, however, has abused such a 
Western stasis in the 2000s with an ambition to regain the sphere of 
influence over the Soviet territory. The West now needs to re-think of its 
agenda which is ‘how to accommodate Russia’s real concerns about vital 
interests yet temper coercive tendencies.’282  
 The bottom line of the Caucasian conflicts is the Russian ambition and 
its value system. If Russia chooses to adopt the international/OSCE 
standards of the principles of international relations and human rights, the 
peace deals can be built up more easily even though there are still other 
actor states which commit realpolitik-based foreign policies. As long as 
Russia plays the dual track I solely for its own interests and practically 
preserves its power to continue the game, Russia’s leverage to influence the 
peace processes is too huge to quell. Therefore, David Galbreath notes that, 
in comparison to the former Yugoslavian conflicts where all conflicts in the 
1990s have been settled, ‘[w]e … see that this irony is largely explained by 
one single factor: the Russian Federation.’283  
 If the OSCE will be a competent peace broker in the coming future, the 
OSCE needs to rebuild and reposition itself. On politics inside the 
organisation, it must develop strategies to counter the defectors, free-riders 
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and pretenders in the light of the organisational principles, norms, practices 
and values. While, in the end, the counter-measures should be institutionally 
equipped with a variety degree of exclusion procedures like the consensus 
minus one principle, it is probably a long way to go to reach the political 
agreement to realise. Therefore, the organisation needs more vigorous 
cooperation from the Western countries of which the values are the source of 
the OSCE's ones. The most of the defectors, free-riders and pretenders are 
led by Russia. The Western united effort is necessary to counter the regional 
great power in the post-Soviet pre-modern/modern world. The OSCE must 
face the Russian problem if it keeps the organisational coherency.  
 Then, the OSCE must be able to organise a militarily capable mission 
that should not count solely on Russia which will not be an accountable actor 
without being checked, whatever it will be done under coordination with 
NATO, the EU or the Western countries. The effort should be done 
proactively rather than waiting for the progress of the peace processes, since 
the locals in Nagorno-Karabakh do not increase confidence on the OSCE 
unless they are presented something more. The OSCE should be a provider 
of public goods including the means of peace, especially the military ones.  
Although it cannot be achieved immediately, such a preparation can show a 
certain degree of willingness to the locals in the conflict zones.  
 The OSCE’s current position is undoubtedly “a waiting and see” or ‘the 
preservation of the peace processes”. While this makes the organisation look 
weak, in a sense, this is also a function of a public actor, as seen in the 
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process towards the Helsinki Final Act and the troublesome follow-up 
process of the Basket III after that. The “waiting and see” position may bring 
the organisation to the position that, when the peace processes move and 
necessitate some international missions, the OSCE will be the first choice to 
be used. This function should not be underestimated.  
 In fact, if the peace processes are preserved for a long time, even 
geopolitical conditions may change. Russia is going to encounter economic 
difficulties in the coming years due to the Shale Revolution and its own 
Kleptocracy. This will economically exhaust Russia. The dual problems may 
help Russia (strategically) cooperate in international relations and towards 
the OSCE. Unlike the 2000s, Russia is needing international cooperation in 
economic and technological terms at a deeper level, even though the 
Western countries’ economy is also in difficulties. The OSCE may find an 
opportunity to change the current structure of the organisational politics and 
the Russian values.  
 In addition, the Caucasus is a bridging region to the Middle East and 
Iran which are one of the most focused international security problems in the 
world. The situation of the Caucasus is a reflection of these two problematic 
areas, though, in comparison to them, the international attention on the 
Caucasus is low. The OSCE is compensating for this international 
indifference to some extent. While it has lost the Mission to Georgia, the 
OSCE still has the diplomatic connection to the country. Then, it has the local 
centres in Azerbaijan and Armenia which are working as a means of conflict 
prevention and an observation post for the frozen conflict and other local 
incidents which may develop into bigger security issues.  
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 Nevertheless, it is true that the OSCE should be more creative in 
widening the possibility of the peace processes of the frozen conflicts, not 
just following the usual routine local activities and diplomatic meetings in the 
organisation. While it is a politically-binding organisation and must be able to 
produce some political skills to make a deeper connection to the frozen 
conflict, the organisation has not actively attempted to do so. In this light, the 
yearly rotating system of the Chairmanship and the Troika may not be ideal 
to make the organisation concentrate on a long-term agenda. Each year, the 
new Chairmanship country sets a new set of agendas to show off its “colour”, 
while there are long-term issues which do not or cannot fit to a specific 
mission category, like the Russian anti-OSCE value problem and the 
Georgian conflicts. Without the official mandates of projects or missions for 
such problems, none of the organisational organs cannot take a charge and 
make a long-term commitment to the problems. Then, the problems are just 
floating in chatting among the diplomats from the Participating States and 
officers of the OSCE without being systematically and organically engaged. 
As a result, there are the situations that everybody knows as the problems 
but nothing can be done. 
 
 
5.3: Conclusion 
 
The frozen conflicts exhibit the limitation of the OSCE in the violent conflicts 
seeded by the prolonged history during the Soviet period. The CSCE/OSCE 
did not and could not prepare for the challenge in a rapidly changing 
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international environment from the middle of the 1980s to the end of the 
1990s. While it was transforming into a regional organisation and dealing 
with the problems of the Eastern European countries, the CSCE/OSCE could 
not extend its influence enough to the Caucasian conflicts under the 
circumstance that external state actors surrounding the Caucasus were 
vigorously working for their national interests over the conflicts. The frozen 
structure of the conflicts was all set. The CSCE/OSCE always came after the 
fait accompli was consolidated. 
 The frozen conflicts also imply a great difficulty to exert influence over 
the violent conflicts when the mediators are not supported by military power 
to win confidence of the parties to the conflicts. Then, the OSCE is just 
waiting for the peace processes to reach the ultimate resolutions without 
attempting to mitigate its flaw in this aspect. Although the OSCE needs 
supports from NATO or the Participating States for preparing peacekeepers, 
this should be done preemptively, since it is clear that the lack of military 
power is an issue.  
 The frozen conflicts further show that energy-security related 
geopolitics turns state actors to self-help actors even in the peace processes, 
no matter how much they are usually cooperative ones over other 
international/regional issues. State’s capability to cooperate is likely 
diminished when energy security comes as a part of the problems. 
 The OSCE is currently working for the preservation of the peace 
processes. Although such an activity may not be highly valued, it is also 
important to keep a possible path to peace until other way will be found. The 
Caucasian frozen conflicts are usually not well highlighted by the 
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international media while, thinking of the geopolitics, it should be followed 
more closely. In particular, under the current civil war in Syria, the prolonged 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian issue, the course of the Caucasian 
stability/instability affects the future course of the Middle East in a greater 
view.  
 More than that, the preservation of the processes may potentially start 
being facing a shift. If the Shale Revolution redraws the map of energy 
resources globally, the game of the rule in the Caucasian geopolitics will also 
change. In the change, the OSCE may find an opportunity to move the 
frozen condition of the conflicts into a positive peace. The OSCE is one of a 
few public actors in the frozen conflicts, even though the organisation cannot 
escape from the influence of the Participating States. Nevertheless, the 
institutional framework has an effect to dilute the self-help nature of the 
Participating States and may extract a peace plan which can be commonly 
good for the parties to the conflicts at least and publicly good for the whole 
international community. It is recommended, however, that the OSCE be 
creative in politically detaching the self-help and anti-OSCE Participating 
States from their national interests. Russia, especially, should be dealt with 
in some way. Ideally saying, due to the Russia’s anti-OSCE stance in a 
variety issues, its membership should be a subject of suspension in charge 
of non-cooperation to the OSCE’s reason d’être, norms, practices, principles 
and values. 
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Conclusion 
 
The OSCE does have some positive records in the field activities in the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) republics. The most conspicuous examples are 
the two fields missions in the Baltic states, Mission to Estonia (1993~2001) 
and Mission to Latvia (1993~2001). The missions were about how to deal 
with tensions between Russian-speaking populations (mainly Russians who 
used to be the ruling ethnicity and fell into the position of an ethnic minority 
group) and the titular ethnic groups (respectively Estonians and Latvians who 
used to be the major subordinating ethnic groups and have become the 
majority ethnic groups) after the demise of the Soviet Union.  
 What the Baltic missions illustrate is about the cases of “when state 
actors are cooperative”, “when there is no antagonistic state actor to 
cooperation existing,” “when state actors are willing to accept an external 
value system” and “when state actors have hope to get what they want”. 
These factors working in the cases in the Baltic states make a stark contrast 
to the cases of the value war with Russia and the Caucasus frozen conflicts, 
which have been discussed in this thesis. Therefore, this concluding part 
likes to consider the contrast.  
 The tensions between the Russian-speaking populations and the titular 
ethnic groups in the Baltic states had been already noticed in the 1990 
CSCE Charter of Paris and an expert meeting was scheduled in Geneva 
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from 1 to 19 July 1991.284 The major would-be-mediator in the non-violent 
confrontations was the High Commissioner of National Minorities (HCNM) of 
the CSCE/OSCE. The post was officially established at the 1992 Helsinki 
Summit at which the Helsinki Document specified the HCNM’s mandates. 
The tensions were a part of the phenomenon of the so-called Russian 
Diaspora, which suggested that ‘some 25 to 27 million Russians resided in 
erstwhile Soviet republic outside the [Russian Federation] — more than a 
million in the pribaltika.’285 Thinking of the fact that the Soviet Union ceased 
to exist in the end of 1991, the then CSCE’s commitments to the Baltic 
tensions had been already begun before the Union ended. This is symbolic 
how much the closeness to the post-modern world of the West in terms of 
geography and psychology had significance in calling for an appropriate 
international attention and initiating proactive measures before the tensions 
would reach the level of violence. Unlike the Caucasian conflicts, there had 
not been a coherent series of external influence to disrupt the effort of the 
CSCE/OSCE. Either the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation did not 
obtrude on the Baltic issues so vigorously and systematically as they did in 
the Caucasus, even though the issues were largely about Russians who 
were and are the core ethnic group in Russia.  
 Russia has a number of means to harass the Baltic states with the 
overwhelming military and economic power against them. For example, the 
three Baltic states depend on Russia about the nearly 100% of their energy 
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supply. And, in fact, sometimes the supply is disrupted by “the faults of the 
energy infrastructure” of the Russian (state-controlled) energy companies. As 
an example of the recent year, the 2007 cyberattack on Estonia was doubted 
as a Russian harassment over the relocation of a grave maker called the 
Bronze Soldier of Tallinn and the grave itself. Despite such an overwhelming 
power disparity, Russia the regional great power did not obscenely interrupt 
the CSCE/OSCE’s effort on the issues of the Russian-speaking minorities in 
the Baltic states other than an occasional lip service for the domestic 
audience of politics in Russia. In this light, the Russian government was and 
is not so much interested in the fate of Russians outside of the federation, no 
matter what it said and says. This is a reflection of the Soviet/Russian values 
in which human rights and humanitarian care over the same ethnic people 
are not firmly fixed and significant in the civilisation.  
 The Baltics historically have a deep relation to the Russian civilisation, 
but not completely belong to it. They rather stick with the European 
civilisation and, no matter whether that is appropriate or not, the Balts put 
their sense of identity rather on “European” than on “Russian”. For the Balts, 
Europe is more advanced than Russia is, and, since they are rather in the 
side of Europe, the Baltic culture should be in some way better, more 
positive and superior to the Russian one. In the Soviet demography, 
languages were the marker of the ethnic distinction.286 That indicates a 
special position of languages in the Soviet territory. Then, the Baltic 
languages, which have absorbed the modernity of Europe, have been 
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considered more advanced languages than Russian.287 In such a way, the 
Balts had been holding their European attachment during the Soviet era. 
When the Soviet Union ended, one of the first aspirations that the Balts had 
is to restore their “European” identity. The affiliation of the European regional 
institutions and organisations was the very first practical step to achieve the 
aspiration at the national level. The CSCE was the easiest and most open 
institution to enter without any cumbersome procedure, unlike the EU which 
has several steps of screening and required standards to achieve. The Baltic 
states were, therefore, much enthusiastic to adapt the European standards 
that happened to be very close to the international standards on a variety of 
things, including human rights.  
 These coincidences helped the CSCE/OSCE to generate a greater 
autonomy for implementation of the pre-emptive measures and missions. 
Unlike the Caucasian conflicts, the CSCE/OSCE could take a lead to the 
processes of controlling the Baltic tensions. The relative indifference on the 
Russian-speaking minorities in the former Soviet territory by the Russian 
government means that the minorities could not get a support or subsidiary, 
while the locals of the Caucasian conflict zones are getting some forms of 
support from the Russian government, including the Russian passports. 
Consequently, the Russian-speaking minorities could not effectively unite 
and organise pressure groups to their host governments even though they 
were relatively living collectively in cities. Their position, therefore, was 
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socially very weak in the Baltic states. If the Baltic states did not have the 
wish for integration in Europe through the CSCE/OSCE, NATO and the EU, 
the Baltic governments under the newly acquired democracy might have 
been pushed by a popular demand of “revenge” against the Russians. The 
Soviet history alone can provide a number of reasons enough to justify this 
Baltic feeling, starting from the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, 
which unilaterally decided the Baltic incorporation to the Soviet Union. 
 If the CSCE/OSCE missions to Estonia and Latvia are regarded as a 
success, some of the reasons should be the facts that the CSCE/OSCE’s 
commitments (1) bared the Baltic governments from engaging in popularism 
politics, (2) induced them to follow the international/European standards in 
human rights and democracy, (3) supported for the installation of a set of 
“reasonable” laws over citizenship for the minorities taking into account the 
historical background that they could not change and (4) proposed practical 
policies on the treatment of the minorities such as the language schools. The 
contribution of the then HCNMs, Max van der Stoel from the Netherlands, 
occupied a large part of the CSCE/OSCE’s achievement in the Baltics. As a 
result, his style of diplomacy — the so called quiet diplomacy — has become 
the trademark of the HCNMs. 
 In the OSCE’s institutional design of conflict management, the HCNMs 
is located in preventive diplomacy covering “early warning” and “early action”. 
He or she is given a relatively greater autonomy as a mediator. He was 
accountable to first of all, the Chairman-in-Office (CiO) and his or her reports 
are strictly confidential until the OSCE decides to disclose them. Although it 
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is an institution for conflict prevention and peace building and management 
about the so-called national minorities, the HCNMs is not a devoted friend to 
any parties in negotiation, in particular to minority groups. It must be 
understood that the HCNM ‘is not an instrument for the protection of 
minorities or a sort of international ombudsman who acts on their behalf.’ 
While the HCNMs takes it for granted that the state responsibility covers 
minority issues, he or she ‘must also remind persons belonging to a minority 
that they have duties as well as rights.288’⁠ Therefore, the High Commissioner 
is “on” national minorities but not “for” them. At the same time, ‘it is only 
possible to say that minorities have … rights: to exist, and to be different in 
their existence from the majority of people in their state.’ While ‘[t]he right to 
exist derives from the Genocide Convention,’ [t]he right to be different has 
now crystallized into a rule of international law to the extent that it is 
expressed in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’289.⁠ 
 Van der Stoel, as the HCNMs, did not deviate from the position 
throughout the missions in the Baltic states. He did not demand to give 
privilege for the minorities other than discretion on them due to the historical 
circumstances and coincidences. He was also capable of reasoning the 
Baltic counterparts in diplomacy when the Estonia and Latvian parliaments 
adopted controversial laws concerned with the Rusian-speaking minorities, 
such as the 1993 Law on the Status of Aliens in Estonian and the 1993 Law 
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on Citizenship in Latvia. The CSCE/OSCE and the HCNMs worked hard to 
help the both governments return the laws to the parliaments to re-consider 
or amend in a number of times. The pressure obviously worked positively 
and the legislations of the both countries on citizenship and minorities today 
fairly match to the international standards at the present time.  
 Nevertheless, what is the biggest reason of the relatively reasonable 
resolutions of the Baltic issues is the capability of the Baltic states to 
cooperate the CSCE/OSCE's agendas. They swallowed and quelled their 
negative feeling on the Russian-speaking minorities in exchange of acquiring 
the European identity which has the post-modern features of human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law, advanced technology or pluralism. The Baltic 
governments persuaded its titular citizens to be reasonable or talked 
necessity to follow the international standards. Although the Baltic quest for 
the European identity partly meant the EU and NATO memberships that 
were supposed to promise economic stability and better border security 
(against Russia), without concerning the antagonism against the Russian-
speaking minorities, the Baltic states could not have become an honourable 
member of the EU states today.  
 Therefore, Russia, which likes to be distinctive from the post-modern 
West, and the states of the "East of Vienna" which do not have any hope to 
be integrated to the post-modern world in terms of geography, are tenacious 
to let them align to the standards of international/regional institutions and 
organisations. Then, for the OSCE, Russia must be deal with in some way. It 
is too huge to ignore or swallow, while it is resistant to the OSCE’s norms, 
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principles and values. This can be also said about the EU, of which the 
traditional member states provide a large part of the post-modern and 
OSCE’s peace and security ideology, when it deals with Russia. Jackie 
Gower and Graham Timmins points a confrontation between the EU and 
Russia in referring to Derek Averre’s article. 
 
‘Derek Averre … argues that there is a deep-rooted 
incompatibility between the EU’s use of post-modern, 
normative power and Russia’s use of modern, 
structural power, an incompatibility which sets out a 
range of complex challenges in developing any 
tangible meaning to the concept ‘strategic 
partnership’ between the two actors.’290 
 
The “realistically" defined national interests of Russia and the other states in 
the “East of Vienna” are not so available to trade with a sense of being 
included in an international/regional community associating with other 
civilisational norms, practices, principles and values, seen in the cases of the 
Baltic states. The non-cooperative states of the “East of Vienna” are 
uncomfortable where equality, accountability and transparency connect to 
their reputation, honour and face value. They are less capable of see the 
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power of the logic of appropriateness in a long term of which the process 
constitutes a coherent profile of states and generates trustworthiness as a 
partner of cooperation in the international community. They have not come to 
term with the truth that the series of behaviour that follows the logic of 
consequences time after time, in the end, is beneficial only for the short term 
and strategic purposes but not so for building up the reputation of 
trustworthiness as either a diplomatic asset or earning a genuine respect. 
 The elites of the non-cooperative states know these traits of their states 
to some extend, though their degree of understanding may vary. These 
strategic and myopic state actors are unable to produce something universal 
that can stands for the test of time. No matter how much they are negative in 
adopting human rights, democracy and the rule of law, they are also unable 
to produce an alternative set of universal institutions and values and a 
counter-ideology that the international community wholeheartedly embraces. 
Such a set of universal things has been generated by the Western civilisation, 
no matter how bitter the states of the “East of Vienna” feel. Nevertheless, the 
ordinary peoples in the states rather appreciate the Western-made 
institutions and values. Their complains against the ruling elites are given the 
names of “freedom of speech”, the “right of assemble” or “the rule of law”. It 
may be the West which first gave the names to these dissatisfactions. Yet, 
the desires for these things are always with humanity all over the world. 
Therefore, it can be said that the Western-made institutions and values 
contain universality that includes social justice in the international community. 
A social space (like the international community) needs social justice 
that transcends the individual (state or national) interests of the members of 
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society and unites it. Social spaces in the form of international/regional 
institutions, therefore, should employ a set of morally justifiable raison d'être. 
This is a key to making the institutions durable and lasting, even though they 
may occasionally suffer from mistakes or low performance. The morally 
justifiable raison d'être, which anyone can objectively agree to, generates 
universality or transcendence. It is a source of soft power and comes out of 
“common goods”. It overcomes a variety of differences in humanity. 
“Common goods” and “public goods” are related to the logic of 
appropriateness that sociological IR associates with, and, more 
fundamentally connects to the “golden rule” that Immanuel Kant sets as his 
most general moral law – the “categorical imperative” or absolute moral 
obligation – which commands us to ‘do only what you want (will) everyone 
else to do, or “do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”’291 It is 
of “reciprocity” and “fairness” that are one of the basic ingredients of a 
healthy society in which cooperation works, as Axelrod’s theory suggests. 
 The post-modern world is much more associated with common and 
public goods, the “golden rule” and Kant’s “categorical imperative”. Because 
this world is a sphere of cooperation and a positive peace, in the light of 
common and public goods for all humanity, it is better that this sphere will 
expand. Then, international/regional institutions and organisations are the 
means to carry out the expansion, since they are the public actors in the 
international community that can be detached from individual-national 
interests. The major tasks of the post-modern world are to condition their 
                                            
291 Kreeft, Peter. (2003). The Modern Scholar Great Professors Teaching 
You!: Ethics: A History of Moral Thought (The course guide of the audio 
book). Recorded Books LLC. p.70. 
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external environments in the way that the states in the worlds do not need to 
constantly engage in strategic choices and policies and to shift the value 
systems of the pre-modern and modern world to the post-modern value 
system. Values cannot change overnight. The value change requires a 
prolonged process in which trials and failures are inevitable. 
 The Helsinki/CSCE/OSCE process is just such a process. Its vocation 
has been set to bridge the East and the West under the roof of the norms, 
practices, principles and values of the post-modern world which connect to 
the concept of international peace and security based on human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. The process has been providing the 
Axelrod’s Prisoner Dilemma game for cooperation. The process lacks 
effective punishment means, so that it is hoped that the glitches will be 
mended for forming a better system for cooperation. Yet, despite its adverse 
attitudes towards the OSCE’s values, Russia has not attempted to escape 
from the organisational framework. It likes to stay in the regional organisation 
of which the raison d’être is common and public goods in the international 
community from which Russia also can get a certain portion of interests. 
Therefore, the game of cooperation/non-cooperation is going on. Then, the 
post-modern world is waiting for the pre-modern and modern worlds to learn 
a lesson that the best strategy to get the maximum benefit from the game is 
to cooperate.  
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix I: Internationally Recognized Human 
Rights 
 
The International Bill of Human Rights recognizes the rights to  
Equality of rights without discrimination (D1, D2, E2, E3, C2, C3) 
Life (D3, C6) 
Liberty and security of person (D3, C9) 
Protection against slavery (D4, C8) 
Protection against torture and cruel and inhuman punishment (D5, 
C&) 
Recognition as a person before the law (D6, C16) 
Equal protection of the law (D7, C14, C26) 
Access to legal remedies for rights violations (D8, C2) 
Protection against arbitrary arrest or detention (D9, C9) 
Hearing before an independent and impartial judiciary (D10, C14) 
Presumption of innocence (D11, C14) 
Protection against ex post facto laws (D11, C15) 
Protection of privacy, family, and home (D12, C17) 
Freedom of movement and residence (D13, C12) 
Seek asylum from persecution (D14) 
Nationality (D15) 
Marry and found a family (D16, E10, C23) 
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Own property (D17) 
Freedom of though, conscience, and religion (D18, C18) 
Freedom of opinion, expression and the press (D19, C19) 
Freedom of assembly and association (D20, C21, C22) 
Political participation (D21, C25) 
Social security (D22, E9) 
Work, under favourable conditions (D23, E6, E7) 
Free trade unions (D23, E8, C22) 
Rest and leisure (D24, E7) 
Foods, clothing, and housing (D25, E11) 
Health care and social services (D25, E12) 
Special protection for children (D25, E10, C24) 
Education (D26, E13, E14) 
Participation in cultural life (D27, E15) 
A social and international order needed to realize rights (D28) 
Self-determination (E1, C1) 
Humane treatment when detained or imprisoned (C10) 
Protection against debtor’s prison (C11) 
Protection against arbitrary expulsion of aliens (C13) 
Protection against advocacy of racial or religious hatred (C20) 
Protection of minority culture (C27) 
 
Note: Includes all rights enumerated in two of the three documents of 
the International Bill of Human Rights or having a full article one 
document.  The source of each rights is indicated in parentheses, by 
document and article number. Abbreviations: D, Universal 
Declaration of Human rights, E, International Covenant on Economic, 
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Social and Cultural Rights; C, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
 
Source: ‘Table 1’ in: Donnelly, Jack. (1995). ‘State Sovereignty and 
International intervention: The Case of Human Rights’. In: Lyons, 
Gene M., and Michael Mastanduno [eds.]. Beyond Westphalia?: State 
Sovereignty and International Intervention. Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. p.117 
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Appendix II: The Helsinki Final Act: Basket I - 
The “Decalogue”  
1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty,  
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force,  
3. Inviolability of frontiers,  
4. Territorial integrity of States,  
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes,  
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs,  
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including 
the freedom of though, conscience, religion or belief,  
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples,  
9. Co-operation among States, and  
10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.  
                                                                                                     
                                                                                               
See: OSCE. (2000). Kemp, Walter., Michal Olejarnik, Victor-Yves 
Ghebali, Andrei Andeosov and Keith Jinks, eds. OSCE Handbook. 
(PDF version). p.10. 
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